lie govt rn<. to Ins own good. Hut a ruler looks to the good of those who are obedient to him, ami eo-arranges all things with r« ferenre to it. 'Y\\c despotic jti cMiliarily, howncr, is present with tin: soul, in eonsefpieneo of her performing all tilings (of the sake of herself; hut the ruling peculiarity, through tilling all things with good. I’or her providential energy is not diminished, through referring all things to her own proper good. And her good remains unchanged, while she gives eomph lion to her providential energies. In another wav also she is a ruler and a despot: tor she proceeds both from the ruling, and the tout d soul.' Uerause likewise, the universe is her dwelling, she is railed it despot. And U-cause she lr ids all things by her motions, she has a ruling power. In rouseipn nee too, of h.mug dominion o\er wholes, she is a despot ; hut because she assimilates all things to the intelligible, she rules over the universe. If however, she was thus constituted at fust, as a despot and a ruler, these things arc essential to her, I mean the despotic and the ruling peculiarity, lint it they are essential, i!i-v are always present with her. And if indeed they were present with her in capacity alone, she would be impi rlei t, which it is not I ivvful to assert ; but it m energv, th it which is governed by In r alvvavs was, and was adorned by her. The uni¬ verse itself therefore, if it was so generated, as to be governed by soul, is consiih- sistent with soul. Tor that wInch is governed is simultaneously conjoined with that w Inch governs. Ilenee through both, we mav discover the perpcliniv of the uiiiM ise, and that to govern is not aecuh ntal to soul, nor to In governed, to body, but that I he soul is, by its very essence, tbe despot of tin- body, and body the vassal of the soul. On this account also, they are spontaneously conjoined to e ii h other; and the body is excited to the participation ol the soul, and the soul to the ear* of the liody .
Part her still, tin* intention ol the words “ from cerium things of ter the / o'lo„ii/g manner, is to lead into light the genera and the things v.iiirh constitute the soul, and also tin* mode of the mixture of them, and the reasons according to which the mixture is divided. Tor the corporeal nature was ni.uh I*y divinity to consist of certain elements, and after a Certain mamn r, ami lie urtiiieiaiiy devised a 'i i tain analogy ol them and physical hum], lint if divinity artificially produced till 1 soul from certain tilings, and alter a n rtnui manner, lie constituted both the subject of her as it were, and the form, it is ridiculous therefore to say, that the essence of her is unliegotten, if-shc consists of certain elements, but that the form of her is generated. Tor Plato says, that divinity produced, both the mat¬ ter as it were of the noul, and the reason according to which slw» is diversified
1 mi. Mir j>i(Kcrilv frimi Prr>'rr|>inr ami Juno.
I'KOCLUS ON Till-:
[Book Iii
w ith such forms as she possesses ; Ijeincj Wind by certain media. If however, divinity generates the elements as it were of her, viz. essence, same, and different, and from these the whole, every tiling that is essential in the soul is ge¬ nerated.
“ From an essence always impartible, and subsisting with invariable sameness, and again from an essence which is partible about bodies, he mingled from both a middle form of essence."
In the first place, it is requisite to show through 1 what cause Plato ih-thers the generation of the soul, si nee it is according to him unbegotten; in the next place, to divide appropriately the whole psychical generation ; in the third place, to de¬ monstrate the middle n it lire of the soul ; in the fourth place, to speak concerning the genera ol those things, from which Plato constitutes all other beings and the soul; in the fifth place, to show how the'mixtuiv of these genera is to he assumed m tin* soul; in tin* sixth place to demonstrate what thd> impartible and the partible natures are; and in the seventh place, to unfold the meaning of the words of Plato, and to ewnce that they accord with all that has been before said. For if we are able to discuss all these particulars, we shall obtain in an appropriate manner the end of this investigation. Ia t us liegin therefore from the first, because some of the ancients have blamed Plato, asserting tli it he does not rightly investigate the principl of a principle, and the generation cf -’'•>viii«-gntten thing. I or it we investigate the < aiises of first nattires, and coins ive g< derations of things self-suhsisteiit, we shall ignorantly proceed to infinity, and have no cud of the theory. Fur as he w ho thinks that all things arc demonstrative, especially subverts demonstration itself, after the same manner also, he who investigates the causes of all things, entirely subvr ,ts all beings, and the order of tin til proceeding from a certain definite principle. 'Filings of this kind indeed, are objected by Theophrastus to Plato, concerning the ir< m ration of the soul, who likewise says, that we ought not to investigate the uhi/ in all physical inquiries. Fur, he adds, it would Ik ridiculous to doubt whv fire burns,on wliat account lire exists, and whv snow refrigerates. Hut those who have written against him in defence of Plato say, that alone to know the on or that of natural tilings,’ is irrational knowledge, and isado.xastic, or Sensitive apprehension of them; but that to add likew ise the uhy t and to investigate the caitsi *of them, is truly the employ incut ofdianuia, and a scientific intellect. For in this right opinion differs from scientific reason.
