The Commentaries of Proclus on the Timaeus of Plato — trans. Thomas Taylor (1820)

of the principle of all, or not participating of it should entirely perish. For essence and hv parxis are imparted to all things from the first principle. But soul is not present with all things, nor is it necessary that all things should participate of soul. But of bodies, some are inanimate, and others are animated. It is likewise necessary that the tirst of all things should he one. For it it were multitude, it would have that which causes things to l>e one, prior to itself. For there will not Ik* a dispersed multitude. But soul is a multitude. The first of tilings also is beyond all essence; since every essence has multitude in conjunction with itself; for there are in it 1 cl ill* rence and saineni ^s, life, anil eternal energy. But soul is an essence. Every where too, the first genus is free from evil; hut the genus of [partial] souls is at a certain time naturally adapted to become evil. And this in short inav In* demonstrated through many arguments. The design however ot Plato is, through the above-mentioned cause, to unfold to us the psychical c-s< nee, to show how it subsists, and to teach us from what elements it is composed, and according to what reasons. For as with respect to our body it is easy to know, that it contains the face and the hands, the thighs and the feet, and all such other parts as are obvious to every one; but to know how it is com¬ posed from the inward parts, from what particulars, and according to what ratio, rerpiires medical and anatomical information ;—after the same manner w ith respect to the soul, it is not difficult to show what it is according to its total powers, hut to unfold the very essence of it, as far as to the elements of which it consists, and to survey the all-various reasons in it, w ill he the work of the most accurate theory concerning it. And this indeed, Plato endeavours to do, anatomizing as it were the psychical essence, and d< mutating the whole of it to those who are aide to follow him. As we have said therefore, we may thus reply to the first of the inquiries, l or that Plato very properly says, that the essence of the soul is generated, we may learn, by considering that he called the corporeal-formed nature generated, liceaireit is always becoming to he, and receives an infinite power of existing. For the soul also is a thing of this kind, and is not aide to receive at once the whole infinity of ta-ing. This is evident from its living in a discursive manner, and producing different reasons at di lie rent times, not having ' the whole of nil infinite life at once present. By always therefore evolving its own life, it is evident that it has an essence always generated, or becoming to I e, and always advancing to the infinite, hut not being infinite. Hence it always receives a life which is essential, and entirely natural to it. For that which is jierfective of a thing is to that thing entirely according to nature. Moreover, if it

* i. f. In the first essence.

[book lit.

18 self-motive, [as Timtrus asserts, then we must admit, that it imparts to itself at once, the whole of the essential life which it possesses in itself, and thus it will lie uiiliejrotten and at the same time]' generated ; being indeed, through the essence and life which it always possesses, ever-living, and ever-existent, but in conse¬ quence of alw ays receiving these, alw ays becoming to Is* essence and life. For it exists in a twofold respect, from itsilf, and from the natures prior to itself. And through itself indeed, always existing ; hut through the natures prior to itself aluays becoming to be. Or rather through the latter having both, viz. to be that which it is, and to be generated, but through itself to be that which it is on,y. For it alone pos¬ sesses from the natures prior to itself the perpetual reception of something ; Aris¬ totle also rightly asserting that nothing is the cause of itself, the well being ot which is according to time, and has not ail eternal subsistence, 1 lest the cause which ourrht to be prior to the thing caused, should be eonsubsisteiit with that which is generated. He nee time and eternity subsist about the soul ; eternity indeed, so far as the soul is unhegotten; but time so far as it is generated. On this account the soul is in a certain respect eternal, as indestructible, but is not simply eternal, as Plato also says in the laws, lbit the second tiling proposed to be done, was to divide the whole generation of the soul in an appropriate manner. \ his how¬ ever, w e shall afterw ards accomplish, again assuming the principle from the things themselves.

In every nature therefore, there are essence, [tower [and energy. And essence indeed,]' is that according to which an existence as lire, or to be fin*, is present with tire. Hut power is mu thing, and » nergv another. For one thing dries, but another beats, and other things produce a change in a different wav. It is neces¬ sary therefore, that in the soul also one thing should he essence, another power, and another energy. And it is. requisite that he who wishes to apprehend and survey the whole of the soul, should speak about all these. Ot the gt iteration of the soul therefore, then* will in the first place he three heads; the first, concerning its essence; the second concerning its power; and the third concerning its energy. For this will he a jw-rfect disquisition of the things proposed for consideration.

* from itit* version of Lcoiiivus Tlmiiwus, it up|K*ars that the words within the brackets are wauling in the printed original, and I ha\e accordingly inserted them from his version.

