sists of these is no longer one being [or being characterized by the one,] but is a whole, so that it has the one and being in itself as parts. For above indeed [i. e. in the first triad] all things are prior to parts and wholeness. But ip this triad there are both parts and a whole, power unfolding itself into light. For as there is separation here, there are parts and the w hole consisting of these. The second triad therefore is called intelligible wholeness. But the parts of it, the one and being, I call the extremes. And power being here the middle, connects the one and being, and does not cause them to be one, in the same manner as in the first triad. Since also it is the middle of both, through its communion indeed with being, it renders the one one being ; but through its communion with the vnc, it perfectly causes being to be one. And thus the one being con- sists of two parts, viz. of being which is characterised by the one, and of the one which is characterized by being, as Parmenides himself says. He begins therefore to speak about this triad as follows : " Again therefore, let us say if the one is what will happen. Consider then if it is not ne- cessary that this hypothesis should signify the one to be a thing of such a kind as to have parts f But- he ends in the following words : •* That which is one therefore is a whole, and has a part."
Through these things therefore Parmenides defines the second order of intelligible* to be a wholeness. For as existence is derived to all things from the first triad, so whole from the second, and an nil-perfect division from the third. This however will be considered by us hereafter. Whole- ness therefore is triple, being either prior to parts, or consisting of parts, or .subsisting in a part, according to the doctrine of Plato. For in the Politico* indeed, he calls genus a whole, but species a part, not that genus derives its completion from species, but exists prior to it. And in the Timseus he says that the world is a whole of wholes. And all the world indeed derives its completion from parts that are wholes ; but each of the parts is n whole, not as the universe is, but partially. Wholeness there- fore, being triple as we have said, according to Plato, the unity, and the intelligible and occult cause of these is now delivered, unically compre- hending and constituting three wholenesses ; according to the hyparxis indeed of itself, the wholeness prior to parts ; but according to its power,
Digitized by 'Google
the wholeness which is from parts ; and according to its being the whole- ness which is in a part. For the one is prior to all multitude ; but power communicates in a certain respect with both the extremes, and compre- hends in itself the peculiarities of them ; and being in a certain respect participates of the one. Hence the first of the wholenesses, or that which is prior to parts is derived from a unical hyparxis. For it is a monad, and is itself constitutive of parts, and of the multitude which is in them. But the second wholeness is from power. For it derives its completion from parts, just as in the power which is collective of the one and being, the extremes in a certain respect shiue forth to the view. And the third wholeness is from being. For being is a part, and is the progeny both of power and the one,' and possesses each of these partially. After the in- telligible therefore, three wholenesses are divided according to the differ- ent orders of beings. But the intelligible wholeness comprehends the three unically, and is the intelligibly connective monad of this triad, every way extending the powers of itself from the middle of the intelligible and occult order.
Immediately after this triad we may sec another proceeding, in which all intelligible multitude shines forth, and which Parmenides indeed constitutes a wholeness, but a wholeness consisting of many parts. For after the occult union of the first triad, and the dyadic separation of the second, the progression of the third is generated, which has indeed its subsistence from parts, but the parts are many, with the multitude of which the triad prior to it is parturient. For in this triad there is a unity, and power, and being. But the one is multiplied, and also being and
' Instead of «vro; it is necessary to read m;.
power. And thus all the triad indeed is a wholeness; but each of its ex- tremes, viz. the one and being, as it is multitude conjoined through collec- tive power, is again divided and multiplied. For this power conjoining unical multitude to the multitude of beings, of some of these it causes each through progression to be being characterized by the one, but of others each according to participation to be the one characterized by be- ing. For here indeed there are two parts of the wholeness, the one and being ; but the one participates of being, for it is conjoined with it ; and being participates of the one. The one of being therefore, is again divid- ed, so that the one and being generate a second unity conjoined with the part of being. But being participating of the one, is again separated into being and the one. For it generates a more partial being suspended from a more partial unity. And being consists of more partial deified beings, and is a more specific monad. The cause however of this progression is power. For power is effective of two things, and is the operator of multitude. For the one indeed calls forth into multitude, but being con- verts to the participation of the divine unities. Whence therefore does Parmenides begin to teach us -concerning this triad? And where docs he conclude his discourse about it? The beginning, therefore, of what he says on this subject is as follows : " What then ? Can each of these parts of the one being, viz. the one and being, desert each other, so that the one shall not be a part of being, or being shall not be a part of the one t It cannot be.'" But he ends thus : " Will not, therefore, the one being after this manner be an infinite multitude ? It seems so."
