cult, ineffable, and unknown to all beings. For every being is united to it, neither by intellectual injection, [or projection] nor the energy of essence ; since things which are destitute of knowledge are united to the first, and things deprived of all energy, participate according to their order of a conjunction with it. That which is unknown therefore in beings according to their union with the first, wc neither endeavour to know, nor to ma- nifest by names, but being more able to look to their progression and conversion, we ascribe indeed to the first two names, which we derive as resemblances from secondary natures. We also define two modes of ascent to the first, conjoining that mode which is through analogy with the appellation of the good, but that which is through negations with the appellation of the one ; which Plato also indicating, in the Republic in- deed calls the first the good, and at the same time makes a regression to it through analogy ; but in the Parmenides establishing it as the one Uaelf, he unfolds the transcendency of it which is exempt from beings, through negative conclusions. According to both these modes therefore, the first principle transcends both gnostic powers, and the parts of speech ; but all other things afford us the cause of knowledge and of appellation. And the first principle indeed unically gives subsistence to all the unions and hyparxes of secondary natures ; but the things posterior to this cause participate of it in'a divided manner. These also, as we have before observed, become multiplied by abiding, proceeding and returning ; but the one is at once perfectly exempt from all the prolific progressions, conver- tive powers, and uniform hypostases in beings. What the modes there- fore are of the doctrine about the first, and through what names Plato en- deavours to indicate it, and whence the names and the modes of this indica- tion which is unknown to all things are derived, is, I think, through what has been said sufficiently manifest.
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CHAP. VII. OF PLATO. m
It, however, it be requisite to survey each of the dogmas about it which are scattered in the writings of Plato, and to reduce them to one science of theology, let us consider, if you are willing, prior to other things, what Socrates demonstrates in the 6th book of the Republic, conformably to the before mentioned mode, and how through analogy he teaches us the wonderful transcendency of the good with respect to all beings, and the summits of the whole of things. In the first place therefore, he distinguishes beings from each other, and establishing some of them to he intelligibles, but others sensibles, he defines science by the knowledge of beings. But he conjoins sense with sensibles, and giving a twofold division to all things, he places one exempt monad over intelli- gible multitude, and a second monad over sensible multitude, according to a similitude to the former monad. Of these monads also, he shows that the one is generative of intelligible light, but the other of sensible light. And he evinces that by the intelligible light indeed, all intelligibles are deifomi, and boniform, according to participation from the first God ; but that by the sensible light, according to the perfection derived from the sun, all sensible natures are solarform, and similar to their one monad. In addition also to what has been said, he suspends the second monad from that which reigns in the intelligible. And thus he extends all things, both the first and the last of beings, I mean intelligibles and sensibles, to the good. Such a mode of reduction to the first as this, appears to me to be most excellent, and especially adapted to theology ; viz. to congregate all the Gods in the world into one union, and suspend them from their proximate monad ; but to refer the supermundane Gods to the intellec- tual kingdom ; to suspend the intellectual Gods from intelligible union ; and to refer the intelligible Gods themselves, and all beings through these, to that which is first. For as the monad of mundane natures is super- mundane, as the monad of supermundane natures is intellectual, and of intellectual natures intelligible, thus also it is necessary that first intelli-
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124 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK II.
gibles should be suspended from the monad which is above intelligible* and perfected by it, and being filled with deity, should illuminate secon- dary natures with intelligible light. But it is necessary that intellectual natures which derive the enjoyment of their being from intelligibles, but of good and a uniform hyparxis from the first cause, should connect su- permundane natures by intellectual light. And that the genera of the Gods prior to the world, through receiving a pure intellect from the in- tellectual Gods, but intelligible light from the intelligible Gods, and a unical light from the father of the whole of things, should send into this apparent world the illumination of the light which they possess. On this account, the sun being the summit of mundane natures, and proceeding from the etherial profundities, imparts to visible natures supernatural perfection, and causes these as much as possible to be similar to the su- pcrcelestial worlds. These things therefore we shall afterwards mpre abundantly discuss.
The present discourse, however, suspends all things after the above mentioned manner from the good, and the first unity. "For if indeed the sun connects every thing sensible, but the good produces and perfects every thing intelligible, and of these, the second monad [i. e. the sun] is denominated the offspring of the good, and on this account causes that which is sensible to be splendid, and adorns and fills it with good, because it imitates the primogeuial cause of itself, — if this be the case, all things will thus participate of the good, and will be extended to this one principle, intelligibles indeed, and the most divine of beings without a.medium, but sensibles through their monad [the sun.]
