These things being discussed, it i' necessary in the next place to show, how, and from what genera this soul, which contains the bond of beings, subsists. Ihit it is more necessary to speak first about the genera themselves, what they are, whence they proceed, and how. For it is requisite to know wholes prior to parts. This therefore, is the fourth of I he things proposed, and we shall discuss it to the utmost ot our ability. That the tnt< lligihle world therefore, coiupn h< mis the causes of secotidarv natures, and that .ill tonus are there, intelligibly or intel¬ lectually, or in whatever way you may he willing to call them, lor they subsist ill both wavs, has been ih inonstratecl in many treatises, and will lie ih moiistrated by Plato in what follows. Of forms themselves however, some are most total, and extend to every thing. Others ire most partial, and are as it were atomic forms. ,\nd ollu rs siihsist hi tween these, extending to many, but not to nil things; as the plena guest or stranger likewise shows in the Soplusta. lor mail is Iroui man itselt, and horse is Iroiu horse itsi it l>ut the sum u "ha s is in men and horses, and in many other things, is Irom similitude itself; and m like manner the dissimilar. Dillerenei*, and sameness however, vvlueh me m all Iwings, are from the sameness and ditlennee which are there Hence some things are from atoime forms, otla rs Iroiu middle, and others trom the most total forms; since also of the sciences which me hi us, same look to one scnuliju object, as medicine to health, hut othii's extend to many, as ant him lie to philosophy, to polities, to the teetonu science, and to main / ot hit's. And this is not only the ease utth arithmetic, hut also with the nnasuninf science, and tilth statics, l'ur Plato says, that uthcr all ot some of the fiihriaiticc arts, regime the assistance oj these, and without these have no accuracy, lint others look to all the aits, and not to those that arefahricatire alone , but to such also as contribute to the contemplative sciences, ax is the case with the dmdtuy ait, as Socrates says in the Plnlehiis. As therefore in the st a net s there are some that are most total, so m inti lligible causes, some are most partial, so tar ns the [initial is III them, and are the leadeis of appropriate numbers ot similar tonus; but others are widely extended, such as the equal, the similar, and the whole: lor whole so lur as whole is not common to all tilings ; since a part, so far as it is a part, is not a whole. < Min is hovvi ver, extend to all things, of w hu h all beings purtu ipate, >o t tr as they are l>eiiigs,and not so far as thev are hv mg,or animated,or possess some other peculiarity ,hut accoiding to the appellation of being. For since being is the fust [ot intclligiblesjt he eaiises also of exist! nee vv ill leave the most total order in the genera ot being. Hut these genera
ROOK in ]
TIM/'EUS OF IM.ATO.
are five in numlter. viz. essence, sameness, difference, motion, and permanency, For every bring i*' essmtialized, united to itself, and separated from itself and from other things, pror eeds from itself and its proper principle, and participates of a certain fpiiel and jiermauency, so tar as it preserves its own proper form. Whe¬ ther therefore, there is an intelligible, or sensible, or middle genus of things, it consists of these ; since all things are from these. For all tilings do nut live, nor are all things vv holes, or parts, or animated; but of these genera all things parti¬ cipate. And with whatever tiling essence is not present, neither will the other genera be present: for they subsist about essence. Sami ness also not existing the whole will he dissipated. \nd the ditference of one tiling from another being' abolished, there will only be one thing, and that void of multitude. Motion like- \ wise not existing, things would Im* unenergetie and dead. And without * per- inanem y they would Im' unstable, and immediately hurried away to non entity. Hence, it is necessary that in ail things there should be each of these, ami that essence should subsist as the first of them, this lieing as it were the Vesta and monad of the genera, and hav ing an arrangement analogous to the one. lint alter this it is necessary that samenessanddiflereiice should subsist, the formerlreingana- logous to bound, but the latter to infinity. Anil in a similar manner it is reipiisile that there should be permanency and motion, the former being especially seen about the powers of beings, but the latter about their energies. For every ’ In'ing, so far as being participates after a manner of a certain essence, as it is written in the Sophista, and in the Parmenides. But every essential po.ver is either under sameness, or under diflercnce, or under both; heat indeed, and every separative power, being under ditference, but cold and every collective power, under same¬ ness. And whatever [tower is a medium between these, Wing under Iroth. For every energy [is either motion or permanency, or is m a certain rrs|»ect both these. For the energy of intellect,] 1 and every energy w hich preserves in the same condition that which energizes, or is that about which it energizes, is rather per¬ manency than motion. But the energy of bodies on each other, is a motion which does not sulfur them to remain in the same condition, but removes them from the state in which they are. And the energy which changes the subject of its energy in the same and about the same, is a stable motion. Every Iveing therefore, participates by its very existence of this triad, viz. of essence, jvovver and energy, on account of these five genera, and also is, possesses capability and
* rii-ru o omitted in the ordinal.
* Instead of irnrrn yap to or hi this place, it is obviously necessary to read rar yap to or.
1 Both the sense and the version of Lconicus Tlioiuacus require the insertion in this place of if *ir>j#i» tar i, ^ oraeu, rj »vi. trtpytta yap rev rov.
