Proclus' Theology of Plato (Six Books) — trans. Thomas Taylor (1816)

Moreover, the one likewise generates the second intellectual order, being unmingled with it. For the one neither stands still, nor is moved. It participates therefore of neither of these ; but being similarly exempt from both, it at the same time transcends the middle orders of the intel- lectual progression of the Gods. For if it were moved, it would be moved in a twofold respect, viz. either according to a change in quality, or local motion. But it is not possible that the one can be changed in quality ; for being thus changed it will be not one, and will fall off from a unical hyparxis. Nor can it be locally moved. For it is impossible that it should be moved in a circle, because it would have parts, viz. middle and extremes. And if it changed one place for another it would be par- tible. For it would be necessary that it should neither be wholly in that place to which it is moved, nor in that whence it begins to be moved. For if it were wholly in either of them, it would be immoveable, in con- sequence of partly not yet being moved, and partly having now ceased

Chap. Xii. Op Plato. 143

its motion. But if the one stands still, it is certainly necessary that it should abide in the same thing. But it has been demonstrated that the one is no where. Hence it is neither in itself, nor in another thing. In no respect therefore is the one moved, or does it stand still, which things [viz. motion and permanency] particularly belong to the middle order of intellectuals, as will be evident from the second hypothesis. For the first God produces this order also, being exempt from it.

In the third place, we may survey through what next follows, the last order of intellectuals, proceeding from the one, and subordinate to it. For in,this order sameness and difference subsist unitedly. But at the same time the one subsists prior to both these. For different is said to be dif- ferent both from itself and from other things. And in a similar manner same is the same with itself, and with other things. But the one is not indeed different from itself, because that which is different from the one will be not one. And it is not the same with other things, lest becoming the same with them, it should latently pass into their nature. Moreover, neither is the one different from other things. For it would be at the same time one, and would have as an addition the power of difference. For so far as it is different it will not be one; since difference is not the one. Hence being one and different, it will be many and not the one. Nor is the one the same with itself. For if the one and the same differ only in name, the many will not be in consequence of participating of sameness with each other. For it is impossible that the many should become one by participating of the many. But if the one and sameness are essentially different, that which is primarily one does not participate of sameness, lest by receiving sameness in addition to the one, it should become a pas- sive one, and not that which is primarily one. If however the extremity of intellectuals is characterized by this tetrad, it is evident that the one exist- ing beyond this also supernally unfolds it into light, and places over the wholes of the universe a tetradic monad, the source of ornament to all secondary natures. For from hence other things primarily receive a com- munication with the one which are also indeed produced and connectedly contained by the one.

But after the intellectual Gods, the ineffable transcendency of the one

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arranges the extent of the supermundane divinities, the one in the mean time, being occultly exempt from its supermundane progeny. And this extent indeed proximately subsists from the intellectual Gods, but uni- formly receives its hyparxis from the first God. This, therefore, Parmen- ides produces through similitude and dissimilitude, from the deity which encloses the boundary of the intellectual monads. For the similar is that which is passive to sameness, in [the same manner as dissimilitude is that which is passive to difference. Parmenides therefore demonstrates that the one transcends according to one simplicity such a peculiarity of the Gods also as this. For that which is established above the power of same and different, in a much greater degree transcends the genera which are allotted a subsistence according to similitude and dissimilitude.

What therefore remains after this ? Is it not evident that it is the mul- titude of the mundane Gods ? But this also is twofold, the one being celestial, but the other sublunary. Of these, therefore, the genus which revolves in the heavens, proceeds together with the equal, the greater and the less. But in the sublunary genus the equal is allotted a difference in multitude from the celestial equality, but the unequal is again divided by the power of the more and the less. According to another genus there* fore of the divine orders, there will be a monad and a duad, but above indeed, they are allied to the one and to sameness, and beneath to multii tude, and the intellectual cause of difference. Hence the one transcends all these. For the equal indeed every where consists of the same parts. By what contrivance therefore is it possible that the nature which at one and the same time is exempt from sameness, and the difference which is associated with it, should participate of equality and inequality ?

