cipates of then! to be a tiling of this kind. Plato, therefore, from these genera con¬ stitutes the psychical essence, producing in the first place the subject 1 of this essence from the ini<h!le genera. l'or as we have said of the elements, that all of them are in the heavens, in the sulilunary region, anil under the earth, and that all things consist indeed of the four, yet not of the same elements, but hea\en of the summits of them, generation ot the second, and the subterranean regions of the last procession of the elements; thus all things consist indeed of these genera ; but intelligible* of such of them as are first, impartible, immmcahle anil entire ; self-inutile natures, of such as are’ both impartible and partible; and eorporeal- formcd natures, of such as are partible. l'or such as are the genera, such also are the essences, Impartihh natures, hmicicr, precede those that are impartible, and at the same time partible ; and the lath r precedi partible natures, l or the im¬ partible is nearer to tlu mu ; since it is impartible on account of union. Since therefore the p»\ i local issi nee has been shown to be the inedmm of beings, it ierv propel I v consists ol the nmldli* genera of being, \ i/. ot essence, same, and ditlerent [of a middle charai teristic 1 . l'or I’l ito in the Pha*drus complicating: the powers denied from these, denominates them a charioteer and horses; because the existence of the soul is defined bv these. lint we may survey permanency and motion m the energies of the soul. l'or permanency and motion are in tlx* essence of it. l’or it constitutes itself, abides ami proceeds, and is eternal ; motion and |h*rmanericv being superior to sameness and difference. For it abides m eternal natures according to permanency, and proceeds, In ing inured. Hut through progression it is separated into united multitude. The genera of being however, are more c learly seen m tin energies of tin* soul.
You may also say that Tima us ill constituting the essence of the soul, after ano¬ ther manner assumes motion and permanency prior to sameness anil difference. For the soul is not only the medium between the impartible and the partible essence, but also between the essence which always subsists with invariable sameness, and that which is in generation, or becoming to In*. Hence, through subsisting with invariable sameness, if participates of permanency according to its essentiality, but through lieing generated, of motion. Unless it should In- said, that because same and different appropriately belong to the Demiurgus, Tiina-u* delivers a precedaneous generation of these. \\ hat then is the charac¬ teristic of each of the middle genera 1 .May w< not say, that since essence con¬ sists of hound and infinity, when the former vanquishes the lath r, it produces the
* l'or virtp** mu' lirrr, riMil vroktiji* toy.
1 lor ru avTvkinim, uvTutv ufufnrrw vat furptGr** here, it is ilfCCSMiry to read ra it avTGkirrjru
c k rwr ufitpiOTW tui fupiOTwr •
Look 111.]
TIM l'US OF PLATO.
impartible essence; but that when infinity vanquishes bound, it produces the partible essence ; and that when the power of these two is equal, they produce the middle essence? And a^ain, wlo-n sameness vanquishes dill* fence, it makes an impartible; but when dillerence vanquishes sameness, a partible saim ness and dillerence: and win u the power of each is equal, they produce a sameness and dillerence of a middle nature. When likewise permancuev vanquishes motion, an impartible, but when motion subdues permanency, a partible; and when the power of each is equal, a middle motion and permanency is produced. Since however, sameness and dillerence eousis) o| both these [i. e. oi hound and infinity] it is necessary that m these also, either bound should have dominion or infinity, or that tin power ol’earh should Is* equal ; ami thus that eithei an imparti¬ ble, or a partible, or a middle sameness and dillereuee should 1 m* elli •< t< d And the like must also necessarily taki place m motion and permanency. For every hyparxis, power, and energy, are from both these; ami are either characterized by bound, or by infinity, or not by one of these more than the other. Hence the whole of the intelligible and intellectual breadth, 1 is said to be hound, and to be in siieb a manner the Mime, as to render it necessarv to inquire whether there is dif/i rent e in it; and also to be in siieb a wav permanent, as to render it dubious whether it lias any iutelleetual motion, lint every coiporeal-lbrmed nature is allied to infinity, to dilierenee, and to motion. And souls exhibit alone and the same tilin', multitude and union, that wbieli is stable, and that which is moved* For there i i. e. m intelligible and iutelleetual natures] the essence is one in each intellect; but in soul, then* i> one and not one essence in each. For tin re are many cs.u nets in tier// soul, and ns mum/ us the parts into uhie/i etich may In divided. And as body bane; partible may In divided into infinites, souls [on the contrary] are divisible into jinit < v, m the same manner as number is divisible into monads, /fan e also, soim have thought propel to rail tin soul numbt r, as divisible indeed, bat into im¬ partible*, and not into things ninth may always In lUriduf. Hence too, the impar¬ tible oi the soul is twofold, vi/. according to that which is as it were a whole, and according to the last oi tin 1 parts. ]*or every number likewise, according to its proper form, is one and impartible, but according to that w hich is as it were the matter o| it, it is partible ;‘ yet not the whole of this, hut in this also the last in which the division t< miniates, is impartible.
1 I^unit'll* I hniiia'iiv appear* from ho version to have read in his manuscript r.njrot* rnr in lliis placr, iii'U ,i»l of iMpm mi ; Iml it ii[i|if ao Iona* tlmt we should read ioqrcr on torpor xui irXfiroi. tor what I’rorluv here says, applied to every intelli^iliii* ami intelleetnal essence, hut in a tian*rcndcnt decree lo the loriner.
1 Tim* tor instance, seven monads or unit*, are as it were the matter of the number seveu, but the heptadic form proceeding from the licptad itself which siijiervciics and invests these monads, is one and impart i bie.
