This therefore is I think prior to all other things apparent to those whose conceptions are not perverted, that every where, but especially in the divine orders, second progressions, are completed through the similitude of these to their proper principles. For nature and intellect, and every generative cause, are naturally adapted to produce and conjoin to them- selves things similar, prior to such as as are dissimilar to themselves. For if it is necessary that the progression of beings should be continued, and that no vacuum should intervene either in incorporeal natures, or in bodies, it is necessary that every thing which proceeds naturally should proceed through similitude. For it is by no means lawful that the thing caused should be the same with its cause ; since a remission and deficiency of the union of the producing cause generates secondary natures. For again, if that which is second were the same as that which is first, each would be similarly the same, and one would not be cause, but the other the thing caused. If however, the one by its very being, or essentially, lias an exuberance of productive power, but the other falls short of the power that produced it, these are naturally separated from each other, and the generative cause precedes in excellence the thing generated, and there is not a sameness of things which so greatly differ. But if that which is second is not the same with that which is first, if indeed it is different only, they will not be conjoined to each other, nor will the one participate of the other. For contact and participation, are indeed a communion of things conjoined, and a sympathy of participants with the natures they participate. But if it is at the same time the same with and different from that which is first, if indeed the sameness is indigent, and vanquished by the power which is contrary to it, the one will no longer be the leader of the progression of beings, nor will every generative cause subsist prior to things of a secondary nature, in the order of the good. For the one is not the cause of division, but of friendship. And the good converts generated natures to their causes. But the conversion and friendship of things secondary to such as are primary is through similitude, but not through a dissimilar nature. If therefore the one is the cause of the whole of things, and if the good is in an exempt manner desirable to all things, it will every where give subsistence to the progeny of precedaneous causes,
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Chap. 1. of Plato. I49
through similitude, in order that progression may be according to the one, and that the conversion of things which have proceeded may be to the good. For without similitude there will neither be the conversion of things to their proper principles, nor the generation of efFepts. Let this there- fore be considered as a thing admitted in this place.
But the second thing besides this, and which is demonstrated through this, is, that it is necessary every monad should produce a number co-or- dinate to itself, nature indeed a natural, but soul a psychical, and intellect an intellectual number. For if every thing generative generates similars prior to dissimilar*, as has been before demonstrated, every cause wilt certainly deliver its own form and peculiarity to its own progeny, and before it gives subsistence to far distant progressions, and things which are separated from its nature, it will produce things essentially near to it, and conjoined with it through similitude. Every monad therefore, gives subsistence to a multitude indeed, as generating that which is second to itself, and which divides the powers that presubsist occultly in itself. For those things which are uniformly and contractedly in the monad, present themselves to the view separately in the progeny of the monad. And this indeed the wholeness of nature manifests, since it contains in one the reasons, [i. e. productive principles] of all things both in the heavens and in the sublunary region ; but distributes the powers of itself to the natures which are divided from it about bodies. For the nature of earth, of fire, and of the moon, possesses from the wholeness of nature its pecu- liarity and form, and energizes together with this wholeness, and con- tains its own allottment. This also the monad of the mathematical sci- ences and of numbers manifests. For this being all things primarily, and spermatically producing in itself the forms of numbers, distributes dif- ferent powers to different externally proceeding numbers. For it is not possible that what is generated, should at once receive all the abundance of its generator. And it is necessary that the prolific power of every thing that pre-exists in the cause ' itself should become apparent. The monad therefore gives subsistence to a multitude about itself, and to
' For airua it U Decenary to read «r<a.
number which distributes the peculiarities that abide collectively in itself. Since however, as was before observed, the similar is always more allied to cause than the dissimilar, there will be one multitude of similars to the monad, proceeding from the monad ; and another of dissimilars. But again, the multitude which is similar to the monad is that in a divided manner which the monad is indivisibly. For if the monad possesses a peculiar power and hyparxis, there will be the same form of hyparxis in the multitude together with a remission with reference to the whole.
