After this however, we must discuss that which we proposed, as the third subject of enquiry, viz. how, and on what account we say that the soul is of a middle nature. For it i* necessary that this should In known prior to the reason¬ ing concerning it. Since then there are many things which proceed from the one, as »ar as to Ibrmh *S> I ind tin l.i't matter, h l tis see vvliat are the peculiarities of the first beings, what of the last, and what are allotted a middle order, and how they are adapted to tin* essence of tin* soul. I he follow mg tin relore, are tin* peculiarities of inti lligihles, ti id v existing being, the eternal, the impartible, the immove ible, the entire, the perfect, a sii|>erplcmtude ol existence, an unwearied and unrestrained life, that vvliii h is motive of all things, similitude, the being present with all things, and the lieing exempt from all things. For all tin se properties are unfolded into light m intelligible.s, according to the progressions of being. But again, there are certain oilier peculiarities ol seiisibles, such as the billowing, that which is not truly-existing being, that which is temporal according to essence, the partible, that which is moved, the partial, that which is in want ol another, that which Is always tilling with existence, that which lives according to participation, that which is altcr-molivc, dissimilitude, and that which on npics place l»y its parts. Between these, which arc opposed to each other as things first to tilings last, there are
nmiK ill,]
TIM.ELS OF PLATO.
certain media, through \\liicli it is entirely requisite that the progression from lir»t to la>l natures, should he effected. For things similar to their producing causes proceed prior to such as are dissimilar; because similitude is allied to the otic, and all timers aspire after the one. The media therefore, between these extremes are, that which is not truly-existing being, yet is more excellent than non-being, but is inferior to real being, that which according to essence is in a certain respect eternal being, but exerts its energies in time, that which is impar¬ tible, according to its most divine part, but is distributed into parts, according to the all-various progression of reasons, that which itself moves itself, that which rules over alter-motive natures, but is inferior to immoveable beings, that which presents itself to tiie view' partially m conjunction w ith its wholeness, that which is in a certain respect a whole, according to the possession of all reasons, but which appears to be partial, according to diminution, and transition of energy. It is also that which perfects itself, and is pi rfected by natures prior to itself, and is more perfect than things which are adapted to be alone perfected by another. Jt likewise tills itself with power, and is tilled by other things, lives from itself, and receives lift; from others, being more divine than the natures which live only by participation, but inferior to those that primarily posse-s life. It is moreover, motive of other things, but is moved by first natures, is similar and at the same time dissimilar, and is exempt from the last of things, and is co-ordinated with tin in.
Sui'h therefore being the peculiarities in essences, let us consider where the soul is to be arranged, w hether in the lirst, or m the last of things. If however, in the first of things, it will be truly-existing being, will be entirely eternal and immoveable, and every thing else consequent to real beings, and we shall neither preserve the partible nature of the psvehical reasons, nor psychical time, nor self- motion, nor a transitive i n< igy, nor anv other thing of the like kind; though we clearly perceive these things in all our souls, lint now we investigate such things as are common to all souls, and which are essentially inherent in tin in, such as are the above-mentioned peculiarities. So that if they are inherent in all soiils, being common, souls will not belong to the lir-t of things, and to eternal lieiiigs so far as they are souls. But neither do they rank among the last of things. For if they did, vve shall make the soul alter-motive, partible and composite, and alone j»erfocted by other things, every thing contrary to which We see even in our souls. For they move and perfect themselves, and conduct themselves as they please. Much more therefore, will divine souls possess the cause of their proper perfection, will lead all things by their own motions, will be converted to, and know themselves, which it is impossible for alter-motive natures to accomplish.
[book hi.
If however, it is not possible for the soul to be placed either in the first, or in the last of things, we must give to it a. certain middle situation; and this very pro¬ perly, in order that it may imitate the first causes of itself. For the Goddess who is the cause of the soul, has a middle rank among the Gods, as she also apj>eared to have totheologists.she being collective of the two fathers,' and from her own how els emitting the life of the soul. As in the fontal therefore, so likew ise in the ruling Gods, we may &*e the psychical principle shining forth to the view ; so that the soul very properly proceeds as a medium between intelligibles simply and sensihles, between beings that are alone eternal, and those that are simply generated.
