In the second place, I think it is necessary that the order of the nega» tions should be defined by those who receive theology according to the intention of Parmenides ; and that it should be admitted that they pro- ceed indeed from the monads which subsist primarily in the divine genera, and that Parmenides takes away from the one all second and third natures, according to an order adapted to each. For that which transcends more principal causes must in a much greater degree subsist prior to those that are subordinate. Parmenides, however, does not begin his negations from the Gods that are united to the first: for this genus is with difficulty dis- tinguished from the one : because being arranged naturally [immediately] after it, it is most unical and occult, and transcendency similar to its pro* ducing cause. Parmenides therefore beginning where prior to all other things division and multitude are apparent, and proceeding regularly through all the second orders as far as to the last of things, again returns to the beginning, and shows how the one differs from the Gods that are most similar to it, and which primarily participate of it, according to one ineffable cause.
In the third place, in addition to what has been said, I determine con- cerning the mode of negations, that they are not privative of their sub- Proc. Vol. I. S
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jects, but generative of things which are as it were their opposites. For because the first principle is not many, the many proceed from it, and be- cause it is not a whole, wholeness proceeds from it, and in a similar man- ner in other things. And in thus determining, I speak conformably to Plato, who thinks it proper to abide in negations, and to add nothing to the one. For whatever you add, you diminish the one, and afterwards evince that it is not the one, but that which is passive to [or participates] the one. For it is thus not one only, but in addition to this possesses some- thing else also by participation. This mode therefore of negations is exempt, unical, primary, and is a departure from the whole of things, in an unknown and ineffable transcendency of simplicity. It is likewise neces- sary, having attributed such a mode as this to the first God, again to exempt him from the negations also. For neither does any discourse, nor any name belong to the one, says Parmenides. But if no discourse belongs to it, it is evident that neither does negation pertain to it. For all things are secondary to the one, things knowable and knowledge, and the in- struments of knowledge, and after a manner that which is impossible presents itself at the end of the hypothesis. For if nothing whatever can be said of the one, neither is this discussion itself adapted to the one. Nor is it at all wonderful that the discourse of those who wish to know the ineffable by words should terminate in that which is impossible ; since all knowledge when conjoined with an object of knowledge which does not at all pertain to it loses its power. For sense, if we should say that it per- tained to that which is the object of science would subvert itself ; and this would be the case with science and every kind of knowledge if we should say that they belonged to that which is intelligible ; so that lan- guage when conversant with that which is ineffable, being subverted about itself, has no cessation, and opposes itself.
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CHAP. XI. OF PLATO.
Let us now therefore, if ever, abandon multiform knowledge, exter- minate from ourselves all the variety of life, and in perfect quiet approach near to the cause of all things. For this purpose, let not only opinion and phantasy be at rest, nor the passions alone which impede our anago- gic impulse to the first, be at peace ; but let the air be still, and the uni- verse itself be still. And let all things extend us with a tranquil power to communion with the ineffable. Let us also, standing there, having trans- cended the intelligible (if we contain any thing of this kind,) and with nearly closed eyes adoring as it were the rising sun, since it is not lawful for any being whatever intently to behold him — let us survey the sun whence the light of the intelligible Gods proceeds, emerging, as the poets say, from the bosom of the ocean; and again from this divine tranquillity descending into intellect, and from intellect, employing the reasonings of the soul, let us relate to ourselves what the natures are from which, in this progression, we shall consider the first God as exempt. And let us as it were celebrate him, not as establishing the earth and the heavens, nor as giving subsistence to souls, and the generations of all animals ; for he produced these indeed, but among the last of things ; but, prior to these, let us celebrate him as unfolding into light the whole intelligible and intel- lectual genus of Gods, together with all the supermundane and mundane divinities — as the God of all Gods, the unity of all unities, and beyond the first adyta,1 — as more ineffable than all silence, and more unknown than all essence, — as holy among the holies, and concealed in the intelligi- ble Gods. And again after these things descending into a reasoning pro- cess from an intellectual hymn, and employing the irreprehensible science
1 For a&MXTon, it is necessary to read aXinat. For the occult and invisible order of Night and Phanea is called by Orpheus the adytum. So that by the Jint adyta, Proclus means the highest order of intelligible*.
