Moft£OT£m, the elements of beauty are the peculiarities of the third triad of intelligibles. But these are, as we have before observed, the lovely, the delicate, and the splendid. The lovely therefore, being ar- ranged analogous to the desirable, pertains to bound. But the delicate being coordinate to the sufficient, pertains to the infinite power which is in the beautiful. And the splendid is of an intellectual peculiarity. For this is the beautiful of beauty ; is that which illuminates all things, and astonishes those that are able to behold it. And as apparent beauty shining most manifestly, is seen through the clearest of the senses (for the objects of this sense have many differences according to Aristotle* and this sense pervades farther than the rest) so likewise intelligible beauty appears to the intellect of the soul shiuiug intelligibly. For it is an in- telligible form. And on this account the splendor of beauty is apparent to iutellect. Splendid beauty therefore, us Socrates calls it, shines forth at the extremity of die intelligible order. For this is the most splendid of intelligibles, is intelligible intellect, and is that which emits the intelligible light, that when it appeared astonished the intellectual Gods, and made them admire their father* as Orpheus says. Such tlierefore is the prepa- ration to the science of the intelligible Gods which may from these tilings, be assumed. And now it will appear how beauty is indeed occultly in.
BOOK 111.
the end of the first intelligible triad, but subsists in the third triad so as to have manifestly proceeded into light. For in the former it subsists ac- cording to one form only ; but in the latter it subsists triadically. It is also evident how each of the triads is at one and the same time a monad and a triad. For the first triad being characterized according to the good,derives its completion from the three elements of the good. But the second being characterized by the wise is contained in the triad of wisdom. And the third subsisting according to the beautiful, is all-perfect through the triad of beauty. If however the beautiful is occultly in the first triad, and shines forth triadically in the third, it is evident that intelligible intellect loves the first triad, and has love conjoined with its beauty. And this is the intelligible love of the first beauty. From these there- fore, intellectual love proceeds, together with faith and truth, as we have before observed. For the three intelligible monads, the good, the wise and the beautiful, constitute three powers which lead upwards all other things, and prior to other things the intellectual Gods. Concerning these things however, we shall speak hereafter.
Let us now then direct our attention to the theory of the Parmenides. But I wish again to remind the reader of what we have before demon- strated. It has been shown therefore, that it is necessary to divide the second hypothesis into the whole progressions of the one being ; and that this hypothesis is nothing else than the generation and progression of the Gods, proceeding supernally from the supreme union of intelligible* as far as to a deified essence. For the discussion is not, as some say it is, in the first hypothesis, concerning God and the Gods. For it was not lawful to Parmenides to conjoin multitude with the one, and the one with mul-
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Chap. Xx1i1. of Plato. 207
titude. For the first God is perfectly exempt from the whole of things. But in the first hypothesis essence, and even the one itself, are taken away from the first God. That such an ablation, however, as this is not adapted to the other Gods is evident to every one. Moreover, neither does Par- menides in the first hypothesis speak about the intelligible Gods, as they say he does ; for they assert that the negations are of these Gods, because they are conjoined with the one, and in simplicity and union precede ' all thedivine genera. For how can the similar or the dissimilar, or contact and the privation of contact, and all the other particulars which are denied of the one, be inherent in the intelligible Gods ? They appear indeed to me to be right in asserting that the things which are taken away are simili- tudes of the Gods ; but they do not speak rightly when they say that all of them are similitudes of the intelligible Gods. To which it may be added, in opposition to this assertion, that the discussion is again con- cerning the intelligible Gods in the second hypothesis. For the things which are denied in the first, are affirmed in the second hypothesis. This therefore, as I have said, is demonstrated that the conclusions with refer- ence to each other have the order of prior and posterior, of causes and effects. It is necessary therefore, that proceeding from the beginning, we should adapt the first conclusions to the first orders, the middle conclu- sions to the middle orders, and the last conclusions k> the hist orders, and should demonstrate that as many questions arc asked, us there are pro- gressions of the divine orders. .And in the first place, we must deliver the doctrine of Parmenides concerning the intelligible Gods, of whom we have proposed to speak ; since Plato speaks about these in many places, partly indicating, and partly clearly untbldinghis meaning.
It is necessary however, that we should collect into one the elaborate and synoptical theory about each order, since it would not be proper now to repeat the exposition which we have given in our commentaries on that dialogue. But assuming each of the conclusions itself by itself, I will endeavour to refer it to an appropriate order of the Gods, following in so doing thedivine inspirations of our leader [Syrianus]. For wealsa
• For ff«x«iTi{ it it neccwary to reid xgo^omf.
