If, however, you are willing to survey the intellectual orders, some of these are arranged in the souls which rank as wholes, and in the most divine of mundane souls, which also they govern in a becoming manner. But others being arranged in the souls of the more excellent genera, are proximately participated by the rulers that are in them ; and are parti- cipated secondarily by more partial essences. But again they arrange third intellectual orders in partial souls. And according as the power which they are allotted is diminished, in such proportion is participation in them more various, and far more composite than the participation of the natures that, are prior to them. If, therefore, this is the mode of par- ticipation in all beings, it is certainly necessary that of the Gods also those that are nearer to the one, should be carried in the more simple parts of being, but that those which have proceeded to a greater distance should be carried in the more composite parts of being. For the parti- cipations of second genera are divided after this manner according to a similitude to them.
Again therefore, we may summarily say, that after the one principle of the whole of things, the Gods present themselves to our view as self- perfect monads, participated by beings.' How many orders therefore there are of beings we shall afterwards unfold, and show what beings are allotted a more simple, and what a more various hyparxis. Of all beings then, the last is that which is corporeal. For this derives its being, and all its perfection from another more ancient cause, and is neither allotted sim- plicity nor composition, nor perpetuity, nor incorruptibility from its own power. For no body is either self-subsistent, or self-begotten ; but every tiling which is so contracting in one, cause, and that which proceeds from cause, is incorporeal and impartible. And in short, that which is the cause of hyparxis to itself, imparts also to itself an infinite power of ex-
• In the original here, about a line and a half is so defectire, that not being able to supply the deficiency, I hare not attempted to translate it.
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CHAP. II. OF PLATO. 15g
istence. Tor never deserting itself, it will never cease to be, or depart from its own subsistence. For every thing that is corrupted, is corrupted through being separated from the power that supplied it with being. But that which imparts being to itself, as it is not separated from itself, is allotted through itself a perpetual essence. No body however, since it is not the cause of perpetuity to itself, will be perpetual. For every thing which is perpetual possesses an infinite power. But body being finite is not the cause of infinite power. For infinite power is incorporeal, because all power is incorporeal. But this is evident, because greater powers are every where. But no body is capable of being wholly every where. If there- fore, no body imparts to itself power, whether the power be infinite or finite, but that which is self-subsistent imparts to itself the power of being, and of existing perpetually, no body will be self-subsistent. Whence therefore is being imparted to bodies, and what is it which is adapted proximately to supply them with being ? Must wc not say that the cause of being to bodies primarily is that which by being present renders the nature of body more perfect than its kindred bodies [when they are de- prived of it?] This indeed is obvious to every one. For it is the province of that which imparts perfection to connect also the essence of secondary natures, since perfection itself is the perfection of essence. What there- fore is that of which bodies participating, are said to be better than the bodies which do not participate of it ? Is it not evident that it is soul? For we say that animated bodies are more perfect than such as are inanimate. Soul therefore is primarily beyond bodies ; and it must be admitted that all heaven and every thing corporeal is the vehicle of soul. Hence, these two orders of beings present themselves to our view ; the one indeed being corporeal, but the other which is above this, psychical.
With respect to soul itself however, whether is it the same with or dif- ferent from intellect ? For as the body which participates of soul is per- fect, thus also the soul is perfect which participates of intellect. And of the soul indeed, which is able to live according to reason, all things do not participate : but of intellect and intellectual illumination rational souls participate, and also such things as partake of any kind of know- ledge. And soul indeed energizes according to time ; but intellect com-
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prebends in eternity both its essence, and at the same time its stable energy. And not every soul indeed is adapted to preserve immutably and without diminution the perfection of itself ; but every intellect is always perfect, and possesses a never-failing power of its own blessedness. The intellec- tual genus therefore is essentially beyond the psychical ; since the former, neither in whole nor in partial intellects, admits the entrance of the na- ture of evil ; but the latter being undcfiled in whole souls, departs in partial souls from its own proper blessedness. What therefore is the first of beings? Shall we say intellect, or prior to this the extent of life? For soul indeed is self-vital, supplying itself with life; and intellect is the best and most perfect, and as we have said, an eternal life. But the life of intellect is indeed in a certain respect intellectual, and is mingled from the intellectual and vital peculiarity. It is necessary however, that there should be life itself. Whether therefore is life or intellect the more ex- cellent thing? But if gnostic beings only participate of intellect, but such beings as are destitute of knowledge participate of life, (for we say that plants live) it is certainly necessary that life should be arranged above intellect, being the cause of a greater number of effects, and im- parting by illumination more gifts from itself than intellect. What then ? Is life the first of beings ? And is to live the same thing as to be f But this is impossible. For if life is that which is primarily being, and to be vital is the same thing as to have being, and there is the same definition of both life and being, every thing which participates of life would also participate of being, and every thing which participates of existence would likewise participate of life. For if each is the same thing all things would similarly participate of being and life. All vital natures indeed have essence and being ; but there are many beings that are des- titute of life. Being therefore subsists prior to the first life. For that which is more universal, and the cause of a greater number of effects, is nearer to the one, as has been before demonstrated. Soul therefore is that which is primarily established above bodies; but intellect is beyond soul life is more ancient than intellect ; and being which is primarily being is established above all these. Every thing also which participates
' Instead of fas here it is necessary to read .
