necessary that primary beings should participate of the first cause through their proximate unities. For secondary things are severally conjoined to the natures prior to them through similars ; bodies indeed to the soul which ranks as a whole, through the several souls [which they participate] ; but souls to universal intellect through intellectual monads ; and first beings, through unical hyparxes to the one. For being is in its own nature dis- similar to the one. For essence and that which is in want of union ex- ternally derived, are unadapted to be conjoined with that which is super- essential, and with the first union, and are far distant from it. But the unities of beings, since they derive their subsistence from the imparticipa- ble unity, and which is exempt from the whole of things, are able to con- join beings to the one, and to convert them to themselves.
It appears therefore to me, that Parmenides demonstrating these tilings through the second hypothesis, connects the one with being, surveys all things about the one, and evinces that this proceeding nature, and which extends its progressions as far as to the last of thing! is the one. For prior to true beings it was necessary to constitute the unities ; since it neither was nor is lawful, says Timaeus, for that which is the best of things to effect any thing else than that which is most beautiful. But this is in a remarkable degree most similar to that which is best. To the one however, a unical multitude is most similar ; since the demiurgus of the universe also being good, constituted all things similar to himself through goodness itself. Much more therefore, does the fountain of all good produce goodnesses naturally united to itself, and establish them in beings. IJence there is one God, and many Gods, one unity and many unities prior to beings, and one goodness, and many after the one good- ness, through which the demiurgic intellect is good, and every intellect is divine, whether it be an intellectual or intelligible intellect. And that which is primarily superessential is the one ; and there are many superes- sentials after the one. Whether therefore, is this multitude of unities im- participable in the same manner as the one itself, or is it participated by beings, and is each unity of beings the flower as it were of a certain being, and the summit and center of it, about which each being 1 subsists ?
' For n it U oeccisary to read »y.
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j54 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK 111.
But if these unities also are imparticipable, in what do they differ from the one ? For each of them is one, and primarily subsists from the one. Or in what being more redundant than the first cause were they consti- tuted by it ? For it is every where necessary that what is second being subordinate to that which is prior to itself, should fall short of the union of its producing' cause, and by the addition of a certain thing should hav e a diminution of the monadic simplicity of the first. What addition therefore, can we adduce, or what redundancy besides the one, if each of these also is by itself one? For if each of them is one and many, we shall appear to transfer to them the peculiarity of being. But if each is one only, in the same manner as the one itself, why does this rank as the cause which is exempt from all things, but eac h of these is allotted a secondary dignity ? Neither therefore shall we. preserve the transcendency of the first with reference to the things posterior to it, nor can we admit that the unities proceeding from it are unconfuscd either with respect to themselves, or to the one principle of them.
But neither shall we be persuaded by Parmenides who produces the one together with being, and demonstrates that there are as many parts of the one as there are of being; that each being* also participates of the one, but that the one is every where consubsistent with being ; and in short, who asserts that the one of the second hypothesis participates of beings and is participated by being, the participation in each not being the same. For the one indeed participates of being, as not being primarily one, nor exempt from being, but as illuminating truly-existing essence. But being participates of the one, as that which is connected by it, and filled with divine union, and converted to the one itself which is imparticipable. For the participated monads conjoin beings to the one which is exempt from the whole of things, in the same manner as participated intellects conjoin souls to the intellect which ranks as a whole, and as participated souls conjoin bodies to the soul which ranks as a whole. For it is not possible that the dissimilar genera of secondary natures should be united without
1 For *a;wof it appears requisite to read rngxyomi. '■ Here also for iv it is necessary to read o».
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CHAP. ir.
media to the cause which is exempt from multitude ; but it is necessary that the contact should be effected through similars. For a similar mul- titude, so far indeed as it is multitude, communicates with the dissimilar ; but so far as it is similar to the monad prior to itself, it is conjoined with it. Being established therefore, in the middle of both, it is united to the whole, and to the one which is prior to multitude. But it contains in itself remote progressions, and which are of themselves dissimilar to the one. Through itself also, it converts all things to that one, and thus all things are extended to the first cause of the whole of things, dissimilars indeed through similars,' but similars through themselves. For similitude itself by itself conducts and binds the many to the one, and converts secondary natures to the monads prior to them. For the very being of similars so far as they are similars is derived from the one. Hence, it con- joins multitude to that from which it is allotted its progression. And on this account similitude is that which it is, causing many things to be allied, to possess sympathy with themselves, and friendship with each other and the one.
