say that each of the divine orders abides ' and at the same time proceeds, we must confess that it stably abides indeed, according to bound, but proceeds according to infinity, and that at one and the same time it has unity and multitude, and we must suspend the former from the principle of bound, but the latter from that of infinity. And in short, of all the opposition in the divine genera, we must refer that which is the more excellent to bound, but that which is subordinate to infinity. For from these two principles all things have their progression into being, even as far as to the last of things. For eternity itself participates at once of bound and infinity ; so far indeed, as it is the intelligible measure, it par- ticipates of bound ; but so far as it is the cause of a never-failing power of existing, it participates of infinity. And intellect, so far indeed as it is uniform, and whole, and so far as it is connective of paradigmatical measures, so far it is the progeny of bound. But again, so far as it pro- duces all things eternally, and subsists conformably to the whole of eter- nity, supplying all things with existence at once, and always possessing its own power undiminished, so far it is the progeny of infinity. And soul indeed, in consequence of measuring its own life, by restitutions and pe- riods, and introducing a boundary to its own motions, is referred to the cause of bound ; but in consequence of having no cessation of motions, but making the end of one period the beginning of the whole of a second vital circulation, it is referred to the order of infinity. The whole of this heaven also, according to the wholeness of itself, its connexion, the order of its periods, and the mcasores of its restitutions, is bounded. But ac- cording to its prolific powers, its various evolutions, and the never-failing revolutions of its orbs, it participates of infinity. Moreover, the whole of generation, in consequence of all its forms being bounded, and always permanent after the same manner, and in consequence of its own circle which imitates the celestial circulation, is similar to bound. But again, in consequence of the variety of the particulars of which it consists, their unceasing mutation, and the intervention of the more and the less in the participations of forms, it is the image of infinity. And in addition to these things, every natural production, according to its form indeed, is
' furu* U (Knitted in the original.
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Chap. Ix. of Plato. 169
similar to bound, but according to its matter, resembles infinity. For these are suspended in the last place ' from the two principles posterior to the one, and as far as to these the progression of their productive power extends. Each of these also is one, but form is the measure and boun- dary of matter, and is in a greater degree one. Matter however is all things in capacity, so far as it derives its subsistence from the first power. There, however, power is generative of all things. But the power of matter is imperfect, and is indigent of the hypostasis which is generative ' of all things according to energy. Very properly therefore is it said by So- crates that all beings are from bound and infinity, and that these two in- telligible principles primarily derive their subsistence from God. For that which congregates both of them, and perfects them, and unfolds it- self into light through all beings is the one prior to the duad. And union indeed is derived to all things through that which is first ; but the division of the two orders of tilings is generated from these primary causes, and through these is extended to the unknown and ineffable principle. Let it therefore be manifest through these things, what the two principles of beings are, which become proximately apparent from the one, according to the theology of Plato.
In the next place let us show what the third ' thing is which presents itself to the view from these principles. It is every where therefore called that which is mixed, as deriving its subsistence from bound and infinity. But if bound is the bound of beings, and the infinite is the infinite of beings, and beings are the things which have a subsistence from both
' For 13^ straw it is necessary to read tv^antf.
• The word ynmrnxq; u omitted in the original.
* TfiTn is onutted in the original.
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1 70 °N THE THEOLOGY BOOK II!.
these, as Socrates himself clearly teaches us, it is evident that the first of things mingled, is the first of beings. This, however, is nothing else than that which is highest in beings, which is being itself, and nothing else than being. My meaning is, that this is evident through those things by which we demonstrate that what is primarily being, is comprehensive of all things intelligibly, and of life and intellect. For we say that hfe is triadic vitally, and intellect intellectually ; and also that these three things being life and intellect are every where. But all things presubsist primarily and essentially in being. For there essence, life and intellect subsist, and the summit of beings. Life however is the middle centre of being, which is denominated and is intelligible life. But intellect is the boundary of being, and is intelligible intellect. For in the intelligible there is intellect, and in intellect the intelligible. There however intellect subsists intelli- gibly, but in intellect, the intelligible subsists intellectually.