You must not however, apprehend its middle nature to lie a thing of such akirul, as to l»e collective of the extremes, hut exempt from the things collected. Fur it is not bi tter than intelligibles, but the end of them. Nor again, is it a thing of such a kind, a> to lie inferior to both: for it transcends sensihles which are moved by it. But since it is a boundary or end, it is the boundary of intelligibles, but the prin¬ ciple of sensihles. By no means, however, must it Ik* said, that it is such a boun¬ dary and su< h a prim iple, as a point is in a line. For it is not in the things that are bounded as a point is in both the sections of a line. But it is in one way the boundary of intelligibles, as presenting itself to the view after the intelligible hypostasis, and in another way the principle of sensihles as Inking exempt from, and motive of them. For thus it will afford us a certain analogy, and it will l»e as alter-motivu are to self motive natures, so are self-motive to immoveable natures. It will also possess the bond of beings through its proper middle condition, evolv¬ ing indeed united causes, hut collecting the dispersed powers of sensihles. And it will be comprehended indeed, by the essence which is immoveable, and always possesses an invariable sameness of subsistence, but will comprehend alter-mutive, and all variously mutable generation. It is liken ise intelligible, as with reference to generated natures, but generated as with reference to intelligibles ; and thus exhibits the extremes in the middle ; imitating in this resjeect the Goddess who is the cause of it. * 1 or she is on eve n/ side luminous, and has a face on ex cry side.
She hi, raise possesses the rudders of the universe, recoiling in her bowitts the progres¬ sions oj intelligibles into her; being filed from the intelligible ' life, but emitting the rivers of the intellectual* life ; and containing in herself the centre of the progression
' Tin* cause of tin* soul n Mu a, hIiu is Collective of ttie two father*, Saturn ami Ju|ut* r , Juno also i* tin* iJUK* ot tin* soul, liut slit is a subordinate cause, being contained in (lie vital fountain of IUiea,
* i e. It lira.
* For rorp,n liere, it is necessary to read ioij-ij,.
4 And instead of riip’iji litre, vie must read totpai.
TlOOK III.]
TIM. PUS or PLATO.
oj oil beings. \ pry properly therefore, is tin* soul both mihegntfen and generated And dll', indeed was before demonstrated from die two-fold life whirh is in her, m/. the e ssential aud the transitive; 1 but it*ma\ now ho shown from lu-r w hole¬ ness and her parts. 1-'or how i> [real] Iwing unhegotien, except I»y Inn ini; tin* infinite power of existing:, al onrt* wholly present ? And how i> hmlv generated, except by having infinite power always flowing into it, in consefjuenre of not being aide to receive the whole of it at once?
r l lie Mini therefore, as Iwing incorporeal indeed, has through its< If an infinite power of existing, not being generated according to the whole of itself, hut immortal; hut according to its parts, it is always generated to infinity. For if it iiad the same total infinity always present, there would he the same inlinitv of the whole and the part, of the perfect and the imperfect, of that which contains and ol that which is contained. Jiut this is impossible. Moreover, neither can the whole o| it always he hi generation, or heroming to he, hut a part of it lie eternal bring, lest the parts should he better than the whole. 11 cure rice versa, the whole /■' infinite bung, but the purl becoming (a be. So that the lixpo^tasis of it possesses infinite power, aud is venerated to infinity ; and tints at one and the same time, it participates of hein^, and is the first of generated natures, body * both in the whole and in the parts of it being in generation. It is not therefore siiflicir lit to say that it is generated, in consequence of energizing partiblv. hut it is requisite to see how this pre-e\i>tent in the very being of the soul. 1 or every energy which is according to nature, has an essence which antecedently assumes the cause ol the energy ; so that the soul likewise pre-assumes the seed of a hte which is according to time, aud which is common to every soul. For it is neces¬ sary that this also should he generated, and not finite be. If however this be the case, si net the soul pnssisscs being according to (he whole, it has to be generated in its parts. Aud how this is true we have shown. And thus much may suffice con¬ cerning the middle of the soul.
I^‘t also the inti-lligihle breadth, the psychical multitude, and the sensible nature, he separate trom each other; and let the last of things he suspended from those that rank as media, and the media from those that are the first. Ia‘t the soul likewise, lie tie* one bond of beings, subsisting in them. For the one also hinds all things, hut ill an exempt manner. For all things are united to each other as homogeneous, and as being derived from one cause, anil extended to
1 II bHore ilfiuoiislnilrit licit the mmiI, iii €<*UMr<| insure of bring self-motive, produces itself, and iv without "enrralmn; hut in coioei) uence of alwnvs receiving essence and lilt irotn the natures superior lo ilv-lf, it is always becoming to he essence and life, aud is always generated.
* For mi trufinret here, read rov wparor.
Tim. Plat. Vol. II.
one object of desire. Hut the soul likewise binds beings, as existing in them. And as in analogy, the middle [lertains to the things that are hound, thus too, the soul must Ik* admitted to lie the middle of lsiugs, binding and at the same time lieing hound as being of a self-motive nature.