ence, all lives, and intellects and souls, and is uniformly preseot to all things, and its exempt from the whole of things according to one cause which gives subsistence to all things. Hence it is the most similar of all things to the one, and unites the comprehension of beings in itself to the first principle of the whole of things, through which all beings, and non- being, wholes and parts, forms and the privations of forms subsist, which privations do not necessarily participate of being, but it is entirely neces- sary that they should participate of the one.
These things as it appears to me persuaded the Elcan guest in the So- phista, when discussing that which is perfectly being, to admit that not only being is there, but also life, intellect and soul. For if true and real being is venerable and honorable, intellect is there in the first place, says be. For it is not lawful for that which is of itself venerable and immate- rial to be without intellect. But if intellect is in that which is perfectly being, intellect will entirely be moved. For it is not possible for intellect ever to subsist, either without motion or permanency. But if intellect is moved and stands still, there are in being both life and motion. Hence, from what has been said, three things become apparent, viz. being, life and intellect. Moreover, soul also in the next place is discovered through these things. For it is necessary, says lie, that life and intellect which before were by themselves, should also be in soul. For every soul is a plenitude of life and intellect, participating of both, which the Elean guest indicating adds, " Shall we say that both these are inherent in it, but yet it does not possess these in soul ?" For to possess, as some one says in a certain place, is secondary to existing. And soul indeed parti- cipates of each of these according to the peculiarity of itself; but it mingles the rational form of its own hyparxis, with the intellectual vivific power. But both intellect and life subsist prior to soul, the former as being moved and standing still at one and the same time, and the latter as being motion and permanency. These four monads also, soul, intellect, life and being are not only mentioned by Plato here, but in many other places. And as in soul all things subsist according to participation, so in intellect the things which are prior to it subsist, and in life that which is prior to life. For we say that life exists, or has a being. Or how could i*be said to be arranged in being unless it participated of being? We
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likewise say that intellect is and lives. For it is moved, and is a portion of being. Hence it is the third of the more comprehensive monads. Prior however to beings which are participated, it is every where neces- sary that imparticipable causes should subsist, as was before demonstrated, conformably to the similitude of beings to the one. Being therefore which is primarily being, is imparticipable ; but life first participates of being, yet is imparticipable, being exempt from intellect. And intellect is filled indeed from being and life; but is imparticipable in souls, and in the natures posterior to itself. Intellect also presides over soul, imparting to it by illumination the participation of life and being; but being imparti- cipable subsists prior to bodies. The last order of beings therefore is that to which bodies are annexed ; celestial bodies indeed primarily, but sub- lunary bodies with the addition of material [vestments.] This therefore is the progression of beings, through life, intellect and soul, ending in a corporeal nature.
If, however, it is necessary that the super essential unities of the Gods which derive their subsistence from the imparticipable cause ' of all things should be participated, some of them indeed, by the first orders in beings, others by the middle, and others by the last orders, as was before demon- strated, it is evident that some of them deify the imparticipable portion of being, but that others illuminate life, others intellect, others sou), and others bodies. And of the last unities indeed, not only bodies participate, but likewise soul, intellect, life and essence. For intellect in itself is a plenitude of life and being. But from the unities which are above this world intellect is suspended, and the psychical power, which preexists in intellect. From the unities above these, imparticipable and intellectual intellect is suspended. From those that are beyond these, the first and im- participable life is suspended. And from the highest unities, the first being itself, and which is the most divine of beings, is suspended. Hence Par- menides beginning from the one being, produces from thence the whole orders of the Gods. These things therefore being previously determined by us, let us speak concerning the divine dialogues, beginning from on high, and producing from the one the whole orders of the Gods. Let us also,
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CHAP. III. OF PLATO. !gA
following Plato, in the first place demonstrate the several orders from other dialogues, by arguments which cannot be confuted. Afterwards, let us thus conjoin and assimilate the conclusions of Parraenides to the divine progressions, adapting the first conclusions to the first, but the last to the last progressions.
