good. If, therefore, the intellect which is in us is an image of the first in- tellect, and the good of the whole of our life is not to be defined accord- ing to this alone, is it not necessary that in wholes also, the cause of good must be established above intellectual perfection ? For if that which is primarily good subsisted according to total intellect, in us also and all other [intellectual natures,] self-sufficiency and appropriate good would be present through the participation of intellect. Our intellect, indeed, is disjoined from the good, and is indigent, and on this account requires pleasure in order to the attainment of human perfection. But a divine intellect always participates of the good, and on this account is divine. For it is boniform through the participation of good ; but divine, as being suspended from the first deity. It is the same reasoning, therefore, which infers that the good is exempt from the first intellect, and which defines felicity to consist not in intelligence only, but in the all-perfect presence of the gootl. For the intellectual form of energy is itself by it- self defective with respect to blessedness. And why is it requisite to be prolix? For Parmenides teaches us most clearly the difference of the one from essence and being, and shows that the one is exempt from all other things and from essence ; for this he evinces of the one at the end of the first hypothesis. But how is it possible that the cause of essence, and which is exempt from it through supreme transcendency, should not also be beyond the intellectual order? For intellect is essence. But if in in- tellect there is permanency and motion, and Parmenides demonstrates that the one transcends both these, does he not immediately bring us to the ineffable cause of all things, which is prior to every intellect? And if every intellect is converted to itself, and is in itself, but the one is demon- strated to be neither in itself, nor in another, how can we any longer con- sider intellect as the same with the first cause of all ? In what respect, also, will the one which is prior to being differ from the one being, which is the subject of the second hypothesis, if intellect is the best of things, and the first principle of all ? For the one being participates of the one ; but that which participates is secondary to that which is participated. That the one, however, is according to Plato more ancient than intellect and essence, is through what has been said recalled to our memory.
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Ik the next place, if the one is neither intelligible nor intellectual, nor in short participates of the power of being, let us survey what will be the modes of leading us to it, and through what intellectual conceptions Plato unfolds as far as he is able, to his familiars, the ineffable and un- known transcendency of the first. I say then, that at one time he unfolds it through analogy, and the similitude of secondary natures ; but at an- other time he demonstrates itg exempt transcendency, and its separation from the whole of things, through negations. For in the Republic, indeed, he indicates the ineffable peculiarity and hyparxis of the good, through analogy to the sun ; but in the Parmenides, he demonstrates the differ- ence of the one with respect to all things posterior to it through negations. But he appears to me through one of these modes to unfold the progres- sion from the first cause of all other things, and prior to other things, of the divine orders. For on this account the first cause is exempt from all the natures produced by it, because every where cause is established above its effects ; and on this account the first is nothing of all things, because all things proceed from him. For he is the principle of all things, both of beings, and at the same time of non-beings. But again, accord- ing to the other of these modes, he adumbrates the conversion to the first of the things which have proceeded from it. For in each order of beings, through similitude to it there is a monad analogous to the good, which has the same relation to the whole series conjoined with it, that the good has to all the orders of the Gods. The cause, however, of this similitude is entirely the conversion of the whole of things to the good. These, there- fore, proceed from thence and are converted to it. And the progression indeed of all things demonstrates to us the ascent to the first through ne? gations ; but the conversion of all things demonstrates this to us through analogies. Let not, however, any one considering these negations to be such things as privations despise such a mode of discussion, nor defining
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Chap. V. of Plato. 1 19
the sameness in words analogously, and words in habitudes, endeavour to calumniate this anagogic progression to the first principle. For negations, as it appears to me, extend a triple peculiarity in things. And at one time, indeed, being more primogenial than affirmations, they are procrea- tive and perfective of the generation of them. But at another time, they are allotted an order co-ordinate to affirmations, and negation is then in no respect more venerable than affirmation. And again, at another time, they are allotted an order subordinate to affirmations, and are nothing else than the privations of them. For with respect to non-being itself, with which there is also a negation of beings, at one time considering it as be- yond being, we say that it is the cause and the supplier of beings ; but at another time we evince that it is equivalent to being ; just as I think, the Elean guest demonstrates [in the Sophista] that non-being is in no respect less, if it be lawful so to speak, than being ; and at another time we leave it as a privation of, and indigent of being. For indeed, according to this mode, we call every generation, and matter itself, non-being.
