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Proclus' Theology of Plato (Six Books) — trans. Thomas Taylor (1816)

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uniform from bound, but the generative, and in short, occult multitude from infinity. For it is all things occultly, and on this account, is the cause of all beings ; which also the Elcan guest indicating to us, calls being the first power, as subsisting according to the participation of the first power, and participating of hyparxis from bound, and of power from infinity. Afterwards however, the Elcan guest defines being to be power, as prolific and generative of all things, and as being all things uni- formly. For power is every where the cause of prolific progressions, and of all multitude; occult power indeed being the cause of occult multi- tude : but the power which exists in energy, and which unfolds itself into light, being the cause of all-perfect multitude. Through this cause there- fore, I think, that every being, and every essence has connascent powers. For it participates of infinity, and derives its hyparxis indeed from bound, but its power from infinity. -And being is nothing else than a monad of many powers, and a multiplied hyparxis, and on this account being is one many. The many however subsist occultly and without separation in the first natures ; but with separation in secondary natures. For by Bow much being is nearer to the one, by so much the more does it conceal multitude, and is defined according to union alone. It appears to me also that Plotinus and his followers, frequently indicating these things, produce being from form and intelligible matter, arranging form ' as ana- logous to the one, and to hyparxis, but power as analogous to matter. And if indeed they say this, they speak rightly. But if they ascribe a certain formless and indefinite nature to an intelligible essence, they ap- pear to me to wander from the conceptions of Plato on this subject For the infinite is not the matter of bound, but the power of it, nor is bound the form of the infinite, but the hyparxis of it. But being consists of both these, as not only standing in the one, but receiving a multitude of unities and powers which are mingled into one essence.

' For w\tfti in the original it is necessary to read

BOOK If I

That therefore which is primarily being is through these things deno- minated by Plato that which is mixed. And through the similitude of it, generation also is mingled from bound and infinity. And the in- finite indeed in this is imperfect power; but the bound in it is form and the morphe of this power. On this account we establish this power to be matter, not possessing existence in energy, and requiring to be bounded by something else. We no longer however say that it is lawful to call the power of being matter, since it is generative of energies, produces all beings from itself, and is prolific of the perfect powers in beings. For the power of matter being imperfect dissimilarly imitates the power of being; and becoming multitude in capacity, it expresses the parturition of mul- titude in the power of being." Moreover, the form of matter imitates ultimately bound, since it gives limits to matter, and terminates its infi- nity. But it is multiplied and divided about it. It is also miugled with the privation of matter, and represents the supreme union of the hyparxis of being, by its essence always advancing to existence, and always tending to decay. For those things which subsist in the first natures according to transcendency, are in such as are last according to deficiency. For that also which is primarily being is mixed, is exempt from the bound of in- finite life, and is the cause of it. But that which consists of the last ' of forms and the first matter, is in its own nature void of life ; since it pos- sesses life in capacity. For there indeed generative causes subsist prior to their progeny, and things perfect prior to such as are imperfect. But here things in capacity are prior to such as are in energy, and concauses

' The punctuation in the latter part of this sentence in the original is erroneous : for instead of x<u tv «v fwnjrotf nXt)twf «W Suwfui ynw/MHj, re »Xi{<0f «*«x<w*T», it should be xcu n]» n txtivp tow wfcjfotff o£i»* Sowifif i yoojWKfl to »Xi]»of , owuxau-aro.

* For wgonw here, it is necessary to read Tot in this place, Froclus is speaking of body.

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are subject to the things which are produced from them. This however, I think, happens naturally, because the gifts of the first principles pervade as far as to the last of things, and not only generate more perfect natures, but also such as have a more imperfect subsistence. And on this account that which is mixed is the cause of generation, and of the nature which is mingled here. The bound and infinity however, which are prior to being, are not only the causes of this nature, but also of the elements of it, of which that which is mixed is not the cause, so far as it is mixed. For bound and infinity are twofold. And one kind of these is exempt from the things mingled, but another kind is assumed to the completion of the mixture. For I think it is every where necessary that prior to things that are mingled, there should be such as are unmingled, prior to things imperfect, such as are perfect, prior to parts, wholes, and prior to things that are in others, such as are in themselves ; and this Socrates persuades us to admit not in one thing only, but also in beauty and sym- metry, and in all forms. If therefore the second and third genera of being and forms subsist prior to their participants, how can we assert that bound and infinity which pervade through all beings have their first sub- sistence as things mingled ? It must be admitted therefore, that they are unmingled and separate from being, and that being is derived from them, and at the same time consists of them. It is derived from them indeed, because they have a prior subsistence ; but it consists of them, because they subsist in being according to a second progression.