Proci.Us Os Tiik
energizes. In short, since* every tliiiur xxhie-h in any way whatever has existence, consists of ImuiikI ami infinity, it is i sscntializeil irnleed and subsists ae-e-ordin" to a participation c»l both these. lbit it possesses sameness xvith itself thron'di the communion of these two; anil dillcivucc, through the division n f tlu-in- Nince also it is not the first, it proceeds from the principle of things, am | ; ,bidi s m it, so that it is both Mimed and is permaiieiit. TIiim* liie centra therefore are in entry Iwienr, so far as it is In inn, tlmnuli they subsist difl'en utlx in dill'erent lieinirs. I'or iutelli-^ibles hate all these esseutialli ; intelliuibleand at the s,mi,, tune intei lei tu d natures, possess them u cording to sameness ml* lleetuals ai ctirdim' to ilillerein e; psychical natures aecmduu to pelmaiienev ; and corporeal natures uiccordin^ to motion. Hut \u e ieisa, if life is motion, and sluggishness perman¬ ency : tor souls indeed, are essential ||\| S, but bodies aie alter-Uloti\e. Ii how¬ ever, motion am! permanency are prior to sameness and ilitli-reiiee, as we may di nioiistrale from other reasonings, * ailing the progression of each thm^ from its cause,* a motion prior to energy, and its abiding in its , aiise, a pernianeiiey prior to the iiueiieriietic eondition w bit h is oppos, ,| to cncrirx ;—it this be the ease, aft. r intelliiribles, the inti Nimble and at the s one time intellectual natures, will subsist according to permanency, hut inlellei luaU accord iu?> to motion. Souls also will dins subsist according to same ness, but bodies accordin'.; to dilleiem e. Hut if we should sax that lile is niolioii, and immutable inti'lli^i iiee permaneiicv, :i”ain in- ti IImibh s will bee liarai t. rized according to (lie essential ; but intelligible and at the same time intellectual natures, Inin.; lixes, aeeordiu^ to motion ; ami intel- lee tu.il naluies, heiii'4 e ssent lal i/ed m intellect, a. cording to p. nil am iicx ; for -mimlaiie nature s ch ine thi ir permaiieiiex from intellec t. M-xrliical natures also
xx <!l t ms subsist accord ii il;Io sameness, because thex contain tlu- bond 1 of impar- tdde s and partibles ; but cerpon tl nature s xxill subsist accordim; to tlilli-reucc i lor m these, as tbc'y an p utihle, strife lias ilomiuioii. The*se lixe- natures lioxxevc r, are silcfcsiw to e aeli othe r, xiz beinm life, inte lle c t, soul, and body ; because; the total m nera whic h are 1 prior to forms, are likewise- Inc. \ml thus much may he said couceriihi£ the live 1 ”e ncra miners.ellx ; only ohserxin;; in adelition, that the* .same* things an; called both ue nera and elements. And the first e»f sec'imd natures iiideeel arecalle'd •jciiera ; hut the.se* remaining imdiiuiiiished and e xempt lrom partial natures, are the eause-s of their e xi-te ru e 1 . Hut e ac h of the- sexeral
Inst, d.l wl r.i .S. I( r,r.i, tm .ora r» uvro her. 1 , it is net vssary In rt .nl rn K , , u „ na< „.ijro
turn rv ui'ro.
I his progression is tlitnliiTr ili “aiillj c.ille.t liy Proelus, an intffablr unfolding into light.
tor a bond is union, and sameness is union of essence.
TIM.rX'S or PLATO.
tilings of which the whole consists, an* railed elements. J’or tlie "encra hi the Dcmim" ii-n ^i\e oomph tion to the demiurgic hein*:, and are the elements of it; hut they are th<‘ genera of all the forms contained in the intellects that proeeeil from him. and also of all those tii.it are in souls and bodies. 1
L t us, however, n you are Milling, proceed to the fifth head, and consider how these genera subsist in souls, and why IMato assumes them. Since, therefore, it has been shown that the soul is the medium between beings and non-beings, and that it knows all beings, both mtelli^ihles and sensililes, whether accordin'.: to the same or accord im: to dilli rent reasons, as some say, it is necessary that the cssi nee ot it should proceed from tile genera of beiii'j. For if it did not proceed from these, but from certain others, it would not be able to know all things, nor to S apply itself to all things. Hence as it knows man aceordin^ to the reason [or form] whir h it contains of man, and d.i'iuon according to the form which is in it of (hemon, thus also it knows hem;: itself, aerordim: to the participation in it of helm:, and ditlereneo according to its participation of difference. So that it will contain all the genera, but in a wav adapted to it»< If. l or it appears to me, that on tins account Plato constitutes the soul from the first *^em ra, and from numbers and harmonic ratios ; and likewise, that lie places in it tin* principles of figures and divine motions, in order that hv antecedently (or cansallyj comprehendim: the reasons of all disciplines and of ilialeetie. it mi^ht thus know all things, vi/. the ? essences, the nimiliers, the harmonies, the figures, anrl the motions ot whieh wholes consist. ll seems likewise, that h< constitutes the soul, as beiim allied to iutelli^ihles, from the genera ol beiiu;, whieh primarily subsist in them ; hut that he <:ives tenure to the soul, as Iwiim alheil to sensililes. For thini;s which are t i it I v figured are sensible*. And that as beim; a medium between intelli^ibles and sensililes, he imiils it with hariiionie ratios ; though m intelligible forms also, there are the form of harmony, and the form ol figure. Hut harmony itself, is not harmonized, nor is figure itself figured. For things which have a primary sub¬ sistence do not exist accordim: to participation. In sensible** also, harm>mv and the genera of hein^ subsist but partibly ; but in souls they subsist iucorporeally and at the same time compositely, 1 and participation manifests their composite nature.* For participation pertains to composites, hut incorporality is the pecu¬ liarity of simple natures. It is necessary however for that which primarily parti-
* Tor Tuiy €V nubia'll yfiwr here, It It requisite to n ail TVv rr ovfinoi titvr.
* In dead of t) a/i/wua ill tins plarc, il is iit-cosarj to rcait airrrj rj append.
1 I'or aevrOrrvt iirrr, il is uc« cssary In read trvrlkrwt.
* instead of to wrVtTvr avrvr trj\er 10 tbo place, it o requisite to read to «r(kr«r «u tw tf
Proclus on This
[book III.