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The Commentaries of Proclus on the Timaeus of Plato — trans. Thomas Taylor (1820)

Preserved in the archive of the housea source of Proclus

I’lato therefore, knowing these things, and that we recur from subordinate to more excellent natures according to a well-arranged ■ progression, thinks tit to make mention of the nature of things, conformably to which the elder is more excellent than the younger, and through this common conception, to arrange the soul prior to the body. 1 or he reminds us that the former is older, but the hitter younger, through an hypothetical guiditnre. For if the soul rules over the body, it is more ancient than tiie bod y. But it does rule over the body: for it leads every tiling m the universe* by its motions. And body, indeed, is alter-motivi?; but soul is naturally adapter] to move both itself, and other things. It is therefore mole aneu lit than the body. It this however be the case*, it is iiece>sarv to conceive ot it by itseil, not as being g< nerated post< rior to the hndv, as we imagine it to be, but giving it a supernal origin, we shoultl survey the corporeal bulk of the universe, unlohled as n were into light from it. For the universe derived its subsistence through soul, imitating the progression of it through its bulk, but the conversion ot it through its figure. These things, however, we shall again

discuss.

But, it you are willing, let us now survey each of the words of the text of Plato. In the first place then lore, wilh re.'per I (o the soul, he manifests that he speaks of every s,nd by adding the .11 tit lr the. For he does not s.iv as lie did l».-lore, •• /Vuiv/yg st.ul m tin u but the soul. For there, there was a power of tiie whole soul about the middle; but lure, every soul is said to l»e more an¬ cient than body. In the next place, the older and the i/nun^tr, are not to be assumed according to tune, 1 - \tticns apprehended they wen*: for the father at once constituted the soul, and surrounded the body of the universe with it, as with a veil. But tb* y must be assumed in the order of essence. For the essence which is more proximal- to the Domiiirgiis [is older]. If you wish also to understand tin: older and the younger according to time; the lime which is in tin: soul, is older and more divine, but tin* time which |M-rtains to body is

Pkoci.Us on Tiie

| BOOK 111.

younger. And soul, so far as soul, is not corporeal time; but tlie time belonging to body in suWdinate to that of soul. For a- there is a different form of motion in both, so likewise the time in each is different. In the third place, lie uses the expression “ artificially produce," in the most propi r sense, in speaking of the soul; clearly indicating that it is a self-motive thing, that it is lull ol reasons, 1 and is inventive 1 of all-various contrivances. .

Farther still, the power of more ancient ruling over junior natures, proceeds into the universe from intelligibles themselves.* For there 1‘rotogonus, [or animal itself,] who is so denominated by all [the («odsl, is the king ut all the iutcllci tual natures. Ami in the intellectual order, the eldest ot the sous ol Saturn, is said

to Ik* the father of all things.

Hut Jove was born tin liist, and more lie knows.

For every where that whu h is older, is the symbol ol a limit inti Her tual, total and monadic life; hut that which is younger, of a life which is partible, proceeds to secondary natures, and is multiplied. Hence thevivilie (.oihlesses, they call on» older, but the other younger.’ Ami of the demiurgic Gods, they

denominate one prior, but the other junior, whom likewise tin y call lecrnt. In

the next place, the word cmijninid, clearly makes the »oul which is the subject of the present discussion mundane, and not hbcratul , nor the one soul \\hi< i exists prior to tin* nuuiv. l or the latter is exempt Irom all souls, and oturi souls proceed alrout it as a centre; hut the torun r receives a colijum turn wit t boilV, tiler ted according to the will ol the father.

“ We however, participating in a certain respect much of that which is casual and without design assert things ol this kind.

What is the reason that we are unwilling to transfer our intellect from f tings that are of a junior nature, to those that are i ssentially more ancient f It is

’ For \oyov In re, rud Xoyuv.

* Xnd for ri|»<Tii.w» read ciyrriu/i.

» For Of uvtuv naOijiri ry t cr/ry, it n obviously net c-oary lo read ill this place, uir uvrwe * aiOr/cfi tw »• vor)Tw »•.

4 Instead of rtvTtpa i in tins place, it is requisite lo rtad >orpu»rip«i.

5 i.e. Rhea u the older, but Juno the younger v,\itic C tailless.

6 The prior Deiuiurgus, is Jupiter, but the junior llaertius.

1 i. e. Not belonging to the order of (,mis denominated hbtrattd, and who are also called tuper- Cfltthal, a* being immediately above lhe mundane (mile.