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CHAP. II OF PLATO. l6l
of soul, by a much greater priority participates of intellect; but not every thing which enjoys intellectual efficiency, is also adapted to participate of soul. For of soul rational animals only participate ; since we say that the rational soul is truly soul. For Plato in the Republic says, that the work of soul is to reason and survey beings. And every soul [i. e. every rational soul] is immortal, as it is written in the Phaedrus ; the irrational soul being mortal, according to the demiurgus in the Timaeus. And in short, it is in many places evident that Plato considers the rational soul to be truly soul, but 'others to be the images of souls, so far as these also are intellectual and vital, and together with whole souls produce the lives that are distributed about bodies. Of intellect however, we not only admit that rational animals participate, but also such other animals as possess a gnostic power ; I mean such as possess the phantasy, memory and sense ; since Socrates also in the Philebus refers all such animals to the intellectual series. For taking away intellect from the life which is according to pleasure, he likewise takes away not only the rational life, but every gnostic . power of the irrational life. For all knowledge is the progeny of intellect, in the same manner as allreason is an image of soul.
Moreover, all things which participate of intellect, by a much greater priority participate of life, some things indeed more obscurely, but others more manifestly. But all living beings do not participate of intellectual power, since plants indeed are animals, as Timaeus says, but they jieither participate of sense, or phantasy ; unless some one should say that they have a co-sensation of what is pleasing and painful. And in short, the orcctic powers every where are lives, and the images of the whole of life* and the last productions of life ; but they are of themselves destitute of intellect and without any participation of the gnostic power. Hence also, they are of themselves indefinite, and deprived of all knowledge.
Again therefore, all animals indeed receive a portion of being, and different animals a different portion, according to their respective natures; but all beings are not similarly able to participate of life ; since we say that qualities and all passions, and the last of bodies, receive the ultimate effective energy of being, but we do not also say that they participate of life. Being therefore is more ancient than life ; life than intellect ; and Proc. Vol. I. X
162 on the Theology Book Iii
intellect than soul. For it is necessary that the causes of a greater number of effects being more ancient and according to order more principal, should preside over causes which are able to produce and adorn fewer effects. Very properly therefore, does Plato in the Timeeus give subsist- * ence to soul from intellect, as being secondary to it according to its own nature. But in the Laws he says that intellect is moved similarly to a sphere fashioned by a wheel.' For that which is moved, is moved by participating of life, and is nothing else than real life about motion. And in the Sophista he exempts being from all the total genera of things, and from motion. For being, says he, according to its own nature, neither stands still, nor is moved. But that which neither stands still nor is moved, is beyond eternal life.
These four causes therefore being prior to a corporeal subsistence, vis. essence, life, intellect and soul, soul indeed participates of all the causes prior to itself, being allotted reason from its own peculiarity, but intellect, life and being, from more ancient causes. Hence it gives subsistence to things posterior to itself in a fourfold manner. For according to its being indeed, it produces all things as far as to bodies ; according to its life, all things which arc said to live, even as far as to plants ; according to its intellect, all things which possess a gnostic power, even as far as to the most irrational natures; and according to its reason, the first of the natures that are able to participate of it.1 But intellect being established beyond soul, and existing as the plenitude of life and being, adorns all things in a threefold manner, imparting indeed by illumination the power of the intellectual peculiarity to all gnostic beings, but supplying the participation of life to a still greater number, and of being to all those to whom primary being imparts itself. But life being arranged above intel- lect, presubsists as the cause of the same things in a twofold respect, vivi- fying secondary natures indeed, together with intellect, and filling from itself with the rivers of life, such things as are naturally adapted to live, but together with being supernally producing essence in all things. But being itself which is primarily being generates all things by its very exist-
' For flrrsMi; it is necessary to read sv npwic. * For «urw{ read avnjf.