Besides all these divine orders therefore we must intellectually survey the genera of deified souls, and which are distributed about the Gods, For in each of the divine progressions and in the progressions also of souls, the first genus presents itself to the view connascent with the Gods ; since both in the heavens, and in the sublunary region divine souls receive the division of the Gods into the world, as the Athenian Guest in a certain place demonstrates. The psychical extent therefore, is characterized by time, and by a life according to time, But the peculiarity of divine souls.

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is shown by Pannenides to consist in their being younger and at the same time older both than themselves and other things. For revolving always according to the same time, and conjoining the beginning with the end, as at one and the same time proceeding to the end of the whole period they become younger, but as at the same time circulating to the beginning of it, they become older. All their ages however, perpetually preserve the same measures of time. Again, there is sameness in them and difference, the former indeed preserving equality, but the latter inequality, according to time. The one therefore subsists prior to divine souls, and generates these also together with the Gods. We now therefore come to the end of the whole distribution of more excellent natures ; and the cause of all intelligibles at once unfolds into light the genera that follow the Gods, and that are triply divided by the three parts of time. But this cause is demonstrated by the intellectual projections of Parmenides to be also exempt from these. For that which is beyond all time and the life which is according to time, can by no contrivance become subservient to the more partial periods of time.

That which is the first of all things therefore, unfolds into light all the Gods, divine souls, and the more excellent genera, and is neither compli- cated with its progeny, nor multiplied about them ; but being perfectly exempt from them in an admirable simplicity, and transcendency of union, it imparts to all things indifferently progression and at the same time order in the progression. Pannenides therefore beginning from the intelligible place of survey of the first intellectual Gods, proceeds thus far, according to the measures of generation, giving subsistence to the genera of the Gods, and to the natures that are united to and follow the Gods,' and perpetually evinces that the one is ineffably exempt from all things. But again, from hence he returns to the beginning, and imitating the conversion of the whole of things, separates the one from the highest, viz. from the intelligible Gods. For thus especially we may survey the transcendency of the one, and the immense difference of its union from

all other things, if we not only demonstrate that it is established above

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146 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK II.

the second or third progressions in the divine orders, but also that it sub- sists prior to the intelligible unities themselves, and this in a manner con- formable to the simplicity of their occult nature, and not through a variety of words, but through intellectual projection alone. For intelligibles are naturally adapted to be known by intellect. This therefore, Parmenides also evinces in reality, relinquishing logical methods, but energizing ac- cording to intellect, and asserting that the one is above essence, and being characterized by the one. For this assertion was not collected from the preceding conclusions. For the discourse about the first Gods them- selves would be without demonstration, if it derived its credibility from things subordinate. At the same time therefore, Parmenides contends that all knowledge, and all the instruments of knowledge, fall short of the transcendency of the one, and beautifully end in the ineffable of that God who is bevond all tlii lij^s. For after scientific energies, and intellec- tual projections, a union with the unknown follows, to which also Par- menides referring the whole of his discussion, concludes the first hypo- thesis, suspending indeed all the divine genera from the onef but evincing that the one is unically exempt from all things, subsisting without the participation of intelligibles and sensible*, and in an ineffable manner giving subsistence to the participated monads. Hence also, the one is said to be beyond that one which is conjoined with essence, and at the same time to be beyond every participated multitude of unities.

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Such therefore is the theology with Plato concerning the first God, as it appears to me, and so great is the transcendency which it is allotted with respect to all other discussions of divine concerns ; at one and the same time venerably preserving the ineffable union of this God exempt from the whole of things, uncircumscribed by all gnostic com prehensions, and apart from all beings ; and unfolding the anagogic paths to him, per- fecting that parturient desire which souls always possess of the father, and progenitor of all things, and enkindling that torch in them, by which they are especially conjoined with the unknown transcendency of the one. But after this imparticipable, ineffable, and truly superessential cause, which is separated from all essence, power and energy, the discussion of the Gods immediately follows. For to what other thing prior to the unities is it lawful to be conjoined with the one, or what else can be more united to the unical God than the multitude of Gods ? Concerning these there- fore, we shall in the next place unfold the inartificial theory of Plato, in- voking the Gods themselves to enkindle in us the light of truth. I wish however prior to entering on the particulars of this theory, to convince the reader, and to make it evident to him through demonstration, that there are necessarily as many orders of the Gods, as the Parmenides of Plato unfolds to us in the second hypothesis.

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148 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK III.