Proclus' Theology of Plato (Six Books) — trans. Thomas Taylor (1816)

whole is the coherence and union of the all. But the one being is in the first triad. For the me is especially the peculiarity of this triad, as Timseus also has demonstrated. And being which is occultly and intelli- gibly being, and which is the cause of essence to all other things, prima- rily shines forth there. Again therefore, following the Eiean guest, three triads present themselves to our view ; the first indeed according to the one being ; the second according to whole ; and the third according to the all. To which also the demiurgus of the universe looking, adorns the sensible universe, defining the visible nature with reference to that intelligible all ; but time with reference to the intelligible wholeness. On which account also time is continued. And as the intelligible whole com- prehends two parts, but contains the parl6 in one boundary, after the same manner, time also is bounded by the now, but by its twofold parts is in- finite. These things therefore, we shall shortly after more fully discuss when we speak concerning the Parmenides. For the conceptions of the Blean guest are the pretekia of the mysteries of the Parmenides. Before however we turn to the Parmenides, let us discuss, if it is agreeable to you, the three triads from the beginning, collecting the conception of Plato from his assertions that are scattered in many places.

There are three triads therefore, as we have frequently observed, and they are divided after this manner into bound, infinity, and that which is mixed. Hence there are triple intelligible bounds, triple inBnities, and triple mixtures. But of every intelligible triad, the bound in each is de- nominated father; the infinite, power; and that which is mixed, intellect. And let not any one apprehend that these names are foreign from the philosophy of Plato. For it will appear that he uses these appellations

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CHAP XXI.

in the before mentioned triads more than any one. For be denominate* the first God father and lord in his Epistles- It is evident however, that as the first God surpasses oven the paternal order, the first paternal is in the intelligible Gods. For these arc they that are most eminently allied to the one, and that intelligibly unfold his ineffable and unknown union. If therefore the first God is denominated one and father from the nature* that proximately proceed from him, — if this be the case, as the intelligible Gods are primarily unities, so likewise they are primarily fathers. For Plato gives names to the inefTable in a twofold respect, either from the summits of beings, or from all beings. For through these the transcen- dency of the one is known. Moreover, the Elean guest calls being that which is powerful and power. The first power therefore exists prior to being, and is united to the father ; but it particularly accords with being, which also it fills. Hence being as participating of power is denominated powerful; but as united to it, and producing all beings according to it, it is called power. If however both Plato himself, and his most genuine disciples, frequently call all [true] beings intellect (on which account, in many places they make three principles, the good, intellect and soul, denominating every [true] being intellect) you will also have the third in these intellect. But it is necessary not to be ignorant of the difference. For with respect to intellect, one kind is intellect as with reference to hyparxis. For when we denominate the unity in each triad intelligible, as the abject of desire to being, and as filling being, then we call that which ranks as the third in the triad intellect. For it is intelligible as essence and intellect, but not as the intellect of essence, but of father and deity. For every participated deity is intelligible, as being the plenitude of its participant. But another kind is intellect which is the intellect of essence ; according to which we say that the being of the third triad, is the intellect of that which is primarily being. For this is essential intel- lect, being allotted its own essence by energising.' For all things are essentially in it, and both the more simple genera, and the primary pa-

radigms ; for it is intelligible intellect. But the third kind is intellectual

' For svro r* ntfytm h it

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intellect, which subsists analogous to intelligible intellect, is conjoined with it, and is filled from it, possessing intellectually those things which are in the other intelligibly. And in short, it is necessary every where that such things as are first according to each series, should have the form of the things that are prior to them. Hence also they are called things first, and possess a certain transcendency of essence towards coordinate na- tures. Since therefore, that which is prior to intelligibles is God, the first intelligibles are Gods and unities. And since the intelligible is essential, the first intellects are essences. Since also intellect is every where ac- cording to its own nature intellectual, the first souls are intellectual. Because likewise, souls are the plenitudes of life, the first of bodies are most vital. And because the bodies that are perpetual are moved in a circle, the summits of material bodies are moved in conjunction with those bodies that are perpetual. This therefore is the cause why the unities are frequently called intelligibles, and beings intelligible intellects.

