says the theulogist concerning the Titans; just as Timms also divides the soul into seven parts. Perhaps too lie reminds us of the Orphic' 'V itamc distribu¬ tion into parts, when he says that the soul is extend, d* through the whole world ; through which the soul not only circularly covers the universe as with a veil, but likewise is extended through the whole ot it. Hence, Plato very properly calls the essence which is proximat. lv above soul, impartible. Anil, in short, he thus denominates the intellect which is participated by the soul, tallow ing the Orphic fables, and wishing to he as it were, the interpreter of arcane and mystical assertions. Returning, therefore, to the words ol Plato, it is necessary to show that what has been before said a< cords with his conceptions.
These things, however, being discussed by us, it is wonderful, since intellect is an impartible cs-ence, how Parmenides in the second' hypothesis, distributes leina into infinite parts, ami together with bang, (be cue ; as it is acknowledged by nearly all the interpreters that the subject of that hypothesis, is the nature that is lieyond souls. Or may it not lie said, that the distribution into parts which is there spoken of, signifies the progression of the many unities 4 from the one bi ing [or being characterized by the one), these unities proceeding in a well-ordered manner from their proper principles, into an appropriate multitude ? Plato, how¬ ever, does not intend to signify that the one being derives its completion Irom these many unities, in the same manner as he say s, that soul being one, has a multitude which terminates in it. But his meaning is that the one bang precedes the many unities and at the same time beings, and that the multitude ol these is subordinate to it; and also that both utiical and all i“>v ntial number, are causally comprehended in it; just as in this dialogue he calls animal itself one whole, hut
' t or re nratitr<u p^apuv, re. O^uou a.o/n^M., in lh«S » “<* d h 'p" h a U
ftlV 1 . X«
1 til Wad of rtraypti rjr here, U is neiesjary lo read Ttraptvnv.
‘ For r,„ ...nrvhm, .1 in ueces>arv to riad r.,e tevr.pa,. For the whole progression of true Wing „ diNcuNM'.i in the second hypolhesis of ihe Parmenides. See ruy translation of .1, and ihe Holes on it.
4 Instead of ruWwr oi oiyruy in this plaee, it is requisite to rt^if ou^wi.
tim t;us or plato.
the four ideas the parts of it; animal itself not deriving its completion from them, hut they being comprehended in it, as distributing by the multitude of themselves the monad of that one bring, each of them having the power of a part of it, hut all of them not being equivalent to the whole monad of it. For thus also both numbers, the unical and the essential, are parts of that one l>eiiig [discussed m the Parmenides] not being completive of i*, so as that it consists of each of these. And thus much in answer to this doubt; hut let us proceed to the words betore us.'
“ From an essence always impartible and subsisting with invariable sameness, and again, from an essence which is becoming to be partible about bodies, he mingled from both a middle form of essence.”
That by the one impartible essence, Plato means the intellectual essence, which in the whole of itself participates of eternity, and by the essence which is partible about bodies, that wbieli is ms, parable from corporeal masses, and is allotted its hy- parxis in the whole of time, he manifests by saying that the former of these “ subsists ith invariable sameness," and by denominating the latter “ that which is becoming to he in order that lie may not only call the soul impartible and at the same time partible, hut abo inti Uigible, and the first of gem rated natures. For an eternal perpetuity is one thing ; but that whir li subsists according to temporal infinity is another,having its hypustasis in extension; and that is another which is mixed from both, such as is the perpetuity of the sou). For the soul is immoveable indeed ac¬ cording to essence, but is moved according to intellections, and is i ternal according to the former, but temporal according to the latter. It is likewise evident, that the .soul necessarily has something of this kind according to liyparxis, or she would not exhibit in her natural energies, the peculiarity of genera*',,n, and temporal extension. And it appears to me that Plato in an ndmirahli manner perceiving this says, that the Pemiurgus not only made the soul a medium between the impartible essence, and the essence which is partible about bodies, hut abo that \ ^ he made it a medium between the essence which subsists with invariable same- / ness, and that which is generated, or becoming to l»e. For how could lie appro¬ priately w rite the Psyrhogony,’ if there was neither generation, nor composition in the soul? How also would it be possible to take away parts from that which
1 Leonii u* Tliomxus lias omitleii to traii'lafe the whole of what 11 here said about the supermundane »oul, bcpiiiiimg (Yon, the wool', *' IIV think it it rrquiutt,’' ami ending with the ,above paragraph.
* ». c. (Jonitrmug the generation of the *oi»I.
w essentially impartible ( For of simple natures there is not any generation what¬ ever. And even such forms as are material, are without generation and corrup¬ tion, as Aristotle says. For through their simplicity, they preserve in the last of things, the peculiarity of the first forms. It i> possible, however, to deliver in words the generation of things which receive any hind of composition. In order therefore, that lie might demonstrate these things which are very properly circu¬ lated about the soul, he calls it the medium between the eternal and the generated li \ postasis.