* vi/. Merely to know that they exut, without knowing the bon, or u~hy tf.**y exist
We however, attending to what both of them say, think that the latter speak well, but in the first place, we would ask Theophrastus himself, whether the cause of no one tiling is to be assigned, or of a certain tiling ? For if of no one thing, besides subverting science which especially knows causes, he will also accuse himself, by enquiring whence thunder is produced, whence winds arise, and what are the causes of lightning, corruscatiuns, fiery whirlwinds, rain, snow and hail; all which in his Meteors, he very properly thinks deserving of an appropriate conjej tural dismission. Hut if the cause of a certain thing is to be assigned, why are some things pertaining to physics to lie surveyed according to causes, hut others are to he delivered irrationally without cause? For it does not follow that in things in w hich that tfny c.rist is manifest, in these it is likewise known why they o\i*-t. But after Theophrastus, we shall ask the lovers of Plato, whether we are entirely to investigate the causes of all things, or not of all things ? For if of all things, we must therefore investigate the cause of the one, which we say is more excellent than cause. For that the one is, we may learn from principles. For if not the one, but multitude ([is the principle of things,3 w hat is it that unites ; since that which is united is from the one, just as that which is essentialized is from essence, and that which is animated is from soul ? But why the one is one cannot be unfolded, for it is more ancient than every cause. And if we are not to inves¬ tigate the causes of all tilings, why should we investigate the cause of soul, and the generation of it from a cause, but should hy no means do this in other tilings?
Since however, we have separately interrogated each of them, we shall doubt with ourselves for both of them, through what cause Plato indeed devises the generation of the soul, and the progression of it from a cause, but Theophrastus condemns ail doctrine of this kind. And having doubted we say, that to Theo¬ phrastus, and all of the Peripatetic sect, the ascent of their speculation, is [only] as far as to the motive forms of the universe ; whether it be proper to call these souls, or intellects.' But by Plato, these as falling short of the lir>t dignity among l>eings, in consequence of I icing participate, are considered as having an order very remote from principles. For prior to these, are the intelligible ami intellec¬ tual orders of beings, from which these derive their progression. And prior to tin 'se orders, is the number of the Gods, causing beings to become one, and con¬ nected, and illuminating them with div ine light. And again, prior to this number, is the imparticipable one, from which this numlier unfolds itself into light through the natures by which it is received. For it is necessary that imparticipable forms
Tim. Plat.
' i. e. The souls of the celestial and sublunary spheres.
PItOCLUS ON THE
KhouUl fwUsitft prior to those that art* participated, and prior to imparticipables, the unities of them. For the united is one thin" and unity another, and prior to the multitude of unities, the one fountain of them exists.
Such therefore I icing the opinions of both these philosophers, Theophrastus indeed, since he asserts that the soul is the principle of motion, and does not admit that there is any thin" else prior to this principle, very projierly thinks that principle on 'lit not to Im investigated. For he "rants that the universe is ani¬ mated, and on this account divine. Fur if it is divine, says he, and has the most excellent life, it is animated; since nothin- is honourable u it It out soul, as he writes in his treatise On the Heaven, lint Plato admits that there are mundane intellects, prior to the celestial souls, and plior to these, iut< Meets without habitmleLto souls], and prior to these, the divine order. Hence, he very properly delivers the soul produced and Generated from another principle; though he also knew that gene- ratioii of another kind has not only a place in bodu but also in souls, so lar as they participate of time. For in divine soi.ls likewise there is time, since, as Plato says ill the Phadrus, they survey through time real being itself. lor all transitive in ition has tune conjoined with it. And thus much tor the tiist ot the before-mentioned problems. For at the same tune, it is sullieiently demon¬ strated, tl at Plato rightly delivers the generation ot the soul, though it is essen¬ tially unbe_M*tt< n, and tli it the argument whii h is urged against it, is partly right and partly not. l or to him who admits that the soul is the first thing, it is coiise- ijueiit to subvert 11 it* gem ration of it. For troiu w hat is the generation ot it, vv hell there is nothing prior to it f This very thing however, is not true, th.it soul is the first of all things. For that which Vristotle says concerning body, that being finite, it alvvavs receives the power ot being always moved, but does not levttVi the infinite at once, the same, thing also must necessarily be said concerning the soul, that it does not at once » uergi/.e aci ordmg to all things, so that it dues not at once possess ail the infinite power, from which it always i.*nergi/es, nor does it energize at once according to every power, so as always to possess one energy. For ot all power, there is one energy ot one power. Home it always receives the power of energizing alvvavs, and on this account does not always energize with invariable sameness, but dillercnlly at dillen nl times. So that m short it is true, that every thing which energizes according ta tune, always reaives the power of energizing, yet does not at once receive the u hole power, and on this account is generated.
That the soul however, is not the first of beings' is evident. I* or th.it which is
first is pn sent with all things, and it is necessary that all things should p irti* ipate
1 lion .at ufori i v f uv irpo tovtuv i/ yi’X'O hi this place, «t is necessary to real ■* -< ou w P u,ro> '
rvr u» Tur il)\oi.
hook in.]
TI M/EUS OF PLATO.