That Plato however knew this triad, I mean father, power and intellect, we shall learn by looking to the demiurgic order. For in this the triad is most remarkably apparent. Hence, on account of its union with the in- telligible, it is filled with this triad, and possesses these things in a more divided manner than animal itself, or intelligible eternity. Immediately therefore, in the beginning of the fabrication in the Timaeus, the demi- urgus calls himself father, " Of which works I am the demiurgus and father." But shortly after he unfolds his power, " Imitating my power in your generation." This therefore is also wonderful, that he lias deli- vered to us the most theological conception concerning power. For in the first place indeed, he calls it the power of the father, when he says, " Of which works I am the demiurgus and father," and that the power is his, [is evident from the words,] " Imitating my power :" so that accord- ing to Plato power is of the lather. And in the next place, he ascribes to this power a peculiarity generative of the whole of things ; for this is evident from the words " In your generation." Power therefore is the cause of generation and of the progression of beings. And in the last place, he delivers the intellectual peculiarity of the demiurgus. " Having thus spoke, again into the former crater in which he had tempered the

CHAP. XXI.

soul of the universe, lie poured mingling the remainder of the former mixture.* For to pour, to mingle, mixture* and to be productive of soul, pertain to intellect. Though what necessity is there for asserting these things, since prior to this he calls the demiurgus intellect. A Whatever ideas therefore intellect perceived by the dianoctic energy in animal itself, such and so many he conceived it necessary for this universe to contain." Hence the demiurgu« is father, and power and intellect. And he poss- esses these things as much as possible on account of intelligiblcs. For he is a God as father, on account of them. He is also power, and the gene- rator of wholes, and knows beings intellectually, on account of them. For in them intelligible knowledge first subsists. Much more therefore are father, power and intellect in intelligibles ; from which also the demi- urgus being filled, participates of this triad. For Plato assumes each of these analogously. For as the paternal triad in intelligibles gives sub- sistence to intelligible eternity, so the demiurgus makes those works to be indissoluble of which he is the father. And as in intelligibles, eternity proceeding according to all power generates intelligible animal itself, so the demiurgic power gives subsistence to mundane animals that are per- petual and divine, and imparts to the junior Gods another power which is generative of mortal animals. That any one therefore may assume these names from Plato is evident from what has been said.

Since however, being has an hypostasis triply in intelligibles, one is primarily being and prior to the eternal ; but another is secondarily being, and the first eternity ; and another is being ultimately, and is intelligible and eternal intellect. And here indeed there is being, but there eternity, and there intellect. And eternity is more comprehensive than intellect; but being than eternity. For every intellect is eternal, but not every thing eternal is intellect. For soul according to its essence is eternal, and every thing which participates of eternity, participates also by a much greater priority ot being. For with perpetuity of existence, existence is entirely consubsistent. But that which participates of existence is not universally eternally being. For bodies also participate in a certain res- pect of the nature of existence, but they are not eternal. Intellect there- fore constitutes an intellectual essence only, so far as it is intellect ; since

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so far as it is also life and being it constitutes uil things. But eternity constitutes both the intellectual and psychical essence. For the mixture [in the second triad] was intelligible life. But being constitutes the in- tellectual, the psychical, and the corporeal life. For matter also is being [most obscurely,] and is capacity indeed, but formless being, and non- being, falling offfrom the participation of being. If, however, some one should say that it is being in power or capacity, yet it has this power from being. For capacity is the forerunning participation of energy. And thus much concerning these things.

But what sufficient argument of division does Socrates afford us in tlio Fbttdrus, concerning these intelligible triads ? And how from what it delivered by him may we recur to the conception of the hypostasis of the most principal Gods ? Socrates therefore in that dialogue, being inspired by the Nymphs, celebrates every thing divine as beautiful, wise and good, and 6ays that by these the aoul is nourished. But if every thing divine is a thing of this kind, this is the case with the intelligible by a much greater priority. And all these indeed are every where, but in the first triad, the good principally subsists ; in the second the wise ; and in the third the beautiful. For in this there is the most beautiful of intelligible*. But in the second triad truth and the first intelligence subsist. And in the first there is the commensurate, which we say is the same as the good. But Socrates in the Plnlebus says that the clement of the good is the de- al ruble, the sufficient, and the perfect. The desirable therefore pertains indeed to bound ; for it is the union and goodness of all the triad, and the triad converges about it. But the sufficient pertains to infinity. For sufficiency is a power capable of pervading to all things, and of being present to all things without impediment. And the perfect pertains to dint which is mixed. For this is that which is primarily triadic ; since every mixture has its coalition from the triad. The elements therefore of the good unfold to us the fir*t triad ; and the elements of intelligible wisdom, the second triad. But every thing wise is full of being, is gene- rative of truilt, and is convertive of imperfect natures to their perfection. The full Uterefore pertains to the second bound ; for this is uniformly filled with the participation of the natures prior to itself. For the full is every

Chap. Xx1l

where adapted to bound, just as that which cannot be fitted is adapted to the infinite. But the prolific pertains to the second power, and to infinity. For that which does not abide in the fulness of itself, but is prolific and generative of other things, is especially indicative of divine infinity. And the convertive pertains to that which is mixed. For this as being allotted the end of the triad, converts every thing imperfect to the full, and unite* itself prior to other things to the bound of the whole triad.