1 In t lie original, cyOwt too ttxoyrvt, uti wiry tone tuvry amoy, o Kara yoy tv

r\(t, n\V oi-s. uivvivi, which I eoini us '1 lionr.vus erroneously translates as follows: Quaiuohrem uptime Arislotrlts loquitur, ipiamlo ilicit, nullani rein sihi ipsi causam < sse, neque Uni|>oraleuj, neque seiupi- lernant. Fur an rtrrnul nature is sclf-subsisteut.

* The words wilhiu the brackets are wanting in the original, but both the sense and the version of Tliomaus require they should he inserted. Hence after to it tvyafiu, it is necessary to add, to it tytp-

yua *a4 i) fit* uvota.

Rook Iii.]

TINLIXS OF PLATO.

Wi- may jwrcrivr however, that tlir* psychical esv,-nce is a certain threefold nature. For tin* hyparxis of it is one tiling, and tin* harmony in it another, according to which its essential multitude is eonnerted ; since it is not one essence 1 like intel¬ lect, nor divisible to infinity, like body which is posterior to it ; hut it is divisible into more essential parts than one, of which it consists, yet they are finite in number, there not being more parts of the soul than these, since these parts of it cannot be divided into others, as will be evident as wc proceed. And the form which is effected from tin se is another tiling; so that the essence of the soul is one anil threefold. For the monad and the triad are adapted to it, since we divide the whole soul into three parts. Hence its essence is one anil triple: for hyparxis is one tiling, harmony another, and form another. And the first of these indeed, alone defines existence, the second harmonizes the essential multitude, hut the third contains the peculiarity of the whole system. All these likewise, are in each other. For hyparxis has with itself an harmonized multitude; since it is not without multitude; nor is it multitude alone iinharmouized. And harmony is itseli essential, and is connective ot essence, to whicli also it gives form. Hence likewise it is shown in what resj>eet the soul is harmony, and in what respect it is not, and that Plato accords with himself in asserting here that the soul is harmony, but in the Plurdo confuting those who maintain that it is. For 1/ is one thing to he the harmony of itself aiul of other tilings, ami a differ, nt thing to he the harmony of another thing alone. F'or the latter produces harmony in a subject, and a harmony inseparable from the things harmonized, anil established in a foreign seat, lint the former produces a separate harmony, subsisting from itself, and converted to itself. Form likewise , is comprehensive of harmonic reasons, contains the hyparxis of the soul, and is the one raison according to which the soul is that which it is. All these therefore are in each other, viz. hvparxis, harmonv, and form, and the essence of the soul is one and triple; since it also consists of three genera, essence, same and different. And again, hyparxis indeed, is rather defined according to essence, but harmony according to sameness, and form according to dilfcrcnce, through which it is separated from all things.

Since therefore, we find that the soul is triple from the loginning, possessing essence, power and energy, and again, having essence itself triple, according to hyparxis, according to harmony, and according to form, from these wc shall make a pentad; arranging by parxis as the first, harmony as the second, idea or form, as the third, power as the fourth, and energy as the fifth. F’or the pentad is adapted to the soul as to a medium, containing the bond of the monad and the

* iestcad of ovre ft mu eunat is tim place, il k Decenary to read cere fttas nou.

[book hi.

ennead, just as Hie soul is the Imnd of the intelligible and sensible essence. Adopting likeni>e this arrangement, we shall divide the whole theory concerning the soul into live heads; in the fust place, speaking concerning the hyparxis of the soul; in the second place, concerning the reasons and harmony in it; in the third place, discussing the idea of it ; in the lourth place, the many powers it contains; and in the fifth place, directing our attention to its energies. For Plato also w hen he speaks about the mundane, body, surveying the corporeal- formed nature of the world itself, by itself, delivers in the first place the nature which is the subject of body, and produces the elements of which the world con¬ sists. In the next place, he delivers the harmony of the elements; for analogy, and the bond subsisting through analogy, are an image of the psychical harmony. In the third place, he delivers the idea of the world exhibiting it to us as a spherical whole of wholes. Ill the fourth place, lie unfolds to us the powers of the world, giving to the spliel't s mdi ed, partible* powers, and such as are ctlecled through partial organs, bill to the animal of the universe, whole and perfect powers. And in the fifth place, he delivers to us the energies ot the world, sur¬ rounding the bod v of it with a wise and intellectual motion. A Iter the same in .in¬ ner likewise, he divides 111 these five heads the theory of the soul. I hat till* »,ene- ration of the soul therefore, is very properly surveyed by Plato, and in how many, and what heads it is divided, may' through these tilings be manifest.