Proclus' Theology of Plato (Six Books) — trans. Thomas Taylor (1816)

however to me that intelligible intellect returning to the principles of the whole of thing*, according to the conversion of itself, it becomes the ple- nitude of forms, and is all things intellectually and at the same time in- telligibly, comprehending in itself the causes of beings, and being full of the ineffable and exempt cause of all things, constitutes the monad of the gods; whence also, Plato I think calls it the idea of the gods. But re- ceiving the intellectual causes of the three principles posterior to the one, it exhibits three ideas after this, one of them indeed, being the cause of air- wandering and volant animals, this cause proceeding analogous to bound. Hence also it constitutes gods that are uniform, elevating, undefiled, united to the celestial gods, and which receive measures second in dignity to theirs, and have the same relation to those gods that govern generation co-ordinately, as the celestial gods have to these, according to exempt transcendency. But it exhibits the cause of the aquatic gods, co-ordi- nate with generative and infinite power, and which produces gods that are tl>e suppliers of motion and prolific abundance, and that are the in- spective guardians of life ; since also this water itself which is the object of sense is under the dominion of effusion, infinite lation and indefinite- ncss. Hence likewise it is attributed to vivific powers. And intelligible intellect exhibits the precedancous cause of terrestrial and pedestrious gods, in a manner adapted to the nature of that which is mixed. It also generates gods who contain the end of the whole of things, who arc stable, who subdue the formless nature of matter by the last Ibrms, and fix the seat of mundaue natures in the one centre of the universe. For deriving their subsistence from the first Vesta as it were, or seat of brings, they sta- bly define this mundane seat. Thus therefore forms first unfold them- selves into light in intelligible intellect, possessing their progression and order according to the first principles. It is necessary however, in addi- tion to these things, to infer this in the third place, following Timaeua, that according to this triad, the multitude of intelligible parts shines forth, and the whole is divided into an all-perfect order of parts. For that, says he, of which other iutclligible animals both according to one, and according to genera are parts, is the first and most beautiful paradigm of die universe. But if other intelligible animals are parts of this, it is

Os the Theology

evident that it is a whole, comprehending in itself the multitude of in- telligible parts, and that it is connective of all intelligible parts. It must be inferred therefore that this triad is the first cause of production and fabrication. For if it contains the primary paradigms of things, it is evi- dent that the orderly distribution of secondary natures, originates from it. And if it is an animal constitutive of all animals, every psychical extent, and all the extent of bodies, have their progression from thence ; and it will also comprehend the intelligible causes of all the vivific and demiurgic orders.

Sue ii conceptions therefore, as these, may be assumed from what is written in the Timaeus concerning the three intelligible triads, conformably to what is said of them in the Philebus, surveying in each bound, infinity, and that which is mixed. If you are willing also, we will show from what is scattered in the Sophista, that Plato had the same conception as we have concerning the first principles. The Elean guest therefore, in that dialogue, doubting against the assertion of Parmenides that the uni- verse is one, unfolding intelligible multitude, and showing how it is sus- pended from the one, at first indeed, he argues from the one being [or being characterized by the one] and reminds us that this is passiveto/Ae one, and participates of the one, but is not the one itself, nor that which is prima- rily one. But afterwards, he produces the conception of the distinction between the imparticipable one and being, from whole. For if the one being is a whole, as Parmenides testifies, but that which is a whole has parts, and that which has parts, is not the one itself, the one being will not be the same as the one. In the third place therefore, he argues from the

Digitized by Google

all-perfect. For that which ii perfectly divided, and is connective of many parts, can never have the same subsistence as that which is entirely one. And having proceeded thus far he shows that what is void of mul- titude, is in its own nature exempt from the one being, proceeding in the demonstration of this through three arguments. And at one time indeed, he begins from the one being, at another time from whole, and at another from all. It is better however to hear the words themselves of Plato. That the one therefore, is not the same with the one being, he proves through the following words. " But what with respect to those who assert that the universe is one ? Must we not enquire to the utmost of our power what they say being is? Certainly. To this question therefore they may answer : Do you say there is one thing alone ? We do say so. Or will they not speak in this manner? They will. What then, do you call being any tiling ? Yes. Do you call it the owe, employing two names respecting the same thing? Or how do you say ? What will be their an- swer after this O guest ?' Through this therefore, Plato separating the one and being from each other, and showing that the conception of the one is different from that of being, and that these are not the same with each other, evinces that the most proper and primary one is exempt from the one being. For the one being does not abide purely in an hyparxis void of multitude and possessing the form of one. But the one itst/fn exempt from every addition. For by whatever you may add to it, you will di- minish its supreme and ineffahle union. Hence it is necessary to arrange the one prior to the one being, and to suspend the one being from that which is one alone. For if the one and the one being were the same, and it made no difference to say one and being (since it' they differed, the one would a <rHm be changed from the one being,) if therefore the one differs in no respect from the one being, all things will be one, and there will not be multitude in beings, nor will it be possible to denominate things, lest there should be two things, the thing and the name. For being ex- empt from all multitude, and all division, there will neither be a name of any thing, nor any discourse about it, but the name will appear to be the same with the thiug. And neither will a name be the name of a thing,