And essence indeed is that which is stable in being, and which is woven together with the first principles, and does not depart from the one. But life is that which proceeds from the principles, and is connascent with in- finite power. And intellect is that which converts itself to the principles, conjoins the end with the beginning, and produces one intelligible circle. The first of beings therefore is that which is mingled from the first prin- ciples, and is triple, one thing which it contains subsisting in it essentially, another vitally, and another intellectually, but all things presubsisting in it essentially. I mean however by the first of beings essence. For essence itself is the summit of all beings, and is as it were the monad of the whole of things. In all things therefore, essence is the first. And in each thing that which is essential is the most ancient, as deriving its subsistence from the Vesta of beings. For the intelligible is especially this. Since intellect indeed is that which is gnostic, life is intelligence, and being is intelligible. If however every being is mingled, but essence is being itself, prior to all other things essence is that which sub- sists as mingled from the two principles proceeding from the one. Hence Socrates indicating how the mode of generation in the two principles differs from that of the mixture says, " that God has exhibited bound and
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infinity." For they are unities deriving their subsistence from the one, and as it were luminous patcfactions from the imparticipable and first union. But with respect to producing a mixture, and mingling through the first principles, by how much to make is subordinate to the unfolding into light, and generation to pate/action, by so much is that which is mixed allotted a progression from tfie one, inferior to that of the two principles.
That which is mixed therefore, is intelligible essence, and subsists pri- marily from [the first] God, from whom infinity also and bound are de- rived. But it subsists secondarily from the principles posterior to the unical God, I mean from bound and infinity. For the fourth cause which is effective of the mixture is again God himself; since if any other cause should be admitted besides this, there will no longer be a fourth cause, but a fifth will be introduced. For the first cause was God, who unfolds into light the two principles. But after him are the two principles bound and infinity. And the mixture is the fourth thing. If therefore the cause of the mixture is different from the first divine cause, this cause will be the fifth and not the fourth thing, as Socrates says it is. Far- ther still, in addition to these things, if we say that God is especially the supplier of union to beings, and the mixture itself of the principles is a union into the hypostasis of being, God is also certainly the cause of this primarily. Moreover, Socrates in the Republic clearly evinces that the good is the cause of being and essence 1o intelligibles, in the same manner as the sun is to visible natures. Is it not therefore necessary, if that which is mix- ed is primarily being, to refer it to the first God, and to say that .it receives its progression from him ? If also the demiurgus in the Timauis, consti- tutes the essence of the soul itself by itself from an impartible and a par- tible essence, which is the same thing as to constitute it from bound and infinity ; for the soul according to bound is similar to the impartible, but according to infinity, to the partible essence;— if therefore the demiurgus mingles the essence of the soul from these, and again separately, from same and different, and if from these being now preexistent, he constitutes the whole soul, must we not much more say that the first God is the cause of the first essence ? That which is mixed therefore, proceeds, as
172 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK III.
we have said, from the first (Jod, and does not subsist from the principles alone posterior to the one, but proceeds also from these, and is triadic. And in the first place indeed, it participates from God of ineffable union, and the whole of its subsistence. But from bound, it receives hyparxis, and the uniform, and a stable peculiarity. . And from infinity, it receives power, and the occult power which is in itself, of all things. For in short, since it is one and not one, the one is inherent in it according to bound, but the , non-one according to infinity. The mixture however of both these, and its wholeness, arc derived from the first Cod. That which is mixed therefore, is a monad, because it participates of the one; and it is biformed, so far as it proceeds from the two principles ; but it is a triad, so far as iu every mixture, these three things are necessary according to Socrates, viz. beauty, truth, and symmetry. Concerning these things however, we shall speak again.
In what manner, however, essence is that which is first mixed, we shall now explain. For this is of all things the most difficult to discover, viz. what that is which is primarily being, as the Elcan guest also somewhere says ; for it is most dubious how being is not less than non-being. In what manner therefore essence subsists from bound and infinity must be shown. For if bound and infiuity are superessential, essence may appear to have its subsistence from non-essences. How therefore can non-es- sences produce essence ? Or is not this the case in all other things which subsist through the mixture of each other ? For that which is produced from things mingled together, is not the same with things that are not min- gled. For neitheris soul the same with the genera, from which, bcingmingled together, the father generated it, nor is a happy life the same with the life which is according to intellect, or with the life which is according to plea- sure, nor is the one in bodies the same with its elements. Hence it is not wonderful, if that which is primarily being, though it is neither bound nor infinity, subsists from both these, and is mixed, superessential natures them- selves not being assumed in the mixture of it, but secondary progressions from thein coalescing into the subsistence of essence. Thus therefore being consists of these, as participating of both, possessing indeed the