would be the fourth, four things being analogous. But if three tilings are analo¬ gous of which the soul is the middle, it is not simply the middle of essence and generation, but of an essence which is entirely unbegotten, and of an essence Incoming to be partible about bodies, being itself an essence w hich is both im¬ partible, and becomng to he partible, yet not about bodies, but liecoining to 1m* partible by itself, and being not at all in want of bodies, in order to be that which it is. To consist also of both these is adapted to the soul, not only, as some sav, liecausc it subsists at» a medium W tween both, but because it is both, being impart- ibles ironically, but partible* |uiradigmutirully. For it possesses the reasons of both. All things, then fore, subsist in it co-ordiliati ly. Since, however, intellect is all things, and the sensible nature is all things, Plato adds, “ in the middle” showing by this how all things are to he assumed m the soul, vi/. in a middle way, and neillu r primarily, nor according to the I ist mode of .subsistence.
Again, after another iiiuuiut also, the essence of (he soul consists of both, as Wing produced by the whole demiurgic intellect, in which impartible* and parti¬ ble* subsist paradigmatic.illy and according to cause. Since, however, [the inundauej intellect also proceeds according to the whole of this intellect, the words “ in the middle" manifest the peculiarity of the psychical hypostasis. And how is it possible that the words “he vun^lcd, should not W* adapted to the essence of the soul, not only bei ause the impartible and partible of it subsist according to union, similar to the mode m which the things that are mingled proceed through each other, but also W-cause the peculiarity of life accords w ith the soul, and the IVmiiirgus* constitute* the soul m conjunction with the vivilie (bidders, and mingles the genera of it ill the ( 'rater. Further still, the wold middle shows “that the soul constitutes its* If, and doe* not alone sustain from the dc miurgU energy, the mixture of the genera ill each other, a* if it were a certain passion.' The words likewise " aJ'urm uf ijocmcy,” sullii a nl 1 y indii ate to u* the comprehension of cllecls 111 t li< IT causes. I'or if essence in the I >i mini gus I* a genus, hut III the soul a form or species, the former is comprehensive of the latter. But it may be called a genu* as W ing exempt from the form of the soul, and generating it. And by W ing exempt, indeed, it ditlers from the co-ordinated genera that are m species ; lint by generating this form, it transcend* tilings that are heterogeneous. For these are unprolilic of genera. After another manner, therefore, these genera and sjM-cies must Ik* assumed. For they are prolific, full of power, comprehensive of individual forms, and have an exempt nature. (>einis, therefore, is the essence
* I he Mvnli, uti •> h.ftuivpy ■-» are Mauling in ibe original.
1 t"riv here, irml
* Ltomcui Tliumau* ba* omitted to tranuldtc tile whole of thil siiiUnir.
non* hi.]
TiM.iirs or im.ato.
in the Pemiurgus ; hut the form or species of this, is the impartible essence. The essence likewise, which is the medium between the impartible essence, and that whii h is divi'ihlo about bodies, is the second form. Hut the third is that which is partible about body. And the last is the corporeal-formed nature. For in these forms there an the prior and the posterior; liecau.sc the genera produce anti give subsistence to the first, middle and last forms. And the whole intellectual essence indeed is impartible as one; that which is partible about bodies, is mul¬ tiplied on account of its distribution about them; and the medium between these is one and not one. For intellect has one essence, one sameness ami one ditler- cure, so far as it is intellect. Hut the parts of the whole soul from which it is composed are many, and adapted to each other. In each of these parts, also, there are essence, same, ami different; and there arc as many essences, same- nrsM s, and difli retires as there are parts. Tin se parts, likewise, are inched num¬ bered, vet are at the same time many, and each of them is one and not' one, but intellect is one essence, one sameness, ami one ditlermce. And tbe nature which is partible about bodies, has one of these in tins place, but another in that, lx ing co-divided with its subjects, just as body itself is not merely divisible into many, but into infinite parts. Hut the soul being divided, into tbe essence of many things, possesses also union, having an hypostasis separate from bodies. .So that again, there are here two media, between truly existing essence, and that which is truly generation, and lietwern the iinpariibilitv of the former, and the infinite divisibility of the latter, viz the soul, and the essence which is partible about bodies, and which is not the same with this generation truly so called. And soul indeed, is in a greater degree impartible, in consequence of verging to itself; but the essence which is divisible about bodies, is,in a greater degree, partible, liecause it lielongs to another thing, and does not subsist iroin itself. Flato therefore says, that the soul consists of this, and the impartible essence, because it is a medium between tilings which are entirely exempt from bodies, and those w hich are merged m bodies, and between tilings which subsist from themselves*, and those which lxdong to others, so that it both subsists from itself and pertains toothers.
By no means, therefore, must we say that it is a medium in such a way as to have something incorporeal, and something corporeal, as Eratosthenes appre¬ hended, or ascribe with Severus geometrical interval to the essence of it. For a mixture can never be effected of that which is without, and that which possesses interval, and of the impartible and body : for neither can there lie a mixture of \\ a point and a line. But if there ran lx- no mixture of the impartible and a line,
' Ov i* omitted 10 the original.