* 111 the ong'njl, fiu it run uinar, airu tuv ifwrfpuie wi rpfnf.t'Ttp*tv, **■* r« car vvtnuy fiHOfivrfoa

r.ciDK III ]

1 IMPELS Of PLATO.

Localiso our intellect resembles one asleep, ami liecause we are full of an irratio¬ nal and disorderly nature. For the words casual, an A rashly, are significant of those tilings. For since we possess sense, and sensihles are P 1 need UTore our view, together with %\ liit-li we are nourished, we first apprclu ml things of a junior nature, as being more familiar to us. And through sense indeed, we are borne along rashly and without design ; but through sonsililes which are placed Is-forc us, w e live in a casual manner. For those that remain on high, as sense is with them at revf t and there is no sensation of the sensihles with which we are now conversant, have nothin" occurring to them of a casual nature. But we, since we have sense, and sensihles are before our ej« s, live casually and without de¬ sign. And as it is said, we form a judgment of things with the head down¬ ward;’ which is also conformable to what Fmpcdodes lamenting our fate savs :

Many dire words and cares nbtmui llie mind.*

For many things invading us who are truly slaves, as having Income exiles from deity, blunt and clog our speculation of real beings. Since however, as this philosopher also says, the casual, and that which is without design, accede to us externally, on this account, l*lato says, that we participate of them, and not that these are exeited from onr essence : for we are essentially intellectual. But since tin re is likewise a participation from more divine natures, Plato adds the word much, in order thid he may indicate the imh finiteness and confusion of a participation of this kind. For the participation of div itter natures, introduces to the participants, union, bound and order.

“ Hut the artificer of the world constituted soul both in generation and virtue prior to and more ancient than body, as the despot [or lord] and ruler of its servile nature; and that from certain things in the follow¬ ing manner.”

Porphyry subdividing, conceives the words to signify, that soul is more ancient than body in generation, but prior to it in virtue. Botli however, or cither, max be signified, and prior to and more ancient than , may be conjoined to the words in ge-

ftr rifiuv pvvXofii fia Toy rout ; but it appears lo me llial tlie wools ui wpririivTtpw ought to be expunged, unless »<• rrail instead of them ot«n orrpvr, (as more familiar to us), aud that for/icvXe- fuOa, wt sluMild read ov fiovXofiifla.

1 I'or KapawmovfirOa here, it appears to be requisite lo read *aptf wmovfjtba.

* In the original, veXXa it itn' firm, -u r< appXvyvvo i fupifjyai. But for ra r« il is obviously ►ary to read ron rf.

PROCl.L'S ON THK

[hook III.

ncration ; anil apain, either may be conjoined to the words w virtue. But "( lie- ration when ascrilwd to the soul, is not that which is accord ins to time ; for I Mato in the Pint elms demonstrates that the soul is nnh.-otten and ind.Mrii.Mil.le; hut is an essential progression from inlelliuihk* causes. I*or of beings, some are in¬ telligible and nnhe^otteii, hut others are sensible and generated. And thetm dia Ik*, ween these, are intelligible and general.-.!, l or some things are entirely in- composite and impartible, and on this account are unbt-otten ; but others which .subsist between these, are intelligible and generated, belief naturally impartible and partible, and after another manner simple and composite. Genera¬ tion therefore, in the soul is one lliiii” but that in the body another. And tin* one, indeed, is prior and more aneieiit ; tor it is more proximate to the l)eiuiur*4iis of all things; but the other is secondary and more recent ; for it is more remote from the one [tabrirative cause nt all. ImiIIht sti! , \irtueis present with the soul, and it is also pr. sent with the body, and the whole animal; but the \ ntue of the soul is more divine, and that of the body, abject. And tin-former is of a more niliuir nature, and is nearer to the mm a! causes of intelliuibh Grtiie; hut the latter is of an attendant nature, and is more remote from iiilelh-ibles. Can ration, kuar, muni ft its progression, hut virtue, perfec- tivnundimivusiun ; of whit !», the former is from the fot ntam ot the soul . 1 but the latter is inherent in souls from i'onlal \irtue, (i. e from Vesta j. 'Hie prior list It also, and the more ancient, have a certain tlitli n nee w itli respect to each other. J-'or prior inthed, is si'jiiifieant if order alone ; but the more am nut, of the han- scemlcney of cause u ith nfireme to tin thing caused. Not eveiy thina therefore whieh is prior, can al>o be c died more atiei. nt, but that whit h is the leader <>l essence to seenmlary natures. Both however are true of the soul. F«.r sin* is allotted a prior order, beim; the sist, r of body, aeeordin- to the progression ot both from one fabriealion ; and >he ^viierates and adorns body in coiijnm lion with the father. IW the first pro-eny of raiiss, produce as they proceed the s* corn! progeny, in conjunction with tin* eau-es ot tin uist ns.

What, however, shall vve say of the words , the lord and ruler 9 Do not both indicate, that the soul supplies all things with^ood, that it provides in every respee, for the hotly, ami that it pn-serves its own proper good in a thuinshin- condition.* And how is it possible, that Plato should not manifest these things throiuih these wolds? For a despot or lord, alw ay s refers lh»r good ' ut those that

• Ii i, nct-Cssarv In 11 1 <» »u|i|ilv riji yi'X’O t hv louiltaiu ot I lie v»ul i~ Juno,

1 I'or ui/if»iii"t' in tin* |»I.u.e, read m/iuioi.

I l„,icud of ru TU,V uvuO-. n. a^.,... ill this |il.iee, U is m|iiisilf to re.ul ru ruie

uyuOu uvayfpet.

mink m.J

TIMAiL'S Ol- PLATO.