Aoaiit therefore, the mystic doctrine concerning the one must be re- sumed by us, in order that proceeding from the first principle, we may celebrate the second and third principles of the whole of tilings. Of all beings therefore, and of the Gods that produce beings, one exempt and imparticipable cause preexists, — a cause ineffable indeed by all language, and unknown by all knowledge and incomprehensible, unfolding all tilings into light from itself, subsisting ineffably prior to, and converting all things to itself, but existing as the best end of all things. This cause therefore, which is truly exempt from all causes, and which gives subsist- ence unically to all the unities of divine natures, and to all the genera of beings, and their progressions, Socrates in the Republic calls the good, and through its analogy to the sun reveals its admirable and unknown transcendency with respect to all intelligibles. But again, Parmenides denominates it the one. And through negations demonstrates the exempt and ineffable hyparxis of this one which is the cause of the whole of things. But the discourse in the epistle to Dionysius proceeding through enigmas, celebrates it us that about which all things subsist, and as the cause of all beautiful things. In the Philebus however, Socrates celebrates it as that which gives subsistence to the whole of things, because it is the cause of all deity. For all the Gods derive their existence as Gods from the first God. Whether therefore, it be lawful to denominate it the fountain
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of deity, or the kingdom of beings, or the unity of all unities, or the good- ness which is generative of truth, or an hyparxis exempt from all these tilings, and beyond all causes, both the paternal and the generative, let it be honored by us in silence, and prior to silence by union, and of the mystic end may it impart by illumination a portion adapted to our souls.
But let us survey with intellect the biformed principles proceeding from and posterior to it. For what else is it necessary to arrange after the union of the whole theory, than the duad of principles ? What * the two principles therefore are of the divine orders after the first principle, we shall in the next place survey. For conformably to the theology of our ancestors, Plato also establishes two principles after the one. In the Phi- lebus therefore, Socrates says, that God gives subsistence to bound and infinity, and through these mingling all beings, has produced them, the nature of beings, according to Philolaus subsisting from the connexion of things bounded, and things infinite. If, therefore, all beings subsist from these, it is evident that they themselves have a subsistence prior to beings. And if secondary natures participate of these mingled together, these will subsist unmingled prior to the whole of things. For the pro- gression of the divine orders originates, not from things coordinated and which exist in others, but from things exempt, and which are established in themselves. As therefore the one is prior to tilings united, and as that which is passive to the one, has a second order after the imparticipable union, thus also the two principles of beings, prior to the participation of and commixture with beings, arc themselves by themselves the causes of the whole of tilings. For it is necessary that bound should be prior to things bounded, and infinity prior to infinites, according to the similitude to the one of things which proceed from it For again, if we should pro- duce beings immediately after the one, we shall no where find the pecu- liarity of the one subsisting purely. For neither is being the same with the one, but it participates of the one, nor in reality is that which is the first the one ; for, as has been frequently said, it is better than the one, Where therefore is that which is most properly and entirely one ? Hence
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CHAP. in. OF PLATO. ^
there is a certain one prior to being, which gives subsistence to being, and is primarily the cause of it ; since that which is prior to it is beyond union, and is a cause without habitude with respect to all things, and im participate, being exempt from all things. If however this one is the cause of being, and constitutes it, there will be a power in it generative of being. For every thing which produces, produces according to its own power, which is allotted a subsistence between that which produces and the things produced, and is of the one the progression and as it were extension, but of the other is the pre-arranged generative cause. For being which is produced from these, and which is not the one itself, but uniform, possesses its progression indeed from the one, through the power which produces and unfolds it into light from the one; but its occult union from the hyparxis of the one. This one therefore which subsists prior to power, and first presubsists from the imparticipable and unknown cause of the whole of things, Socrates in the Philcbus calls bound, but he denominates the power of it which is generative of being, infinity. But he thus speaks in that dialogue, " God we said has exhibited the bound, and also the infinite of beings."
The first therefore and unical God, is without any addition denominated by him God ; because each of the second Gods is participated by being, and has being suspended from its nature. But the first indeed, as being exempt ' from the whole of beings, is God, defined according to the in- effable itself, the unical alone, and superessential. But the bound and the infinite of beings, unfold into light that unknown and imparticipable cause ; bound indeed, being the cause of stable, uniform, and connective deity ; but the infinite being the cause of power proceeding to all things and capable of being multiplied, and in short, being the leader of every generative distribution. For all union and wholeness, and communion of beings, and all the divine measures, are suspended* from the first bound. But all division, prolific production, and progression into multitude, de- rive their subsistence from this most principal infinity. Hence, when we
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168 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK III.