In the first place, therefore, it is proper to understand the manner of the progression of the divine genera; and that conformably to the intel- ligible monad, which we arrange according to the one being, the duad posterior to it which we call a wholeness [proceeds.] But we say that it consists of two parts which are separated by power, and that intelligible multitude presents itself to the view from the monad and the duad. For when all things are said to be parts of the one being, viz. secondary things, and such as become apparent through the separating cause of power, then
1 It U necessary to cornet the text here, and to read as follow* : tuw; raw p*pun immpn rov» raw tow »»$• orr»{ to, ti it x«i ts oy ap* (nroXfnrraim, q to it. ». r. K.
Digitized by Google
ON the ti]j:olo<;y
HOOK lit.
Parmenides delivers the union which pervades from the monad to the third triad. But when power separating and conjoining the unities and beings gives completion to multitude, then the participation of the duad becomes perfectly apparent, as 1 think Parmenides demonstrates when he says, " so that it is necessary two things should always he generated, and that there should never be one thing (only.)" This triad, therefore, pro- ceeds according to both the preexistent triads, flowing according to the Oracle, and proceeding to all intelligible multitude. For infinite multitude is indicative of this flux, and of the incomprehensible nature of power. Hence, in the first place, I have said that the hypostasis of this triad is through these things demonstrated to l>e suspended from the triads prior to it. And in the next place, I say, that this triad, according to Parme- nides, is primogenial. For this first imparts the power of being generated; and Parmenides calls the multitude which is in it in generation, [i.e. be- coming to be, or rising into existence^] For he says : " And the part w ill be generated from two parts at least." And again : " Whatever part is generated, will always have these parts." And in what follows : •* So that it is necessary it should always be generated two things, and should never be* one."' Does not he, therefore, who frequently uses the word ge- • Deration in teaching concerning the progression of the intelligible multi- tude, proclaim that the natures prior to this order are more united to each other? But this order proceeds to a greater extent, unfolds the occult nature of the triads prior to itself, and is primogenial, unfolding in itself prolific power.
In addition to these things also, it is necessary to consider the infinity of multitude, not as those think fit to speak, who assume the infinite in quantity, but since in the principles of the whole of things, there are bound and infinity, the former being the cause of the union, but the latter of the separation of multitude^ Parmenides calls the first and intel- ligible multitude infinite, because all multitude indeed, according to its own nature, is infinite, as being the progeny of the first infinity. All in- telligible multitude, however, is a thing of this kind. For it is the first multitude, and multitude itself. But multitude itself is the first progeny of intelligible infinity. Intelligible multitude, therefore, is on this ac-
Digitized by Google
Chap. Xxvii. of Plato. 415
count infinite, as unfolding into light the first infinity, and this infinity is the same with the all-perfect. For that which has proceeded to the all, and as far as it is requisite an intelligible nature should proceed, through the power which is generative of the whole of things, is infinite. For it cannot be comprehended by any other thing. But intelligible multitude is comprehensive of all intelligible multitude. For if indeed that which is primarily infinite, was infinite according to quantity, it would be re- quisite to admit that the intelligible is infinite multitude of this kind. Since, however, the intelligible is infinite power, it is necessary that the partici- pant of the primarily infinite, should cause infinity to shine forth accord- ing to the power which is comprehensive of all prior natures. And if it be requisite to relate my own opinion, as that which is primarily one is primarily bound, so that which is primarily- multitude is infinite multitude. For it receives the whole power of infinity, and producing all unities, and all beings, as far as to the most individual natures, it possesses never-failing power. It is, therefore, more total than all multitude, and is an incom- prehensible infinite. Hence unfolding into light all multitude, it bounds and measures it by iufinite power, and through wholeness introduces bound to all things. These tlnngs, therefore, may be assumed from Par- uienides concerning the third intelligible triad.
CHAFFER XXVII.
Let us in the next place speak in common about all the intelligible triads. With respect to the first triad, therefore, which is occult, and is allotted the intelligible summit in intelligibles, Plato at one time proceed- ing from the union which is in it, and its exempt transcendency with re- spect to the other triads, denominates it one, as in the Tiinacus. For eter- nity, says he, abides in one. Hut reason evinces that this one is the first triad of intelli»ibles. But at another time proceeding from the extremi-
Digitized by Google
BOOK HI.
ties which arc in it, viz. that which is participated, and that which parti- cipates, he calls it the one being, considering the power which is compre- hended in these as ineffable, in consequence of its subsisting uniformly and occultly. And at another time, he uufolds the whole of it, accord- ing to the monads which are in it, bound, infinity, and that which is mixed; bound indeed indicating its divine hyparxis, infinity its generative power, and that which is mixed, the essence proceeding from this power. Plato, therefore, as I have said, teaches us through these names the first intelligible triad ; at one time indeed through one name, but at another through two names, and at another again through three names, unfolding it to our view. For there is a triad in it, according to which the whole is characterized ; and a duad according to which the extremes communicate with each other ; and a monad which exhibits the ineffable, occult, and unical nature of the first, through its own monads.