If you are willing also from the words of Plato that follow the prece- ding, we will show that to be the recipient neither of language nor of knowledge is adapted to the first principle. For the words : " This your inquiry concerning the cause of all beautiful things is as of a nature en- due I with a certain quality," are to be referred to this principle. For it is not possible to apprehend it intellectually, because it is unknown, nor to unfold it, because it is uncircumscribed ; but whatever you may say of it, you will speak as of a certain thing ; and you will speak indeed about it, but you will not speak it. For speaking of the things of which it is the cause, we are unable to say, or to apprehend through intelligence what it is. Here therefore, the addition of quality, and the busy energy of the soul, remove it from the goodness which is exempt from all things, by the redundancy of its conceptions about it. This likewise draws the soul down to kindred, connate, and multiform intelligiblcs, and prevents her from receiving that which is characterized by unity, and is occult in the participation of the good. And it is not only proper that the human soul should be purified from things co-ordinate with itself in the union and communion with that which is first, and that for this purpose it should leave all the multitude of itself behind, and exciting its own hyparxia, approach with closed eyes, as it is said, to the king of all things, and par- ticipate of his light, as much as this is lawful for it to accomplish ; but intellect also, which is prior to us, and all divine natures, by their highest unions, superessential torches, and first hyparxes are united to that which is first, and always participate of its exuberant fulness ; and this not so far as they are that which they are, but so far as they are exempt from things allied to themselves, and converge to the one principle of all. For the cause of all disseminated in all things impressions of his own all-per- fect transcendency, and through these establishes all things about himself, and being exempt from the whole of things, is ineffably present to all things. Every thing therefore, entering into the ineffable of its own nature, finds there the symbol of the father of all. All tilings too naturally vene- rate him, and are united to him, through an appropriate mystic impres- sion, divesting themselves of their own nature, and hastening to become his impression alone, and to participate him alone, through the desire of
his unknown nature, and of the fountain of good. Hence, when they have run upwards as far as to this cause, tlicy become tranquil, and are liberated from the parturitions and the desire which all things naturally possess of goodness unknown, ineffable, imparticipable, and transcen- dent] v full. But that what is here said is concerning the first God, and that Plato in these conceptions leaves him uncoordinated with and exempt from the other causes, has been, I think, sufficiently evinced.
Let us in the next place consider each of the dogmas, and adapt them to our conceptions concerning cause, that from these we may comprehend by a reasoning process, the scope of the whole of Plato's theology. Let then one truth concerning the first principle be especially that which celebrates his ineffable, simple, and all-transcending nature ; which esta- blishes all things about him, but does not assert that he generates or pro* duces any thing, or that he presubsists as the end of things posterior to himself. For such a form of words neither adds any thing to the unknown, who is exempt from all things, nor multiplies him who is established above all union, nor refers the habitude and communion of things secondary to him who is perfectly imparticipable. Nor in short, does it announce that it teaches any thing about him, or concerning his nature, but about the second and third natures which subsist after him.
Such then being this indication of the first God, and such the manner in which it venerates the ineffable, the second to this is that which con- verts all the desires of things to him, and celebrates him as the object of desire to and common end of all things, according to one cause which precedes all other causes. For the last of things subsists only for the sake of something else, but the first is that only for the sake of which all other things subsist : and all the intermediate natures participate of these
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BOOK U.
two peculiarities. Hence they genuinely adhere to the natures which surpass them, as objects of desire, but impart the perfection of desires to subordinate beings.
The third speculation of the principle of things is far inferior to tlie preceding, considering him as giving subsistence to all beautiful things. For to celebrate him as the supplier of good, and as end preceding tlie two orders of things, * not very remote from the narration which says, that all causes are posterior to him, and derive their subsistence from him, as well those which ace paternal, and the sources of good, as those that are the suppliers of prolific powers. But to ascribe to him a producing and generative cause, is still more remote from the all-perfect union of the first. For as it cannot be known or discussed by language, by secondary natures, it must not he said that it is the cause, or that it is generative of beings, but we should celebrate in silence this ineffable nature, and this perfectly causeless cause which is prior to all causes. If, however, as we endeavour to ascribe to him the good and the one, we in like manner at- tribute to him cause, and that which is fin*l or paternal, we must pardon the parturition of the soul about this ineffable principle, aspirin? to per- ceive hkn with the •eye of intellect, and to speak about him ; but, at the same time, the exempt transcendency of the one which is immense, must be considered as surpassing an indication of this kind. From these things therefore, we may receive the sacred conceptions of Plato, and an order* adapted to things themselves. And we may say that the first part of this sentence sufficiently indicates the simplicity,* transcendency, ami in short the uncoordination with all things of the king of alL For the assertion that all things -subsist about him, unfolds the hyparxis of things second, but leaves that which is beyond all things without any connexion with things posterior to it But the second part celebrates the cause of all the Gods* as prearranged in the order of end. For that which is the highest of aU causes, is immediately conjoined with that which is prior to cause; but of this kind is the final cause, and that for the sake of which
• For *fa$ iv, k is necessary to read t«£ w. ' For t>)( aiXffTi^r»{ I read T^t ««Xvn]ra. 3 For tw liov, it is necessary to read tmf 9»«r.
