tuated on each side of it, lint that it is not the medium lietween every intellectual and corporeal essence. For it is not the medium of partial intellects, and the forms which are distributed in the parts of the universe. It is likewise the peculiarity of the soul of the universe, neither to consist of numbers, nor ot these or those reasons, nor of so many circles. For all these ami other things, are common to every div ine, du-moniaral, and human soul. llut the Juculiuritji of it is, fur the essence of it, to he the medium between the following i rtrentes, xiz.thc out mundane mUlUet , and the whole cf the partible essence which is distributed about bodies. \nd it is the medium ot these, not so far as mt« Meet is gnostic, or vital, nor so tar as nature is the hto ot bodies; for the discourse is not about knowledge, nor about lives ; but so far as these are certain essences, the forim i beiii” an impartible essence, but the latter an essence divisible about bodies. For on this account we also endeavour to assume both bnii^ and generation, the impartible and the partible, according to the hvparxis of the soul, disinissiii" mutations and energies, not seeking to per¬ ceive tin 1 energies of the soul, but the essence of it, which is uuh« gotten and at the same timt generated. 1
It is likewise evident, that the essential bound of it, is more unical than all the bounds that are m all other souls, and that the infinite of it is more comprehensive than all the infinites in other souls. I'or neither is every bound equal to every bound; some bounds beinjj more total, but others more partial; nor is every infinity equal to every power. So that neither is every essence equal to every essence, bill one is total, and another partial. I he essential tin relore, of the soul of the universe, is more total than iwiv psychical essence, the hound in it is the most total of all psychical hounds, and its infinity is the most total of all the infinites in souls. For the extremes of these are, the simply impartible essence, and the simply partible about bodies, not about some, but about all bodies. For the soul of tin- sun, is the mi diuiii belvvi-eii a certain impartible esscm e, (and not of the impartible iudcfuiiti ly,) and a certain partible essence, and not every essence which is divisible alumt bodies. 1‘lato, likewise, assuming this in the first place, as the peculiarity of the mundane soul, connects the remaining particulars, as be- loniiinjr to tin" discussion of a soul ot this kind, viz. number, harmony, and form. Hence the impartible must not now be said to be every intellectual essence, but only the essence of tin* mundane intellect. And in the soul of the.situ, it must he said to be the essence of the solar intellcc'., and m a similar manner in the soul of tin moon, and in all other souls. For every medium lias peculiar proximate extremes, and will be the medium of these, and not of all extremes every where.
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noon Hi.]
TIM.EL'S OF PLATO.
Tims too, darinons who are more exalted than partial souls, subsist as media between their proper intellects, and the bodies that are eonnaseeiit with them. So that Plato, if he had discussed some one ut other souls, would not have said that tin* essence of it is a medium between the impartible essence, and the essence which ;s divisible about bodies, but between this or that impartible and partible essence belonging to partial natures. Pot articles manifest the transcendent and the total, as Plato elsewhere determines, asserting that when we say the b« autiful, we manifest one thing, but another when we say lieautiful. And the former manifests the exempt, but the latter, some one of the things co-ordinate with others. \nd if you are willing to adopt here what is said by the illustrious Theodoras, intillert e without habitude, the life about bod) subsists in habitude, but the soul is the medium between the two, lieing a certain half-habitude. And according to the groat Iainbliclms, intellect indeed is exempt; the life about body, is co-arran^ed with corporeal masses; and the soul is exempt from, and at the same time co-arranged w ith the corporeal life. livery intellect, therefore, is impartil>le, as having cne essence, one sameness, and one ililfen nee, of which it wholly consi-ts. Put every soul is partible, because earh mixture of the elements in it of which it consists, is divided into many parts, each of which is compounded of all the ni'in rn ; so that there are many essences in each mixture, many same¬ nesses, and many differences, which arc co-divided together with the parts that are in it. What the parts are however, and bow many, he demonstrates to us, bv using media, and sections through sesrpiioctavcs, and leimmas, as will 1 m* manifest as we proceed.
Moreover, this is evident, that, we say that intellect so Jar as it is intillict, is im¬ partible, conceiving that the multitude rj'forms though tin 1 / arc in it, arc (liferent from it; and that the soul, so far as it is soul, is partible, not surveying at the same time the forms that are in if, but solely looking to the psychical essence, and abo to the intellectual essence, and to ca< h separate fiom the other. Hence the intellect which is participated by the soul, is call* d by Plato an impartible essence ; but the corporeal j armed life which proceeds from the soul, and has the rela¬ tion of splendour to it, is said by him to be divisible about bodies. For intellect, indeed, is analogous to the sun, soul to the light proceeding from the sun, and the partible life to the splendour from the light. Very properly, therefore, do we conceive these assertions to be more accurate than the former; because it is necessary that the Demiurgus should be the lord of every impartible, ami of every partible essence,' in order that the recipient may have a place, that the nature w hich consists of
1 Oveiat it onultcd 10 tbc original.
f DO OK 111.
So
both may lx' mingled, and all such other particulars may be effected, as Plato adduces in what follows. Iamhlirlms, therefore, and together with him Theodo- doms, refer what is here said to the supermundane soul; but we are of opinion, that Tinnius generates through these things the soul of the universe, as the words also manifest.