Book Iii

but a name will be die name of a name, if a thing is the same with a name, and a name is the same with a thing,' and a tiling will be the thing of a thing. For all things will exist about a thing the same as about a name, through the union of the thing and the name. If theretore, these things are absurd, and theone is, and also being, and being participates of the one, the one and the one being are not the same.

But that whole also is not the same with the one, Plato afterwards de- monstrates [in the same dialogue,] beginning as follows: " What then? Will they say that whole is different from the one being, or that it is the same with it? Undoubtedly they will and do say so. If therefore whole is, as Parmenides says, " that which is every where similar to the bulk of a perfect sphere, entirely possessing equal powers from the middle; for nothing is greater or more stable than this :" — if this be the case, it is ne- cessary that being should have a middle and extremities. And having these, there is every necessity that it should have parts. Or how shall we say? Just so. Nothing however hinders but that when it is divided, it may have the passion of the one in all its parts, and that thus the all and whole may be one. Undoubtedly. But is it not impossible that that which suffers these things should be the one f Why ? Because according to right reason, that which is truly one should be said to be entirely with- out parts. It must indeed necessarily be so. But such a thing as we have just now mentioned, in consequence of consisting of many parts would not accord with the one'' Through these things therefore, the Elean guest arguing from wholeness after the one being, and also from the division of the parts of wholeness, demonstrates that the all is not one. For if whole is in beings, as Parmenides in his verses testifies it is, all things will not be theone. Vox the one is impartible ; but whole possesses parts. Whole therefore is not the one itself. For that transcends all things and whole- ness ; but whole is passive to the one. Hence also it is denominated whole ; for it is not the one itself. Hence all things are not one void of separation and multiplication.

Moreover, the all is comprehensive of many parts. For whole indeed,

' lojteid of to rpayna r<f *np*rt, it it Decenary to read t» «*>i« r<y wpoyn-orri.

Digitized by Google

Chap. Xx. of Plato. I99

consists at first of two parts ; but the all possesses a multitude of parts, and participating of wholeness at the same time is all, as being perfectly distributed into parts. This therefore is not the one itself, but is passive to the one. For the one itself \s impartible. But it is impartible in such a manner as to be exempt from all parts. Hence the all is not the same with the one. We therefore, have divided whole and the all, but Plato conjoins them, when he says : " Nothing however hinders but that when it is divided, it may have the passion of the one in all its parts, and that thus the all and whole may be one." At the same time however, they are divided after the above mentioned manner. From these three arguments therefore, the Elean guest separates the one from the participants of the one, and doubts against those who assert all things to begone, viz. the one being, whole and the all ; of which the all indeed participates of whole, and is a self-perfect multitude, consisting of many parts ; but whole par- ticipates of being. For being is not whole, as Parmenides testifies. These therefore, having such an order as this, is it not necessary that the argu- ments of Plato should be made conformably to the three intelligible ' triads ? For it was requisite, since Parmenides defined the one being in intelligibles, that Plato should from thence derive his demonstrations of the distinction between the one prior to intelligibles, and the one which is in intelligibles. For the doubts against Parmenides, evince in many places that tlie one which is participated derives its subsistence from the im participate union. The one * therefore is not in these triads, but the one being and whole. But with respect to the all, it is evident that it is in the extremity of the intelligible order. For that which is in every respect perfect, and all intelligible multitude, have their subsistence in that extremity. But whole is in the middle centre, and in the bond of the intelligible breadth. For whole is adapted to have a subsistence prior to the all ; since the all is a whole, but whole is not necessarily all. For the all is divided multitude ; but that which contains multitude in itself, and which is not yet separated is whole. And this especially pertains to eter- nity. For eternity is the measure of all intelligible multitude, just as

• For vwpaf hera it it nfcemry to read

* It U requisite here to Wppty n it.

Digitized by Google

200 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK lit.