Again therefore, and after another manner, Plato narrates to us in this extract from the Republic the analysis to the first principle. For he sus- pends all the multitudes in the world from the intelligible monads, as for instance, all beautiful things from the beautiful itself, all good things from the good, and all equal things from the equal itself. And again, he con- siders some things as intelligibles, but others as sensibles ; but the sum- mits of them ait; uniformly established in intelligibles. Again, from these intelligible forms he thinks fit to ascend still higher, and venerating in a greater degree the goodness which is beyond intelligibles, he apprehends
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that nil intelligibles, and the monads which they contain, subsist and are perfected through it. For as we refer the sensible multitude to a monad - uncoordinated with sensibles, and we think that through this monad the multitude of sensibles derives its subsistence, so it is necessary to refer the intelligible multitude to another cause which is not connumerated with in- telligibles, and from which they are allotted their essence and their divine hyparxis.
IiCt not, however, any one fancy that Plato admits there is the same order of the good in intelligible forms, as there is prior to intelligibles. But the good indeed, which is coordinated with the beautiful, must be considered as essential, and as one of the forms which are in intelligibles. For the first good, which by conjoining the article with the noun we are accustomed to call royals* or the good, is admitted to be something superessential, and more excellent than all beings both in dignity and power ; since Socrates also, when discussing the beautiful and the good, calls the one the beautiful itself and the other the good itself, and thus says he we must denominate all the things which we then very properly considered as many. Again, particularly considering each thing as being one, we denominate each thing that which it is, and thus Socrates leading us from sensible tilings that arc beautiful and good, and in short from things that are participated, subsist in other things, and are multiplied, to the superessential unities of intelligibles and the first essences, from these again, he transfers us to the exempt cause of every thing beautiful and good. For in forms, the beautiful itself is the leader of many beau- tiful things, and the good itself of many goods, and each form alone gives subsistence to things similar to itself. But the first good is not only the cause of what is good, but similarly of things beautiful, as Plato else- where says ; and " all things are for its sake, and it is the cause of every thing beautiful."
For again, in addition to what has been said, the good which is in forms is intelligible and known, as Socrates himself teaches; but the good prior to forms is beyond beings, and is established above all know- ledge. And the former is the source of essential perfection ; but (he latter is the supplier, of good to the Gods so far as they arc Gods, and is
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ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK II.
generative of goods which are prior to essences. We must not therefore apprehend that when Socrates calls the first principle the good, from the name of idea, that he dkectly calls it the intelligible goodness ; but though the first principle is superior to all language and appellation, we permit Socrates to call it the cause of every thing beautiful and good, transfer- ring through the things which are proximately filled by it, appellations to it. For this I think Socrates indicating asserts in all that he says about the good, that it is beyond knowledge and things that are known, and likewise beyond essence and being, according to its analogy to the ,un. And after a certain admirable manner be presents us with an epi- tome of the negations of the one in the Parmeaides. For the assertion that the good is neither truth, nor essence, nor intellect, nor science, at one and the same time separates it from the supereaseotial unities, and every s of the Gods, and from the intellectual and intelligible orders, and from every psychical subsistence. But these axe the first things, and through the first hypothesis of the Parmenides, these are taken away from the principle of the whole of things.
Moreover, neither when he celebrates the good the leader of the divine orders as the most splendid of being, does he denominate it most splendid as participating of light. For the first light proceeds from it to intelligi- bles and intellect, but he gives it this appellation as the cause of the light which is every where diffused, and as the fountain of every intelligible, or intellectual, or mundane deity. For this light is nothing else than the narticipation of a divine hyparxis. For as all things become boniform through participating of the good, and are filled with the illuminat.on pro. ceeding from thence, thus also the natures which are pnmanly beings are deiform • and as it is said, intelligible and intellectual essences become divine through the participation. of deity. Looking therefore to all that has been said, we shall preserve the exempt transcendency of the good with reference to all beings and the divine orders Bu aga.n ,n each order of beings, we must grant that there is a monad analogous to it, not onlv in sensibles, as Plato says the sun is, but likewise in supermundane natures and in the genera of Gods arranged from the good prior to these. For it is evident that the natures which are nearer to the first cause and
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which participate of it in a greater degree, possess a greater similitude to it. And as that is the cause of all beings, so these establish monads which are the leaders of more partial orders. And Plato indeed arranges the multi- tudes under the monads ; but extends all the monads to the exempt prin- ciple of the whole of things, and establishes them uniformly about it. It is necessary therefore that the theological science should be unfolded con- formably to the divine orders, and that our conceptions about it should be transcendent, and unmingled and unconnected with other things. And we should survey indeed all secondary natures, subsisting according to and perfected about it ; but we should establish it as transcending all the monads in beings, according to one excess of simplicity, and as unitfclly arranged prior to the whole orders [of Gods.] Pot as the Gods themselves enact the order Which is in them, thus also it is necessary that the truth concerning them, the precedancoUs causes of beings, and the second artd third progeny of these should be definitely distinguished.