This, therefore, is the one truth concerning the first principle, and which possesses one reason remarkably conformable to the Platonic hypothesis, viz. that this principle subsists prior to the whole orders in the Gods, that it gives subsistence to the boniform essence of the Gods, that it is the fountain of superessential goodness, and that all things posterior to it being extended towards it, are filled with good, after an ineffable manner are united to it, and subsist uniformly about it. For its unical nature is not Uftprolific, but it is by so much the more generative of other things, as it pre-eftablishes a union exempt from the things which have a subsistence- Nor does its fecundity tend to multitude and division ; but it abides with undented purity concealed in inaccessible places. For in the natures also which are posterior to it, we every where see that what is perfect desires to generate, and that what is full hastens to impart to other things its plenitude. In a much greater degree therefore it is necessary that the nature which contains in one all perfections, and which is not a certain good, but good itself, and super-full, (if it be lawful so to speak) should be generative of the Whole of things, and give subsistence to them ; pro- ducing all things by being exempt from all things, and by beitig imparti- cipable, similarly generating the first and the last of beings.
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128 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK ,11.
You must not, however, suppose that tlus generation and progression is emitted in consequence of the good either being moved, or multiplied, or possessing a generative power, or energizing; since all these are secon- dary to the singleness of the first. For whether the good is moved, it will not be the good; since the good itself, and which is nothing else, if it were moved would depart from goodness. How, therefore, can that which is the source of goodness to beings, produce other things when deprived of good ? Or whether the good is multiplied through imbecility, there will be a progression of the whole of things through a diminution, but not through an abundance of goodness. For that which in generating departs from its proper transcendency, hastens to adorn inferior natures, not through prolific perfection, but through a diminution and want of its own power. But if the good produces all things by employing power, there will be a diminution of goodness about it. For it will be two things and not one, viz. it will be good and power. And if indeed it is in want of power, that which is primarily good will be indigent. But if to be the good ittelf is sufficient to the perfection of the things produced, and to the plenitude of all things, why do we assume power as an addition? For additions in the Gods are ablations of transcendent unions. Let the good therefore alone be prior to power, and prior to energy. For all energy is the progeny of power. Neither, therefore, does the good energizing give subsistence to all things through energy, nor being in want of power docs it fill all thiugs with powers, nor being multiplied do all things participate of good, nor being moved do all beings' enjoy the first principle. For the good precedes all powers, and all energies, and every multitude and motion ; since each of these is referred to the good as to its end. The good therefore is the most final of all ends, and the centre of all desirable na- tures. All desirable natures, indeed, impart an end to secondary beings ; but that which pre-subsisls uncircumscribed by all things is the first good.
' For tmtix rufevr*, I read wmrrm t« sit*.
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CUAP. VIII. OF PLATO.
Chapter V11l
After these things, however, let us direct our attention to the concep- tions about the first principle in the epistle [of Plato] to Dionysius, and survey the manner in which he considers its ineffable and immense tran- scendency. But perhaps some one may be indignant with us for rashly drawing to our own hypotheses the assertions of Plato, and may say that the three kings of which he speaks are all of them intellectual Gods ; but that Plato docs not think fit to co-arrange or connumerate the good with secondary natures. For such a connumeration ought not to be considered as adapted to the exempt transcendency of the good with respect to other things, nor in short, must it be said that the good contributes as the first with reference to another second or third cause to the completion of a triad in conjunction with other natures ; but that it in a greater degree precedes every triad and every number, than the intelligible precede the intellectual Gods. How, therefore, can we connumerate with other kings the good which is at once exempt from all the divine numbers, and co- arrange one as the first [king,] another as the second, and another as the third ? Some one may also adduce many other things, indicating the transcendency of the first principle with respect to every thing divine. Such a one, however, in thus interpreting the words of Plato will remark- ably accord with us who assert the good to be im participate, to transcend all the intelligible and intellectual genera, and to be established above all the divine monads.