The genera of being also are twofold ; some of them indeed being fa- bricative of beings, but others existing as the elements of the nature of each being. For some of them indeed presubsist themselves by themselves, as possessing a productive power ; but others being generated from these* constitute each particular being. Let no one therefore any longer won- der, how Socrates indeed in the Fhilebus establishes that which is min- gled, prior to bound and infinity, but we on the contrary evince that bound and infinity are exempt from that which is mixed. For each is twofold, and the one indeed is prior to being, but the other is in being ; and the one is generative, but the other is the element of the mixture. Of this kind also, are the bound and infinity of the mixed life, each being the

HOOK III.

element of the whole of felicity. Hence also each is indigent of each. And neither is intellect by itself desirable, nor perfect pleasure. It is necessary however, that the good should consist of all these, viz. of the desirable, the sufficient, and the perfect. Bound itself therefore and in- finity, which are separate, subsist according to cause prior to that which is mixed. But the bound and infinity which are mixed are more imperfect than the mixture. Hence, from what has been said, it is evident what the things are of which the mixture consists.

Ik the next place, we must speak of the triad, which is consubsistent with this mixture. For every mixture, if it is rightly made, as Socrates says, requires these three things, beauty, truth, and symmetry. For nei- ther will any thing base, if it is introduced into the mixture, impart recti- tude, since it will be the cause of error, and of inordinate prerogative, nor if truth is at auy time separated, will it suffer the mixture to consist of things that are pure, and which are in reality subdued, but it will fill the whole with an image and with non-being. Nor without symmetry will there be a communion of the elements, and an elegant association. Sym- metry, therefore, is necessary to the union of the things that are mingled, and to an appropriate communion. But truth is necessary to purity. And beauty to order ; which also renders the whole lovely. For when each thing in the mixture has a place adapted to itself, it renders both the elements, and the arrangement resulting from them, beautiful. Here therefore, in the first mixture, these three things are apparent, symmetry, truth, and beauty. And symmetry indeed is the cause to the mixture, that being is one ; truth is the cause of the reality of its existence ; and beauty is the cause of its being intelligible. Hence it is intelligible and truly being. That also which is primarily being is more uuiform, and in-

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tcllect is conjoined to itr according to its familiarity with the beautiful. But each participates of existence, because it is being derived from being. That which is mixed however, is supreme among beings, because it is united to the good. And it appears to me, that the divine lamblichus perceiving these three causes of being, defines the intelligible in these three, viz. in symmetry, truth, and beauty, and unfolds the intelligible Cods through these in the Platonic theology. In what manner indeed, the intelligible breadth consists of these, will be most evident as we pro- ceed. Now however, from what has been said, it is perfectly manifest why Socrates says that this triad is found to be in the vestibules of the good. For that which is primarily being participates of this triad through its union with the good. For because indeed the good is the measure of all beings, the first being becomes itself commensurate. Because the former is prior to being, the latter subsists truly and really. And because the former is good and desirable, the latter presents itself to the view as the beautiful itself. Here therefore, the first beauty also subsists ; and on this account the one h not only the cause of good, but likewise of beauty, as Plato says in his Epistles. Beauty however subsists here occultly, since this order comprehends all things uniformly, in consequence of sub- sisting primarily from the principles [bound and infinity]. But where and how beauty is unfolded into light, we shall shortly explain.

Such therefore, is the first triad of intelligible*, according to Socrates in the Ph Helms, viz. bound, infinite, and that which is mixed from these. And of these, bound indeed is a God proceeding to the intelligible sum- mit, from the imparticipable and first God, measuring and defining all things, and giving subsistence to every paternal, connective, and undefiled Proc. Vol. I. Z

genus of" Gods. But infinite is the never-failing power of this God, un- folding into light all the generative orders, and all infinity, both that which is prior to essence, and that which is essential, and also that which pro- ceeds as far as to the last matter. And that which is mixed, is the first and highest order of tbe Gods, comprehending all things occultly, deriving its completion indeed through the intelligible connective triad, but uni- cally comprehending the cause of every being, and establishing its summit in the first intelligibles, exempt from the whole of things.

After this first triad subsisting from, and conjoined with the one, we shall celebrate the second, proceeding from this, and deriving its comple- tion through things analogous ' to the triad prior to it. For in this also it is necessary that being should participate, and that the one should be participated, and likewise that this one which is secondarily one, should be generative or that which is secondarily being. For every where parti- cipated deity constitutes about itself that which participates it. Thus whole souls render bodies consubsistent with their causes : and partial souls generate, in conjunction with the Gods, irrational souls. Much more therefore, do the Gods produce in conjunction with the one all things. Hence, as the first of the unities generates the summit of being, so like- wise the middle unity constitutes the middle being. But every thing which generates, and every thing which makes or produces, possesses a power prolific of the things produced, according to which it produces, corroborates and connects its progeny. Again therefore, there will be a second triad unfolded into light analogously to the first. And one thing indeed, is the summit of it, which we call one, deity, and hyparxis. But

1 For oAoywv it is necessary to read uvatoymi.

Chap. Xi! I