Procm's on Thr
much less ran there l>c n mixture of it with n certain other dimension [viz. the dimension of depth]. For that which is triply partible, is more distant from the impartible, than that which is partible in one way only. We say, however, that th«* intellectual essence always remains one, that the partible consists of many essences, and that the psychical i-. one, and not one, so as to preserve the one in Iwing multiplied, and multitude in being united. For the Demiurgiis did not so divide it, a-> to consume the whole in the division, but preserved the one of it in t he multiplication, and the whole in the divisiun of it. Nor is this wonderful, since in bodies, likewise, all which are partible, there is, as the Flean "in-st or stranger *a\ ■*, a certain one wlm h is connective of the parts. And Aristotle also asserts that in partible n ilures there is something impartible; so that the soul will much more remain a whole and one, when multiplied and divided lienee, like¬ wise, it is impartible, as Tun eus says. lint it tin* one of it was not 1 preserved, it would lie alone partible: ju>t, for instance, as it y oil should say that the dianoe- tic and dove tic powers of tin: soul, are two essences, ami yet at the same time the whole soul is one tiling which energizes dianoetically and dov.istically, in consequence of converging to itself. \\ e tin refort In ing impi lied from w hat Plato liims ll'savs, thus interpret the impartible and the partible essence.
Of those, however, prior to us, ami who make tin* essence of the soul to he inatheruntieul, as being a medium between natural and supernatural things, some asserting that it is number make it to consist of the monad as impartible, and the indefinite du.id as partible. Hut otln rs, considering it as a geometrical hypostasis, assert that it consists of a point and interval, the former being impartible, but the latter partible. Aristander, N'limenius, and their followers, and many other of the interpreters, arc of the former opinion, but Scv crus is of the second. Others, again, as Plutarch and \ttu us, survey ing the physieal esst nee, say, that the irra¬ tional part which precedes [in the ordi r of physical theory] the rational part, is tin- partible essence; but the divine part of the soul, the impartible. And they make the rational essence to consist of the two, of the latter, as that which adorns, and of the former as a subject. They likewise s.iv, that the soul is unhegotten according to its essence, but generated according to its form. Others, however, as Plotinus, who consider the words of Plato in a more philosophic manner, sav, that tin- soul is a medium between intellect and sense, the former being impartible, but the latter divisiblc about bodies. Hut others proceeding higher, and placing two intellects prior to the soul, one possessing the ideas of wholes, but the other of partial natures, >ay that the soul is the medium between these as
* Mi? ii oniittid in tlic original
noo* in.]
TiM.Kl S OF PLATO.
I r,
«lrn\ ing it* subsistence Imm both. I'or thus Thi'minnis, the Ashm an, says, who f*>un<i llus opinion in Porphyry as «l<-ri\•■(! from tin' Persian*. These things* therefore, Antoninus ivluti-s who was i|ii* dis< iph* of Ainmuiiiiis. To the first of tlir-s-**, Imwcv. r. k must lx- said, that since Plato dors not make the soul to lie iiuiiiIht, it IS alisunl to investigate the principles of mimhi-r of which the soul consists. Hut to the second, that Plato says the soul is incorporeal when com¬ pared with every body, and that it has a self-motive essence; hut that nothing which possrsses interval is a tiling of this kind. To the third it must he said, that IMato is not of opinion that the irrational is more ancient than the rational part. Tor divinity, as he says, did not think lit that the more ancient should In* governed by the junior nature. To the fourth, tiiat the discussion is not concern- “ ing the psychical knowledge, hut the psychical essence. And hence it is not pro¬ per to say, that the soul is a medium between the two gnostic powers, the intellectual and the sensitive. And to the fifth, that every intellect is unbegotten, and separate from bodies. Hut IMato calls the soul a partible and generated essence, giving it a division opposite to the essence which subsists with invariable sameness, ami to that which is partible about bodies, and separating it from tho essence w hich is external to bodies, and always is. As these particulars, however, have lieen siilu iently discussed, let us consider w hat follows.
“ And again alter the same manner, with respect to the nature of same and the nature of different, he constituted the soul in the middle of the impartibilitv of these, and of the nature which is divisible about bodies.”
Essence, as we have said, lias the first oirhrin the genera, because it is as it were, the Vesta of being. Sameness, therefore, has the second ; and difference, the third ordi r. for some consider difference as having a dignity snjwrior to sanii ness. Hut IMato, in what he before said, has < learly evinced that the similar is better than the dissimilar; and now assuming sameness after essence, directly givt s it the preference to difference. And as we have said that the middle essence is inferior to the intellectual essence, lint transcends that which is divisible about body, thus also we say that the sameness of the soul is inferior to the impartible, but is more united than the partible sameness, and in a similar manner with resjK ct to diffen nee. Hence in the essence of intellect, the sameness, being one* collects itself, and also the essential difference, to the essence which is there, and is one; just as the difference lieing one, separates itself, nnd the essence and same¬ ness from each other. Hut m the soul sameness collects into one the differences
[hook III.