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208 ON T,*K THEOLOGY BOOK III.
through his assistance have with a divine head pursued these sacred paths about the theory of the Parmenides, being agitated with a divine fury, and wakened as from a profound sleep to this arcane mystic discipline. And thus much concerning the mode of tl»e whole of the conclusions. But from hence I shall pass to the narration of the things proposed.
The first and im participate one therefore, which preexists beyond the whole of things, and not only beyond the unities that participate, but also those that are participated, is celebrated through the first hypothesis, being demonstrated to be the cause of ull things ineffably, but not being defined itself in any one of all things, nor having any power or peculiarity of a kindred nature with the other Gods. But after this [imparticipable one,] that which is aloae supercssential and surpassing, and unmingled with all hyparxis, is a unity participated by being, and constituting about itself the first essence, and by the addition of this participation becoming more redundant than that which is primarily one. This however is a superesscntial hyparxis, and the hyparxis of the first intelligible triad. As there are therefore these two things in the first triad, viz. the one and being, and the former generates, but the latter is generated, and the former perfects, but the latter is perfected, it is necessary that the middle of both should be power, through which and together with which the one con- stitutes and is perfective of being. For the progression of being from the me, and its conversion to the one, is through power. For what else con- joins being to the one, or causes the one to be participated by being except power? For it is the progression of the one, and its extension to being. Hence, in all the divine genera powers precede progressions and generations. This triad therefore, the one, power and being, is the summit of intelhgibles. The first of these indeed producing ; the third being pro- duced ; and the second being suspended from the one, but coalescing with
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CHAP. XXtV.
This triad therefore, Parmenides delivers immediately in the beginning of the second hypothesis, adjoining to the one the most simple participa- tion of essence. But he calls it the one being, and says that being par- ticipates of the one, and the one of being. The participation however of these is different. For the one ' indeed so participates of being, as illumi- nating and filling, and deifying being ; but being so participates of the one, as suspended from the one, and deified by it. But the habitude which is the middle of both, is not with them void of essence. For neither is the habitude which is among sensibles in no respect being, and much more is this the case with the habitude which is there. But this habitude is biformed. For it is of the one, and is connascent with being. For it is the motion of the one, and its progression into being. Parmenides de- livers this triad, beginning what he says about it as follows : " See there- fore from the beginning if the one is. Is it possible then for it to be, and yet not to participate of essence ? It is not possible." But he ends speaking about it in the following words : " Will therefore that which is said be any thing else than this, that the. one participates of essence, when it is summarily asserted by any one that the one is ? It will not." This there- fore is the first intelligible triad, the one, being, and the habitude of both, through which being is of the one and the one of being, in a manner per- fectly admirable ; Plato indicating through these things, that the father is the father of intellect, and that intellect is the intellect of the father, anil that power is concealed between the extremes. For deity is the father of the triad, and bein*; is the intellect of this deity. Yet it is not intel- lect in the same way as we are accustomed to call the intellect of essence. For every such intellect stands still and is moved, as the Elean guest says.
• In the original n o», but the true reading is eridemlf r» alone. Proc. Vol. I. *2 D
*10 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOKIH.
But that which is primarily being, neither stands still, nor is moved, as he also teaches. The first triad therefore is called one being ; since power is here occultly. For the triad docs not proceed from itself ; but subsists without separation and uniformly, being primarily defined according to divine union. Hence, this is the first participation of essence, which participates of the one through power as the middle, which collects toge- ther and separates both the one and being. And it is supcressential in- deed, but is conjoined with essence. We must never think therefore that all power is the progeny of essence. For the powers of the Gods are su- peressential, and are consubsistent with the unities themselves of the Gods. And through this power the Gods are generative of beings. Rightly there- fore, does poetry every where assert that the Gods are able to do all things. For essential powers indeed are not capable of effecting all things ; since they are not constitutive of supcrcssential natures. The first triad therefore, is through these things unfolded to us by Parinenides.
But immediately after this, the second triad is allotted a progression, which Parmenides characterises by intelligible wholeness, as we have shown in the Sophista, For the first triad being uniform, and possessing all things intelligibly and occultly, viz. hyparxis, power and being, so that power which is the cause of division, subsisting between the one and being, is concealed, and becomes apparent through the communion of the ex- tremes with each other,— the second triad proceeds, being characterized by the first intelligible power, and having the monads in itself distinguished from each other. For all things being uuited and without distinction in the first triad, distinction and separation shine forth in this triad. Being also and power arc more divided from each other. And that which con-