We think it requisite however, that the lovers of contemplation, should inves¬ tigate what the partible and tin impartible are 1 in the supermundane soul For a supermundane intellect is seated above everv soul, lhit what is the partible in the supermundane soul * For c< rlain sensible bodies are not suspended from such soul-,. For as the\ are siip» riiiimdaiie, the re\er>e of what takes place in human souls is true* of them ; sinc e bodies are suspended from t n< h of the latter, through whic h also they are mundane. Hut a pe c uliar intellee i is nut established above them, on winch account they do not alw ays perceive intellectually, llodies, how¬ ever, are suspend* d from all the souls that arc between human !l, »d supermundane souls. Hence also they are mundane, !»eing more redundant than supermundane souls hv the* connexion of body. And there is a peculiar intellect from w liieh they arc* suspended, on whic h ac count likewise* they an* not always in the* intelligible. For the immoveable* is effecti\e of eternal e nergy. Hence since the extremes, viz. supermundane and mundane souls, bare a contrary mode* of subsistence*, and as it would -c*c in, flu* lath r be mg deficient according to the- partible*, but the former exceeding according to the impartible ;—this be ing the case, we say that the* part¬ ible of supermundane souls, is not that wbic li is di\idl'd about bodies, but about the mundane sends 1 themselves. For they proximate ly transcend these, just as mundane souls transcend the partible essence which subsists about bodies. Hence* the supermundane* souls aie* media hetvvee n intelh e'ts and mundane souls ; intel¬ lects baring a subsistenc e* unmingled w ith body, but mundane souls, transition in intelle-etions. But the impart Hit t*f hut/ian souls, so Jar as there is a thing of this haul in them, is ui tin souls that are above them, which are a heaps intellective, from v hieh human souls are suspcndi it, anil oj which they at a certain time participate, as fur as thei / are able. Fur through these, as media, thep arc lihtuise conjoined with the intellects that an above souls, and become intelh tual.
These, howe\e*r,’as we* have saiel, be mg th* e xtremes, all the intermediate souls have a jx*ciiliar impartibilitv and partibility, w hether the-y have* a divine or elie mo- niacnl allotment ; rational ehemnus, and prior to these the soul of the unive rse*, be mg me din be*tween the w hole* mundane* intellect which has an impartible essence,
1 Tin tennis n ro «ui arc omitted in the original,
i'l yiui it omitted in the original.
ami the partible essence which sulisists aliout bodies. And we assert these things looking to all that has been Indore said, through which we have manifested the trutii of them, from the words themselves ol Plato and not from our own concep¬ tions. Fur by those :■ ho raison from the [Chaldean] Oracles, it must be said that supermundane souls ride in certain supermundane ethereal and empyrean bodies. Or how could those bodies lie moved unless souls moved them in a manner more divine than that of mundane souls ? But if this l»e "ranted, it may also be admitted that partial souls have an impartible intellectual essence above them, and one certain power nf intellect, which illuminates similar souls ; and that on this account they are partial, and intellective at a certain time, the souls which are suspended from each total intellect being alone a In ays intellective.
Farther still, in order that these things may accord with the Orphic doctrines, we must say, that Orpheus does not predicate the impartible of every intelligible, or intellectual order, but that according to him there is something sujierior to this appellation, just as other natures are more excellent than other names. For he does not adapt the appellations of king and father to all the [divine] orders. Where then shall we first see the impartible according to him, in order that we may apprehend the divinely inspired ' conception of l*lato? Orpheus, therefore, establishing a Demiiirgus * of all-divided fabrication, analogous to the one father who unfolds into light the total fabrication, produces from him the whole mun¬ dane intellectual multitude, tin* numlwr of souls. and corporeal natures; this JD< miurgus generating all these unitedly, hut the Gods that surround him, dividing and separating his fabrications. He says, however, that all the other fabrications of the God, were distributed into parts by the deities who are of a dividing cha¬ racteristic ; but that the heart alone was undivided through the providence of Minerva. For since he constituted intellects, souls, and bodies, but souls and bodies receive much division and s« paration into parts in themselves, and intellect remains united and indivisible, Iiemg all things m one, and comprehending intel¬ ligible wholes in one intellection;—hence he says, that the intellectual essence alone, and the intellectual numlier, were left preserved by Minerva. For he savs,
l lie ini* Ilecttial licart alone remain'd.
Clearly calling it intellectual. If therefore the imdividl’d heart is intellectual, it will evidently he intellect and an intellectual iiiiidIht, yet not every intellect, but that which is mundane, l or this is the undivided heart; since of this also the
1 For rtflr> brre, rtad trOtor.
* i. r. IWchut.
PKOCLUS ON Tin:
[rook mi.
divided God was the Demiurgus. Orpheus, therefore, calls the intellect of Bac¬ chus, the impartible essence of the God. But he denominates his genitals, the life which is divisible about body ; this lieing physical and productive of seeds. This also he says Diana, who presides over all tin* generation in nature, and ob- stetrieatrs physical reasons, extends as far as to the subterranean realms, distribu¬ tin'.,' the prolific power of Baet Inis. But all the remaining body of the God, forms the psychical composition, this likewise being divided into seven parts.
All ibe scuii |i irti tlii\ scat lei <1 ol itic bo\ ,