After this however, it is necessary to consider in the third place, that of progressions, such as are nearer to their cause are indicative of a greater multitude of things, and are at the same time in a certain respect equal to their containing causes ; but that such as are more remote possess a less extended power of signification ; and on account of the diminution of their power, change and diminish at the same time the amplitude of production. For if, of progressions, that which subsists the first in order is more similar to its principle, and that which gives subsistence to the greatest number is both with respect to essence and power more similar to the generating principle of all things, it is necessary that of secondary natures, such as are nearer to the monad, and which receive dominion after it, should give a greater extent to their productions ; but that such things as are more separated from their primary monad should neither pervade in a similar manner through all things, nor extend their efficacious energies to far distant progressions. And again, as similar to this, it is necessary that the nature which gives subsistence to the greatest number of effects, should be arranged next to the monad its principle ; and that the nature gene- rative of a more numerous progeny, because it is more similar to the supplying cause of all things than that which is generative of a few, must be arranged nearer to the monad, according to hyparxis. For if it is more remote, it will be more dissimilar to the first principle ; but if it is more dissimilar, it will neither possess a power comprehending the power of similar natures, nor an energy abundantly prolific. For an abundant cause is allied to the cause of all. And universally, that which is gene- rative of a more abundant, is more naturally allied to its principle than that which is productive of a less numerous progeny. For the production
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of fewer effects is a defect of power ; but a defect of power is a diminu- tion of essence ; and a diminution of essence becomes redundant on ac- count of dissimilitude to its cause, and a departure from the first prin- ciple.
Again therefore, in addition to what has been said, we sball assert this which possesses the most indubitable truth, that prior to the causes which are participated, it is every whe re necessary that imparticipable causes should have a prior subsistence in the whole of things. For if it is neces- sary tbat a cause should have the same relation to its progeny as the one to all the nature of beings, and that it should naturally possess this order - towards things secondary ; but the one is imparticipable, being similarly exempt from all beings, as unically producing all things ;— if this be the case, it is requisite that every other cause which imitates the transcen- dency of the one with respect to all things, should be exempt from the natures which are in secondary ranks, and which are participated by them. And again, as equivalent to this, it is requisite that every imparticipable and primary cause should establish monads of secondary natures similar to itself, prior to such as are dissimilar. I say, for instance, it is requisite that one soul should distribute many souls to different natures ; and one intellect participated intellects to many souls. For thus the first exempt genus will every where have an order analogous to the one. And secon- dary natures which participate kindred causes will be analogous to these causes, and through the similitude of these will he conjoined with their imparticipable principle. Hence prior to the forms which are in other things, those are established which subsist in themselves ; exempt causes prior to such as are co-ordinate ; and imparticipable monads prior to such as are participable. And consequently (as that which is demonstrated at the same time with this) the exempt causes are generative of the co-or- dinate, and imparticipable natures extend participable monads to their progeny. And natures which subsist from themselves produce the powers which are resident in other things. These things therefore being discussed, let us consider how each of the divine genera subsists through analogy,' and survey following Plato himself, what are the first and most total
' For ■mAotn* it U neceMWy to mdmmXoymf.
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On the Theology-
BOOK lit.
orders of the Gods. For having discovered and demonstrated this, we shall perhaps be able to perceive the truth concerning these several orders.
It is necessary therefore, from the before-mentioned axioms, since there is one unity the principle of the whole of things, and from which every hyparxis derives its subsistence, that this unity should produce from itself, prior to all other things, a multitude characterized by unity, and a num- ber most allied to its cause. For if every other cause constitutes a pro- geny similar to itself prior to that which is dissimilar, much more must the one unfold into light after this manner tilings posterior to itself, since it is beyond similitude, and Me one itself must produce according to union things which primarily proced from it. For how can the one give subsist- ence to its progeny except unically ? For nature generates things secon- dary to itself physically, soul psychically, and intellect intellectually. The one therefore is the cause of the whole of things according to union, and the progression from the one is uniform. But if that which prima- rily produces all things is the one, and the progression from it is unical, it is certainly necessary that the multitude thence produced should be self- perfect unities, most allied to their producing cause. Farther still, if every monad constitutes a number adapted to itself, as was before demon- strated, by a much greater priority must the one generate a number of this kind. For in the progression of things, that which is produced is frequently dissimilar to its producing cause, through the dominion of dif- ference : for such are the last of things, and which are far distant from their proper principles. But the first number, and which is connascent with the one, is uniform, ineffable, superessential, and perfectly similar to its cause. For in the first causes, neither does difference intervening separate from the generator the things begotten, and transfer them into • another order, nor docs the motion of the cause effecting a remission of power, produce into dissimilitude and indefiniteness the generation of the whole of things ; but the cause of all things being unically raised above all motion and division, has established about itself a divine number, and has united it toits own simplicity. The one therefore prior to beings has given subsistence to the unities of beings.
For again, according to another mode [of considering the subject] it is.