That Plato, indeed, admits the first God to be the king of all things, and says that all things arc for his sake, and that he is the cause of all beautiful things, does not I think require much proof to those who consi- der his words by themselves apart from their own conjectures, by intro- ducing which they violently endeavour to accord with Plato. But that we do not assert these things connumeratiug [the first God with secondary Proc. Vol. I. R
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jgQ ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK II,
natures,] Plato himself manifests, neither calling the first king the first,, but alone the king of all things, nor asserting that some things are about him, as he says that second things are about that which is second, and third things about that which is third, but* he says, in short, that alt things are about him. And to the other kings, indeed, he introduces number and a divided kingdom ; but to the king of all things he neither attributes a part of number, nor a distribution of dominion opposite to- that of the others. Such a mode of words, therefore, neither connumerates the king of all things with the other kings* nor co-arranges him as the leader of a triad with the second and third power. For of a triad ic divi- sion the first monad, indeed, is the leader of first orders, and which are co-ordinate with itself ; but the second of second ; and the third of third orders. If, however, some one should apprehend that the first monad is- the leader of all things, so as to comprehend at once both second and third allotments ; yet the cause which subsists according to comprehen- sion is different from that which similarly pervades to all things. And to the king of all things, indeed, all things are subject according to one reaV son and one order ; but to the first of the triad, things first are subjected according to the same order ; and it is necessary that things second and third should be subservient according to their communion with the remain- ing kings. Does not, therefore, what is here said by Plato remarkably celebrate the exempt nature of the first cause, and his un-coordinatioa with the other kingdoms of the Gods ? Since he says that this cause si- milarly reigtis over all things, that all things subsist about biro, and that for his sake essence and energy are inherent in all things.
If also Socrates in the Republic clearly' teaches that the sun reigns over the world analogous to the good, let no one dare to accuse this ana- logy as connumerating the good with the king of mundane natures. For unless* together with the similitude of secondary causes to the first principles, we think fit to preserve that exempt dominion [of the first
1 For x<u here, it it necessary to read aXXmi
* For <ro$at{, it is necessary to read
* In the original ^ is wanting after »u.
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chap. vm.
cause] it will be impossible for us to evince that the super-mundane kings have their allotment analogous to the first cause, who subsists prior to the whole of things according to one transcendency. But what occasion is there to be prolix ? For Plato indeed calls the first God king; but he does not think fit to give the others the same appellation, not only in the beginning of what he says about the first, but shortly after, he adds : " About the king himself and the natures of which I have spoken there is nothing of this kind." The first God, therefore, alone is called king. But he is called not only the king of things first, in the same manner as the second of things second, and the third of things third, but as the cause at once of all being and all beauty. Hence the first God precedes the other causes in an exempt and uniform manner, and according to a transcendency of the whole of things, and is neither celebrated by Plato as co-ordinated with them, nor as the leader of a triad.
That these things, however, are asserted by Plato about the first God we shall learn by recurring a little to the preceding words, which are as follow : " You say, that I have not sufficiently demonstrated to you the particulars respecting the first nature. I must speak to you, therefore, in enigmas, that in case the letter should be intercepted, either by .land or sea, he who reads it may not understand this part of its contents. All things are situated about the king of all ; and all things are for his sake ; and he is the cause of every thing beautiful." In these words, therefore, Plato proposing to purify our conceptions about the first principle through enigmas, celebrates the king of all tilings, and refers to him the cause of the whole of things beautiful and good. Who, therefore, is the king of all things, except the unical God who is exempt from all things, who pro- duces all things from himself, and is the leader of all orders according to one cause ? Who is he that converts all ends to himself, and establishes them about himself? For if you call him, for whose sake all things sub- sist, the end of all ends, and the primogenial cause, you will not deviate from the truth concerning him. Who is he that is the cause of all beauti- ful things, shining upon them with divine light, and who encloses that which is deformed and without measure, and the most obscure of all things in the extremity of the universe?
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BOOK It,