Analogies, however, are assumed for the purpose alone of indicating the similitude of secondary natures to the first principle. And neither any reason, nor habitude, nor communion of this principle with things pos- terior to it, becomes apparent from these. For its exempt nature is not of such a kind as is beheld in the second and third orders of beings ; but the good transcends the whole of things in a much greater degree than intellect surpasses the natures posterior to itself, whether it be the demi- urgic intellect, or the intellect of the whole world, or some other intellect from among the number of those that are called divine. Every intellect however, and every god, is allotted a transcendency with respect to subor- dinate natures, and those things of which it is the cause, inferior to that which the first principle has to every being ; for this principle similarly transcends all things, and not some in a greater, but others in a less de- gree ; since thus we should introduce a greater and less habitude of it to secondary natures. It is necessary, however, to preserve it without habi- tude to all things, and similarly exempt from the whole of things. But of other natures, some are indeed nearer, and others are more remote from it. For each thing proceeds from it, since it produces all things
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130 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK. II.
according to one cause. And different things are indeed converted to it in a different manner, this principle in the mean time, receiving no habi- tude or communion with things posterior to itself.
Tiie mode of demonstration, therefore, pertaining to the one is, as we have said, twofold. For again, Plato delivers to us twofold names of the ineffable cause. In the Republic indeed he calls it the good, and demonstrates it to be the fountain of the truth which unites intellect and intelligibles. But in the Parmenides, he denominates such a prin- ciple as this the one, and shows that it gives subsistence to the divine unities. Again therefore, of these names, the one is the image of the progression of the whole of things, but the other of their conversion. For because indeed all things derive their subsistence and proceed from the first principle, on this account referring the one to it, we demonstrate that it is the cause of all multitude and every progression. For whence is multitude unfolded into light except from the one* But because again the progressions from it are naturally converted to it, and de- sire its ineffable and incomprehensible hyparxis, we denominate it the good. For what else is that which converts all things, and which is ex- tended to all beings as the object of desire, but the good f For all other things subsist distrihutedly, and are to some beings honourable, but to others not. And every thing which in any respect whatever is said to have a subsistence aspires after some things, and avoids others. But Me good is the common object of desire to all beings, and all things accord- ing to their nature verge and are extended to this. The tendency however of desiring natures is every where to the appropriate object of desire. The good therefore converts, but the one gives subsistence to all secondary natures. Let not, however, any one suppose that the ineffable can on this.
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Chap. Vi- of Plato. 12!
account be named, or that the cause of all union is doubled. For here indeed we transfer to it names, looking to that which is posterior to it, and to the progressions from, or the circular conversions to it. Because, in- deed, multitude subsists from it, we ascribe to it the appellation of the one ; but because all things even as far as to things that have the most obscure existence, are converted to it, we denominate it the good.
We endeavour therefore to know the unknown nature of the first prin- ciple, through the things which proceed from, and are converted to it ; and we also attempt through the same things to give a name to that which is ineffable. This principle, however, is neither known by beings, nor is efiable by any one of all things ; but being exempt from all knowledge, and all language, and subsisting as incomprehensible, it produces from itself according to one cause all knowledge, every thing that is known, all words, and whatever can be comprehended by speech. But its uuical nature, and which transcends all division, shines forth to the view dyadically in the natures posterior to it, or rather triad ically. For all things abide in, proceed from, and are converted to the one. For at one and the same time, they are united to it, are in subjection to its union which is exempt from the whole of things, and desire the participation of it. And union indeed imparts a stable transcendency to all secondary natures, and which subsists in unproceeding conjunction with the cause of them. But subjection defines the progression of beings, and their se- paration from the imparticipable and first unity. \nd desire-perfects the conversion of the subsisting natures, and their circular tendency to the ineffable. First natures therefore, being always entirely united, [to the ineffable] some more remotely, but others more proximately, and receiv- ing through this union their hyparxis, and their portion of good, we en- deavour to manifest through names the progression and conversion of the whole of things. But with respect to their stable comprehension, if it be lawful so to speak, in the first, and their union with the ineffable, this as being incomprehensible, and not to be apprehended by knowledge, those who were wise in divine concerns were unable to indicate it by words. But as the ineffable is primarily concealed in inaccessible places, and isexemptfrom all beings, thus also the union of all things with it isoc- Proc. Vol. I. Q