But if it is necessary, indeed, that there should be many principles, and that they should participate of the one, the one will be co-ordinated in the many. Again, however, it is necessary, that the unco-ordinated should every where be more ancient than the co-ordinated, and the exempt than the participated. For how is the one in each of the many except from one principle which co-arranges the multitude, and converts it to itself ac- cording to the communion of the one? Again, if the first one were multi- plied, the one will be passive ; for at the same time it will be one and not one, and will not be that which is one [only.] It is necessary, however, in each genus of things, that there should be that which is unminglcd with
' in, which are multitude only without any participation of the one.
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an inferior nature, in order that there may be that which is mingled, in the same manner as we say respecting forms. For from the equal itself, things which are equal in these sublunary realms, appear indeed as equal, though they are filled with a contrary nature ; and from that which is primarily being, that which is mingled with non-being is derived, and which presents itself to the view as being. And in short every where th6 simple unmingled subsistence of each thing precedes those things which through remission are mingled with the privations of themselves. The one therefore is by itself exempt from all multitude ; and that which is one, and at the same time not one, is not the first one, but is suspended ' from that which is primarily one ; through the principle, indeed, participating of the one, but through the diminution arising from multitude, now mani- festly exhibiting in itself the cause of separation.
That the one therefore is the principle of all things, and the first cause, and that all other things are posterior to the one, is I think evident from what has been said. I am astonished however at all the other interpre- ters of Plato, who admit the existence of the intellectual kingdom, but do not venerate the ineffable transcendency of the one, and its hyparxis which surpasses the whole of things. I particularly, however, wonder that tliis should have been the case with Origen, who was a partaker of the same erudition with Plotinus. For Origen ends in intellect and the first being, but omits the one which is beyond every intellect and every being. And if indeed he omits it, as something which is better than all knowledge, language and intellectual perception, we must say that he is neither discordant with Plato, nor with the nature of things. But if he
1 For c£]pi|T«i it U necessary to read ffcymrraj. The punctuation also of the text in this place, tnust be altered agreeably to the translation.
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omits it because the one is perfectly unhyparctic, and without any sub- sistence, and because intellect is the best of things, and that which is primarily being is the same as that which is primarily one, we cannot as- sent to him in asserting these things, nor will Plato admit him, and con- numerate him with his familiars. For I think that a dogma of this kind is remote from the philosophy of Plato, and is full of Peripatetic innova- tion. If you are willing, however, we will adduce some arguments against this dogma, and against all others who are the patrons of this opinion, and we will strenuously contend for the doctrine of Plato, and show that ac- cording to him the first cause is beyond intellect, and is exempt from all beings, as Plotinus and Porphyry, and all those who have received the philosophy of these men, conceive him to assert. *
We. shall begin, therefore, from the Republic ; for here Socrates clearly shows that the good is established above being, and the whole intellectual order, following the analogy of the first goodness to the sun. For if, as the sovereign sun is to generation, to every thing visible, and to all visive natures according to the power generative of light, so it is necessary the good should be with reference to intellect and intelligibles, according to a cause productive of truth, — if this be the case, we must say that the sun is exempt at one and the same time from visive and visible natures, and must admit that the good transcends the natures which are always intel- lective, and also those which are eternally intelligible. It is better, how- ever, to hear the Platonic words themselves: " You may say that the sun not only imparts the power of being seen to visible natures, but also that he is the cause of their generation, increase, and nutriment, not being him- self generation. Certainly. We may say, therefore, that things which are known, have not only this from the good that they are known, but like- wise that their being and essence are thence derived, whilst the good itself is not essence, but beyond essence, transcending it both in dignity and in power." Through all these things, therefore, it is evident how the good and the first principle are defined by Plato to be expanded above not only the intellectual, but also the intelligible extent, and essence itself, accord- ing to union, in the same manner as it is inferred the sun surpasses all visible natures, and perfects and generates all things by his light. How,
therefore, following Plato, can we admit that intellect is the best of things, and the cause of all things ? How can we assert that being itself* and essence are the same with the principle which is the leader of all the di- vine progressions ? For essence and intellect are said to subsist primarily from the good, to have their hyparxis about the good, to be filled with the light of truth proceeding from thence, and to obtain the participation which is adapted to them from the union of this light, which is more di- vine than intellect itself and essence, as being primarily suspended from the good, and affording in beings a similitude to that which is first For the light which is emitted from the sun causes every thing visible to be solar-form. And the participation of the light of truth renders that which is intelligible boniform and divine. Intellect, therefore, is a god through a light which is more ancient than intellectual light and intellect itself, and that which is intelligible and at the same time intellectual participates of a divine hyparxis through a plenitude of this light being appropriately imparted to it.* And in short, every divine nature is that which it is said to be, on account of this light, and is through it united to the cause of all beings. By no means, therefore, is the first good to be considered as the same with intellect, nor must it be admitted that the intelligible is more ancient than all the hyparxis of the whole of things, since it is even sub- ordinate to the light proceeding from the good, and being perfected by this light, is conjoined according to its own order with the good itself. For we must not say that the intelligible is united to the first after the same manner as the light [of truth ;] but the latter through continuity with the good is established in it without a medium ; while the former, through this light, participates of a vicinity to the good ; since in sensibles also, the solar light is primarily connascent with the circulation of the sun, ascends as far as to the centre of the whole sphere, and subsists on all sides about it. But all sensible natures through this obtain a similitude to the sun, each of them according to its own nature being filled with solar-form illu- mination. These things, therefore, will be sufficient to recall into the
1 For wno to i, it is necessary to read aim to or.
* This sentence is very erroneous in the original, m will be evident from comparing it with the above translation.
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memory of those who love the contemplation of truth, the conceptions of Plato on this subject, and to evince that the order of intellect is secondary to the exempt transcendency of the one.
If, however, it is requisite to evince the same thing through many testi- monies, let us survey what the Elean guest in the Sophista determines concerning these things. He says, therefore, it is necessary that the mul- titude of all beings, whether they are contraries or not, should be sus- pended from the one being, [i. e. from being characterized by the one ;] but that the one being itself should be suspended from the one. For when we call the hot or the cold, or permanency or motion, being, we do not denominate each of these as the same with being itself. For if perma- nency were being itself, motion would not be being ; or, if motion were such like being, permanency would not participate of the appellation of being. But it is evident that being accedes to permanency, to motion, and to every multitude of beings from one thing which is primarily being. This very thing, therefore, which is the cause of essence to all things, and which is participated by all other things, is a participant of this one, and on this account, as it is being alone,' so also it is primarily being.' It is, however, being itself indeed, and is not allotted to &e, from participation ; but it is one according to participation, and on this account it is passive to the one. But it is being* primarily. If, therefore, Plato gives to the one a subsistence beyond being, in the same manner as that which is first in wholes is supposed by him to transcend beings, how is it possible that being should not be posterior to the owe, since it participates of it, and on this account is denominated one ?
Moreover, Socrates in the Philebus clearly demonstrates the same thing to those who arc able to know wholes from parts, viz. that intellect has not the same order as the first cause of all. Investigating, therefore, the good of the human soul and its end, of which participating in every re- spect sufficiently it will reap the fruits of a felicity adapted to its nature, he -in the first place removes pleasure from an end of this kind, and after this intellect, because neither is this replete with all the elements of the
• For it it is necessary to read «».
* Here also o» must be substituted for n.