If however it be requisite, not only by employing the intellectual pro- jections of Parmenides to unfold the multitude of Gods participated by beings, but also concisely to demonstrate the theory of Socrates about these particulars, we must recollect what is written in the Republic, where » he says that the light proceeding from the good is unific of intellect and of beings. For through these things the good is demonstrated to be ex- empt from being and essence, in the same manner as the sun is exempt from visible natures. But this light being in intelligibles illuminates them, in the same manner as the solar-form light which is iu visible na-
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O.N the Theology
tures. For visible natures no otherwise become apparent, and known to the sight, than through the light which is ingenerated in them. All intelligibles therefore become boniform through the participation of light, and through this light, every true * being is most similar to the good. If, therefore, it makes no difference to speak of this light, or of the one (for this light conjoins intelligibles, and causes them to be one, as deriving its subsistence from the one) if this be the case, the deity proceeding from the first is participable, and all the multitude of unities is participable. And that indeed which is truly supercssential is the one. But each of the other Gods, according to his proper hyparxis, by which he is a superessential God, is similar to the first ; but they are participated by essence and being. According to this reasoning therefore, the Gods appear to us to be unities, and participable unities, binding indeed all beings to themselves, but conjoining through themselves to the one which similarly transcends all things, the natures posterior to themselves.
Since therefore each of the Gods is indeed a unity, but is participated by some being, whether shall we say that the same being participates of each of the unities or that the participants of some of the unities are more, but of others less numerous ? And if this be the case either the par- ticipants of the superior unities must be more, but of the inferior must be fewer in number, or vice versa. For it is necessary that there should be an order of the unities, in the same manner as we see that of numbers some are nearer to their principle, but others more remote from it. And that some are more simple, but others more composite, and exceed indeed in quantity, but suffer a diminution in power. But it is well that we have mentioned numbers. For if it is necessary to survey the order of the first monads with respect to each other, and their progression about beings, from these as images, in these also the monads which are nearer to the one will be participated by things which arc more simple in essence, but those which are more remote from it, will be participated by more composite essences. For thus the participation will be according to the analogous ; first monads being always participated by the first beings, but second monads by secondary beings. For again, if the first is exempt
■ oirr<«{ U omitted in the original.
CHAP II.
from all things, and is imparticipable, but that which is connascent with the most simple nature and the one is more similar to the imparticipable than that which is connascent with a more various and multiform nature, and which has more powers suspended from it, — if this be the case, it is perfectly obvious, that the unities which are nearer to the one are neces- sarily participated by the first and most simple essences ; but that those which are more remote are participated by more composite essences, which are less in power, but are greater in number and multitude. For in 6hort, additions in these unities are ablations of powers ; and that which is nearer to the one, which surpasses the whole of things by an admirable simplicity, is more uniform, and is consubsistent with more total orders. And it happens according to the ratio of power, that the simplicity of the first unities is transcendent. For those things which arc the causes of a greater number of effects, imitate as much as possible the cause of all things, but those which are the causes of fewer effects, have an essence more various than the natures that are prior to them.' For this variety distributes inio minute parts and diminishes the power which abides in one. Moreover, in participated souls also, such as are first and most divine subsist in simple and perpetual bodies. Others again are connected with bodies that are simple, but in conjunction with these with material bodies also. And others are connected at one and the same time with simple, material and composite bodies. For the celestial souls indeed rule over simple bodies, and such as have an immaterial and im- mutable subsistence. But the souls that govern the wholes of the elements, are at the same time invested with etherial garments, and at the same time through these are carried in the wholes of the elements, which as wholes indeed are perpetual and simple, but as material receive genera- tion and corruption, and composition from dissimilar natures. And the souls that rank in the third order, are those which proximately inspire with life their luciform * vehicles, but also attract from the simple ele-
1 Instead of n jut yaf *A«i»w»* out**, xcu rat wctvno* mrrmi xarct Tip ivra+ur rant *f* avrwr *«miX«ri{an> xmret tij» owiav tow, it U necessary to read ra pr, yaf *X|ior»» cutix, xcu raw wairaw """!«» xarm fovofuv pyuvno*, T« ttrwv i\atr<ronov toi> wjg xvtwy ireixiA»Tff« xot« nf» cv»mw ten*.
1 For avTMifarir it if requisite to read j^miW*
158 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK III.
ment material vestsmeuts, pour into these a secondary life, and through these communicate with composite and multiform bodies, and sustain through this participation another third life.