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all things subsist This part therefore is posterior to the otW, and is woven together with the order of things, and the progression of the Pla- tonic doctrine.
Again, the third part asserts him to be productive of all beautiful things, and thus adds to him a species of cause 1 inferior to the final. Whence also Plotmus, I think, does not hesitate to call the first God the fountain of the beautiful. It is necessary therefore to attribute that which is best to the best of all things, that he may be the cause of all, and in reality prior to cause. But this is the good. This too, which is an admirable circumstance, may be seen in the words of Plato, that the first of these three divine dogmas, neither presumes to say any thing about the good, and this ineffable nature, nor does it permit us to refer any species of eause to it. But the second dogma leaves indeed the good ineffable, as it Is fit it should, but from the habitude of things- posterior to it, enables us to collect the final cause : for it does not refuse to call it that for the sake of which all things subsist. But when it asserts that all things are for the sake of the goodr it excites in us the conception of the communion andi co-ordination of that which is the object of desire with the desiring na- tures. And the third dogma evinces that the good is the cause of alh beautiful things. But this to say something concerning it, and to add to the simplicity of the first cause, and- not to abide in the conceptions of the end, but to conjoin with it the producing principle of things second. And it appears to me that Plato here indicates the natures which are proximately unfolded into light after the first. Pork is not possible to say any thing concerning it except at one time being impelled to this from' all things, and at another from the best of things : for it is the cause of hyparxis to all things, and unfolds its own separate union through the peculiarities of these. We ascribe to it therefore the one and the good, from the donation which pervades to all things from it. For of those' things of which all participate, we say there is no other cause than that which is established prior to all these. But the about which (™ npi «,) the
' For muty it u ocewwry to rtad «ur»<j.
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!36 ON THE THEOIX)GY BOOK II.
on account of which (to h, o *), and the from which (n a^'ov,) particularly subsist in the intelligible Gods : and from these they are ascribed to the first God. For whence can we suppose the unical Gods derive their pe- culiarities, except from that which is prior to them ? To this summit of intelligibles therefore the term about is adapted, because all the divine orders occultly proceed about this summit which is arranged prior to them. But the term on account of which pertains to the middle order of intelli- gibles : for all things subsist for the sake of eternity and an hyparxis per- fectly entire. And the term from which is adapted to the extremity of intelligibles : for this first produces all things, and adorns them uniformly. These things, therefore, we shall indeed make more known in the doctrine which will shortly follow concerning the intelligible Gods.
In the next place, let us finish the discussion concerning the first God, with the theory of Parmcnidcs, and unfold the mystic conceptions of the first hypothesis as far as pertains to the present purpose. For we shall refer the reader for the most perfect interpretation of them to our com- mentaries on that dialogue. In the first place therefore, it is requisite to determine this concerning the first hypothesis, that it comprehends as many conclusions negatively, as the hypothesis which follows it does af- firmatively. For this latter demonstrates all the orders proceeding from the one ; but the former evinces that the one is exempt from all the divine genera. From both these hypotheses however, it is obvious to every one how it is necessary that the cause of the whole of things should transcend his productions. For because the one is the cause of all the Gods, he
• For fc- du it is necessary to read If o i since the former denotes the inttrumtntal, but the latter HbgJhuU cause.
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transcends all things. And because he is exempt from them through transcendency, on this account he gives to all things their hypostases. For through being expanded aboveaall things he causes all things to subsist. Since in the second and third orders also of beings, causes which are en- tirely exempt from their effects, more perfectly generate and connect their progeny than those causes do which are coordinate with their effects. And the one by ineffably producing all the divine orders, appears to be unically established above all. For in the productions posterior to it, cause is every where different from the things caused. And on this account nature indeed being incorporeal, is a cause which transcends bodies ; but soul being perfectly perpetual, is the cause of things generated ; and intellect being immoveable is the cause of every thing that is moved. If, there- fore, according to each progression of beings effects are denied of their causes, it is certainly necessary to take away all things similarly from the cause of all.