Prior to this, however, we should ratlu r make tin* following division ; that it is necessary with rcspectto the impartible and partible.cither that hotli should he prior to the soul, or both posterior to the soul, or hoth in the soul; or that the one should Ik* prior, hut the other posterior to the soul. Hoth, therefore, will not lie prior to the soul since the soul is hi tter than the partible life ' w liieh is rising into existence; [for she has a nature separate from bodies, but the partible life is merged in bodies. IS or is it fit to say that hoth are posterior to the soul:] * for the impartible essence is eternal, and subsists with invariable sameness. Hut the soul is not entirely eternal, since, as he s,i\s in the I,aw s, .she pai ticipates of generation. IN or are both in tin* soul; because it is impossible for all tlie.se which difler from ca< h other, to give completion to one thing; viz. for the inseparable and the separate from bodies, the unbegntten and the generated. Hence it remains, that the one which is more excellent should he prior, lint that the other which is less excellent should he posterior to it Sinee, however, these subsist about it, it is necessary as it does not consist of these, that it should consist of tilings analogous to them, which either have a subsistence separate from each other, or mingled together. But it is impossible that it should consist of them s» parale from each other: fur Plato elf-arly says, that these are mingled logellu r. Hence it is neces¬ sary that the essential part of the soul should consist from the mixture of these. And since in the soul one thing is better, hut another worse, that which is impar¬ tible m it [is h*ss excellent than the impartible prior to it, and that which is partible in it] * is better Ilian the partible nature which is posterior to it. For Wing a medium, it has that w hich is more excellent, in an inferior manner, hut that which is less excellent, in a superior manner. And this indeed is evident
1 &wi)i is omitted in the original.
* The words wiihiu the brackets are added from the version of Thomrus, being omitted in the onglbdl.
J Here likewise, the words within the brackets, are wanting in the original, and are supplied from the .ersion of Thomaus. So that in the original after ro puy aptp.orty, it is necessary to add, yripny t[ft row *po avnji nptpiorov, to It pitpiaroy.
hook ill ]
TIM/T.rs Ol PLATO
snce it iloos not consist of these very tilings themselves, Imt' of others that are analogous to them.
But that the essence of the soul lines not consist of those, as giving completion to it, is evident. For again let us make this ury tiling the subject of considera¬ tion. In the first place, tin refort t how is it possible for the impartible to Ik* mingled vv ith the partible, and the eternal w itli the generated ; for these are in a cer¬ tain respect contrary to, and most remote Irom each other, so that as we hare In-fore said, the\ can by no means be conjoined vv itli each other. In the second place, shall we not make the soul posterior and secondary to the things that are in it, * and the essence inseparable from body more ancient than that which ^separate, if it consists of an essence which is divided about bodies? Farther still^iow can the soul lie justly said to be a third thing ; for that which is a third tiling is e\ idently so in conjunction with the other two, which are preserved and not corrupted, lhit things that are mingled together, are no longer themselves, but a certain other tiling, and not a third tiling is produced from them. For they themselves have no i \istenee, but are corrupted through the mixture. 'Again, if the Demiurgus taking a portion of the impartible constituted the soul, that which is said to lie an impartible essence will no longer he so. l'nr how can any one take away a part of it, if it is impartible ? But if he consumed the whole of the impartible in the essence of the soul, he will no longer he beneficent, in eonseipieuee of consuming' more divine natures, which are nearer to himself and are more causal, into the hypostasis of less excellent natures. In addition to these things alsoj if the soul derives its romplelion from a generated partible nature, that partible nature will not only be divisible about bodies, but likewise about the soul. Hence the impar¬ tible itself, and the partible itself do not, as some fancy, give completion to the soul; hut that winch is asserted by Plato is true, that the Demiurgus from the impartible essence, and from that which is partible about bodies, mingled a middle form of essence. So that the same thing is partible indeed, as with reference to that which is impartible, hut impartible with reference to that which is partible, and truly affords us the middle nature of the soul.
Moreover, this third thing itself, exhibits to us the nature of analogy iiiexistent in tbe soul. For if the same thing is both the middle and the third, but ibis is as the first,and is also as the last, the soul is at one and the same time, tin* iirst and the last; which analogy is naturally adapted to effect in the most beautiful manner. And if this third tiling is also the middle, it w ill evidently, since it is one thing, be the mid¬ dle of two certain extremes, and not a middle together with another thing. For it
Tim. Plat .
1 V\A’ it it.uiling lure m liie original.
* I "»r fierur III lliis Jil.it c, rrltd rir’ uvry,
Proclus Os the
Fbook hi.