32 PItOCLUS ON 1'IIL [book hi.
If you are willing likewise, this may he surveyed after another manner. Since these middle genera are three, when essence vamiuishes same and different, then according to the mixture of the media, a divine soul is generated, and the more and the less in the domination, produce the extent according to breadth ofdivine souls. Hut whell sameness and at the same tune essence, vanquish difference, then an angelic soul is generated. \\ hen sain* in >s alone predominates, a da iuonia- cal soul is produced; hut when sameness toget her w ith ditfereiice, have dominion over essence, then an heroic soul is generated; and when difference alone pre¬ vails, a human soul is produced. I'or it is impossihle that the (extremes should vampiish the medium, hei use lliev cannot without it he conjoined with each other, lint according to eat h of the mixtures, the more and the h ss of the pre¬ dominating natures produce thehn adtli ol souls. 1 liese things, linvvrv* r, xxill In* mole till lx discussed elsewln re.
It ieiuaills tin r< line, ill the next place, to consider what the impartible, and also w hat the partible form of « >s* lice is. For among the more am u nt interpre¬ ters, there w as a di/lereiiee of opinion on tins subject. I h nee concerning these things, let Us fust speak more generally, hut alt* rwards, in a iiiaiim r more proxi¬ mal* to the proposed subjects ol inquiry. i or it is possible to .speak in both these ways. \\ e say, tliei <-lore, that ex cry Hit*lligilile and intellectual essence both total and partial, and which is imiuaterial and separate and prior to the eternal, or wInch is eternal, is impartible; but that all essences which proceed about bodies whethcr they are mundane 1 i\is, or natures which verge to corporeal masses, or physical reasons which are divided about the body that is void Of (piahty, ar< partible. 1 or all th* se are div isible about bodies. And some of them indeed subsist in these visible bodies and are in them as in a subje* t. Hut others have an ess* nlial subsistence, and are the forms of life, but are inseparable from bodies, as nature. And others are distributed into parts imbed, but collect themselves into tin* impartible, as sense. And if you are willing, you may say that the impartible essence is triple, subsisting according to being, according to life, and according to intellection. And the essence which subsists according sensible perception, is instead of intellection ; that which subsists according to nature, is instead o! lif* ; and that which subsists according to the forms that are div id« d about the bulks of bodies, is instead of 1 m ing. Fur the three latter being images of the three former have a subsistence contrary to them with respect to their order to each other. Hut the media between these are the being, life, and intellei ti*ui in souls, w Inch preserve the order of the natur* s prior to tin m, through a .similitude to them, but have a distribution into parts equal 1 to the natures that
* I r«jm ill*' version ill 1 .1-011 it US Tiioma lit, lllstrllil of roe £t fitfuouvv yen;, roil fitru ruvra in
this place, it appears vo sliouM re.nl ^tlie seieo also requiring lllis tinemlalion) roe £e fir^te/wv ru ifu>v r C/i* prart vru.
IIM/UJS <>i PLATO
.Tl
are posterior to them. Wn must therefore give a triple division to all things, ami thus dividing, we must arrange the psychical essence Ix-twecn the impartible and the partible nature, as being the imago of the former, but the paradigm of the latter; and as abiding and at the same time proceeding ; as simple and compo¬ site ; and as exempt from, and co-arranged with the corporeal essence. I’or the appropriate middle nature of it, presents itself to the view according to all these. And thus in a general way we may admit every essence lietwoen the one and the soul to be impartible, and every essence between the soul and bodies to be partible.
If, however, it lx* requisite to define the partible and the impartible in a more proximate manner, we must speak as follows: The Demiurgus constituted the universe an animal, animated and endued with intellect, conceiving that the animated is better than the inanimate, and tin: intellectual than that which is deprived of intellect. Hence there is in it a corporcal-forined life, according to which it is an animal: for being bound with animated bonds, it became an animal. The soul itself however, is not mingled with body. For the opinion that it is, Socrates also reprobates in the Pir.edrus. Hut the soul is divine, ac¬ cording to which the universe is animated, having indeed a connascent life, and having likewise a separate life. Then: is also in it, an immaterial 1 and divine intellect. For it is necessary to call this an essential intellect, hut not 1 an intellect which subsists as a habit of the soul. For the Demiurgus did not con¬ stitute the latter, hut the soul, according to the motion of itself about the intelli¬ gible, as Tinueiis afterwards says. So that the universe has a triple life, viz. cnrporeal-formed, psychical, and intellectual. And the intellectual life of it, indeed, is impai tihle, as lx*ing eternal, as at once comprehending rverv intelligible, as immoveable, and as united, according to a supreme transcendency of secondary natures. Hut the cnrporenl-formed life is partible, as proceeding about corporeal masses, being mingled with body, and verging to subjects. And the psychical life is tliig middle lietvveen both, transcending the latter through a separate subsistence ; through circularly covering externally as with a veil the hulk of the universe, as has been saitl, and will he again asserted in what follows; through being extended to intellect, and yet again being inferior to it; through jierceiv ing intellectually in time; through evolving the impartiality of the intellectual life; and through in a certain respect coining into contact with body. Plato, however, by constituting the mundane eoul from these media, manifests that it is a medium lietwecu the natures that are si-
1 For nvrot here, it is necessary to read «vXm.
* For aAXo ^njr here, it u necessary to read aXX’ cv.
Tun. Plat.
PKOCLUS ON Till: