a circle, us a wheel w hen rolled along. But it is the peculiarity of the world, that being circular it is moved in a circle, through h.irmonimislv revolving about the centre. In a still greater decree however, the do me laiiililidms, appropriately interprets the meaning of these words. For he says that the circle is twofold, the one being psychical, hut the other corporeal, and that the latter is moved in the former. For tlu> is conformable to what has been before said, ami accords with what is afterw ards asserted. For Plato himself shortly after moves the corporeal nature accordin'; to the psychical circle, and renders the twofold circulations analogous to the periods in the soul. And such is the interpretation according to both these philosophers.
Moreover, to comprehend the whole blessedness of the world in three appel¬ lations, is most appropriate to that which subsists according to a triple cause, viz. the final, the paradigmatic, and the demiurgic. I’or of the appellations them¬ selves, the first of them, viz. owe, i> assumed from tin* final cause; (or the one is the same with the good. I’uit the second, viz. single or only, is assumed from the para¬ digmatic cause. For the onhf-heyotten and onli/ms.s (uovfieru) were, prior to the universe, m all-perfect animal. And the third, viz. the solitary, i< assumed from the demiurgic cause. For the ability of using itself, and through itself governing the world, |noreeds from the demiurgic goodness. The world therefore, is owe, so far as it is united, and is converted to the vtic. lint it is single, so far as it par¬ ticipates ol the inti lligihlr, and rompr«‘ln*n«l>j nil things in itself. And it is solitary , so far as it is similar to its lather, and is able to save itsi If. l*rom llie three how¬ ever, it appears that it is a God. For the one, the perfect, and the se//-su//icient, are the elements of deity. Hence, the world receiving these, i> also itself a God; being one indeed, according to liyparxis ; but single or only according to a per¬ fection which derives its completion from all sensible natures; and solitary , through being sutlicient to itself.' For those that lead a solitary life, lieing con¬ verted to tin mselves, have the hopes of salvation in themselves And that this is the meaning of the term solitary, will he evident from the following words of Plato;
" Able through virtue to eon vet sc with itself, indigent of nothing exter¬ nal, and sufficiently known and friendly to itsell.”
For in these words, he clearly manifests what the solitariness is which lie ascribes to the world, and that he denominates that being solitary, who looks to himself, to that with which he is furnished, and to his own proper
1 The world is jing/r, or alont, because llicre i* not another world equal to it; but it »s solitary* because it is sulhcicnt to itself, bo that the alone, and the solitary, have not here the same meaniuj.
Proclus on Tui
measure. For those that live in solitary places am the saviours of them¬ selves, so far as respects human causes. The uni*erne therefore is likewise after this manner solitary, as being sufficient to itself, and preserving itself, not through a diminution, hut from an exuberance of power; for self-sufficiency is here indicated; and as he says, through virtue. For he alone among partial animals [such as we are] who posst sses virtue, is aide to associate* with, and love him self with a parental affection. Hut the vicious man looking to his inward liaseness, is indignant with himself ami with his own essence, is astonished vvi.ii externals, and pursues an association with others, in coiisei|uence of his inability to behold himself. On the contrary, the worthy man perceiving himself beau, titul rejoices and is delighted, and producing in himself beautiful conceptions, gladly embraces an association with himself, l or we are naturally domesticated hj the beautiful, but hastily withdraw ourselves from deformity. Hence, if the world possesses virtue adapted to itself, in its intellectual and psychit al essence, and m the |ierfcction of its animal nature, looking to itself, it loves itself, and is present with, and suffieii nt to itself.
Ills proper therefore, to assert these things to those vvho place intelligible* cxtimal to intellect. For how can that which t< nils to other things, and as being deficient is indigent of externals, l« blessed? Hence, it the world is through virtue converted to itself, must not iutelleet do this m a much "renter decree? Intellect therefore intellectually pereciv. - it^i-ll' And this is among the number of things immediately know n. this uUn ileserves to be ri marked, ileal Plato when he gives animation to the world, directly imparts virtue to it. For the par¬ ticipation of soul is immediately accompanied with the fulness of virtue, m the lieiii" which subsists according to nature ; since the one cause of the virtues, 1 is also co-arranged with the fountain of souls,' and the progression of this fountain is conjoined with the progression of soul. For with respect to virtue, one indeed is unical. primary and all-perfect; but another subsists in the ruling supermun¬ dane Gods ; another in tin* lilierated Hods; and another is mundane, through which the whole world possesses nude tiled inti Uigence, an undev iating life, an energy converted to itself, and a purity uumingled with the animals which it < on- tains. From this virtue therefore, the world becomes known and friendly to itself. For knowledge precedes fnmiliuritv.
Since the universe also is intellectual, an animal, and a Hod, so far indeed, as it is intellectual, it becomes known to itself; hut so far as it is a (iod, it is friendly to itself For union is more perfect than knowledge. If therefore, the universe is known to itself, it is int* lh dual ; for that which is primarily known to itself is
i. r. Vela.
' i. c. J.a: j.
UUOK Ili.J
Tl MAX'S OF IM.ATO.
intellect. And if it is friendly to itself it is united. But that which is united is deified; for the one w liirli i-. m intellect is a (iod. Airnin therefore, you liave % irlue, a knowledge of, and a friendship with itself, in the world; the first of these proceed¬ ing into it from -mil; the second - from intellect ; and the third from deity. Hence Plato very properly adds, that on account of these things, the world was "ene- rated by the Dcmiurppis a ldessed Hod ; for the presence of soul, the participation of intellect, and the reception of union, render the universe a (iod. And the blessed < iod which lie now mi ntioiis is the (iod “ xrhnat a certain time would exist animated, endued with intellect, and united Union however, is present with it according to the bond of analogy ; but much more from the one soul and the one intellect which it participates. For through these, greater bonds, and a mure excellent union proceeded into the universe. And still beyond these unions, divine friendship, and the supply of good, contain and connect the whole world. J'nr (hi bond u Ini h jmn m Is from intelh < t ami soul is strong, as Orpheus also says ; hut the union of the golden chain [/. c. of (he tlcijic scries] is still greater , and is the iau sc of gnu Ur good to all things.
Moreover, felicity must likewise be assumed in a way adapted to the universe. For since it is suspended from the p it< rn d intellect, and the whole fabrication of things, and since it live- conformably to those* causes, it is consequently happy (fj'i'xianiv)' from them. For the Demiur^iis also is denominated a da-inon by Plato in the Politicos, and a "real ibeinon by Orpheus, when he says,
(•in' llic "i< ;it (I,« iiiini and tInc lord of all.
lie therefore vvho lives according to the will of the father, and preserves th»* iiiLelleclual nature w hicii was imparted to him from thence immutable is happy and blessed. The first and the all-perfect form of felicity likewise, is that of the world. The second is that of the mundane (toils, whom Plato in the Phaidrus (■alls happy (bids following the mighty Jupiter. The third is that of the genera superior to us [vi/. the leiicitr of an"-Is, daemons and heroes], loir there is one v irlue of angels, another of difiions, anil another of the heroic genera : and the form of felirity is triple, being different according to each genus. The fourth formof felicity is that which subsists in the undetilcd souls, who make blameless descents [into the realms of generation,] anti exert an inflexible and untamed life. The fifth is that of partial souls [such a« ours]; and this is multiform. For the soul which is an attendant ou the moon, is not similarly happy with the soul that is
1 i. r. Havmz a Kood (l,t mon
* Instead <»J m f'aifittr tysttro fisyai n»o Tai rwi’, it if rd|Ui«lf to read tit isnfjir yrrtrv^tyai
u ? » X (.« uTa irwr.
?•. Vol. II. B
IMtOCLlIS ON TIIK
{ BOOK III.
suspended from the solar order ; hut as the form of life is different, so likewise perfection is defined l.y different measures. And the last form of felicity is that which is sis-n in irrational animals. For every thin- which obtains a perf.-ction adapted to it accord in-to nature is happy. For through its proper perfection, it is conjoined to its proper ihvmoii, and partakes of his providential can*. I ie forms of felicity therefore, 1 m in- so many, the tir>t and highest must lie plaeed in the world, and which also is now mentioned bv l’lato. \\ e nm-t not. however, woinh r that he immediat. Iv calls the world a < It id. from its p irtieip itinii of soul. For every thin- is deified ihrou-h that wliieli is proximatcly prior !■» it ; the corpo¬ real world indeed through soul; hut soul through intellect, as 1 lie Athenian guest also says; (lor he asserts that by receiving intellect soul Incomes * ^■•*«!.) and intellect throu-h the one. Hence, intellect is dome, hut not a God. 1 The out however is no lunger a God throu-h an\ thin- . l>i*. hut is primarily a God ; just as int. lleet is primarily -nostir, as m»u 1 is primarily self-motive, and as hudy 11 primarily in place. Hut tie -e thill-► being p*-i-l«-< lly true, and peculiar to IMato, it is necessary to survey in what follows, where he i stahlishes intellect in soul, as here he plaei s soul in hodv.
“ B u t, indeed, iliviuitv did not thus afterwards artificially produce the soul, as we just now endeavoured to say, junior to the hodv. I 01 hew in conjoined these, would never permit that the more ancient, nature should be governed by the younger.”
IMato knew that the mode according to conversion, eutiivlv delivers as first, things which arc second in order. For things which are proximatelv partici¬ pated, are secondary to those that are rveiiipl ; and such as are more known to
the hearers, are inferior to invisible ihiii-s. Tin* cause however of this is, that
when we now survey beings we ire in a fallen condition. I m when we menu hi^h, mid b« hold the tlun-s tli.it are lu re limn .1 certain shadow, we me ahh to perceive their «1 imitintiv•• nature, in consequence ol associating w ith inti Hi—ibles. and bavin- them before mu eves, lint falling into generation, and surveying tlun^s as it were III a siipnu eoiulition, we Iiis( perceive niboU, and things proximate to our senses, as III -i It- placed nearer I • Us \ Oil be^ilinill- ll'olil tin se, w*- recur through reminiscence to bein-s themselves and truly existing essence.
* t. r. lullllrcl, i' in it' ‘>"11 oat tire ilivim , uml n> I j (■■*!; I'ul " la » •' s»|“ r ** ,r ‘ ,I|,M 1 < i>iimiIi«Mi ill »illi ll, it o Him ■>
r.ooK ni.j
\ or plato.
if
The survey therefore from on high, will be lli.it of souls abiding there ; but the sur¬ vey from beneath, will h<* that of souls who have separated tin inselves [from the in¬ telligible world]. And tlie judgment indeed, which originates from things essential¬ ly more aneii nf, is that of souls living according to iute'd-cl; but the judgment " liieh proreeds from secondary to first natures, is the judgment of fallen souls. For truly existing being i' near to souls that abide in the intelligible; but non- to those that are in a fallen condition. For that which abides, abides in lieing, and that which falls [from the intelligible], is situated m non-bein". But to each of these, that m which it dwi lls is more proximate.