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BOOK 11.
of dialectic, let us, following the contemplation of first causes, survey the manner in which the first God is exempt from the whole of things. And let our descent be as far as to this. But opinion and phantasy and sense, prevent us indeed from partaking of the presence of the Gods, and draw us down from Olympian goods to earth-born motions, Titannically divide the intellect that is in us, and divulse us from an establishment in wholes to the images of beings.
What therefore will be the first conception of the science proceeding from intellect, and unfolding itself into light ? What other can we assert it to be than that which is the most simple and the most known of all the conceptions contained in this science ? What therefore is this ? « The one, says Parmenides,if it is the one will not be many." For it is necessary that the many should participate of the one ; but the one does not participate of the one, but is the one itself. Neither is that which is primarily one par- ticipate. For it would not be purely one if mingled with the many, nor that which is one, if it received the addition of that which is subordinate. The one therefore is exempt from the many. The many however subsist pri- marily in the summit of the first intellectual Gods, and in the intelligible place of survey, as we are taught in the second hypothesis. The one, there- fore, entirely transcends an order of this kind, and is the cause of it. For the not many, is not privation, as we have said, but the cause of the many. This, therefore, Parmenides does not think it requisite to demonstrate, but as a thing most manifest to every one, he first evinces this, through the opposition as it were of the many to the one. But employing this he takes away that which follows ; and he takes away that which is posterior to this by employing the conclusions prior to it, and this he always does, after the
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Chap. Xii. Op Plato. 141
same manner. And at one time indeed, he assumes the elements of the demonstrations from proximate conclusions, but at another time from those that are more remote. For after this intelligible order of Gods, as we have said, he gives subsistence to that order which connectedly con- tains and bounds the extent of them, from their exempt cause. But this order is called by him in the second hypothesis parts and a whole. These therefore he denies of the one employing the many for the purpose of distinguishing the subjects and the one. For, as he says, that which is a whole and has parts is many ; but the one is beyond the many. If, therefore, the one transcends the intelligible simplicity, but whole and that which has parts proceed from it in order to become the bond of the whole of this distribution, is it not necessary that the one should neither be a whole, nor be indigent of parts ? And I think it is through this trans- cendency that the one presubsists as the cause of this order of Gods, and that it produces this order, but in an exempt manner.
In the third place after these, we may survey the order which is allotted the boundary of the intellectual and at the same time intelligible Gods, proceeding from Me one, and may behold the one perfectly expanded above it. For this order indeed subsists from the second genera, and from the intellectual wholeness of the genera. But the one, as has been demon- strated, is exempt according to cause from this wholeness. The one there- fore has neither beginning, or middle, or end, nor has it extremes, nor does it participate of any figure. For through these Gods, the before men- tioned order of Gods becomes apparent. Whether therefore, there be a perfective summit, or what is celebrated as the middle centre in these Gods, or a termination converting the end of these divinities to their be- ginning, the one is similarly beyond every triple distribution. For the one would have parts, and would be many, if it participated of things of this kind. But it has been demonstrated that the one unically subsists prior to the many, and to wholeness together with its parts, as the cause of them. And you see how Parmenides indeed exhibits to us one nega- tion of the highest order, but two negations of the middle, and three of the last order. Besides this also, he shows that the one has no extremity.
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On the Thlology
BOOK 11.
But the infinite is a thing of this kind. And separately from this he like- wise shows that the one is unreceptive of all figures.
Again therefore, after these triple orders we must direct our attention to the intellectual Gods subsisting from these, and receiving a tripartite di- vision, and must demonstrate that the one transcends these also. For such is the one, says Parmenides, since it is neither in itself, nor in another. For if it were in another, it would be on all sides comprehended by that in which it is, and would every where touch that which comprehends it. But in this case, it would have a figure, would consist of parts, and on this account would be many and not one. And if it were in itself * it would entirely comprehend itself in itself. But comprehending and at the same time being comprehended, it will be two, and will be no longer primarily one. The discourse therefore proceeds to the same conclusion, and evinces that the one will not be one, by the summit of the intellectual order, if any one endeavours to mingle it with other things. Hence the one being perfectly exempt from this summit also, gives subsistence to it, this summit at one and the same time participating of the third of the Gods placed above it, but being produced from the second of these Gods, and being perfected from the first, and entirely established in it.