Proclus' Theology of Plato (Six Books) — trans. Thomas Taylor (1816)

Again therefore, according to this hypothesis, the same things will be according to the same, similar and disimilar. For if all the manys are not one, and each thing according to all things is not one, that which is not one will evidently suffer the same passion in consequence of the pri- vation of the one. All things therefore being deprived of the one, after the same manner, they will on this account subsist similarly with respect to caeh other. But things which subsist similarly, so far as they thus sub- sist, are evidently similar to each other. Hence the many will be similar to each other, so far as they are deprived of the one. They will likewise according to this privation of the one be perfectly dissimilar. For it is necessary that things which are similar should suffer the same passion ; so that things which do not suffer any thing that is the same, will not be similar. But things which suffer any thing that is the same, suffer also one thing. Hence things which arc deprived of every one, will not suffer any thing that is the same. The many therefore will be similar and dis- similar according to the same. But this is impossible. Hence it is im- )K>ssible for the many to exist which are in no respect one.

Moreover, tl>e many will be the same with and different from each other according to the same. For if all things are similarly deprived of the one, so far indeed as all of them are similarly deprived they Mill be the same according to this privation; since things which subsist after the same manner according to habit are the same, and also things which are after the same manner deprived according to privation. Bu t so far in

short, as each of them is deprived of every one, so far the many will be different from each other. For if the one in the many is the same, that which is in no respect one, will in no respect be the same. The many therefore will be the same and not the same with each other. But if they are the same and not the same it is evident that they are different from each other. For that which is the same and not the same, so far as it is not the same, is not the same, by nothing else thau the different. Farther still therefore, these many will be moveable and immoveable, if the one is not. For if each of them is not one, they will be immoveable accord- ing to the privation of the one. For if that which is not one should be changed, each of them would have the one ; since privations being changed, entirely lead into habits the things that are changed. It is necessary however that what is not one should remain immoveable according to the privation of the one, though this very thing is itself impossible, viz. that the many should stand still. For every thing which stands still is in something which is the same, via. it is either in the same form, or in the same place. But every thing which is in the same, is in one thing which is the same. For the same in which it is, is one thing. Every thing therefore which stands still is in one thing. The many, however, do not participate of the one. But it is perfectly impossible that things which do not participate of the one, should be in one certain thing. And things which are not in one thing cannot stand still, since things which stand still are entirely in one and the same thing. It is impossible there- fore, that the many should stand still, and remain immoveable. It has been demonstrated however, that the many must necessarily stand im- moveable. The same things therefore, and the same passion, (I mean the privation of the habit of the one,) are moveable and immoveable. For things immoveable, and things which stand still, so far as they are unstable, so far they must necessarily appear to be moveable.

Moreover, there is no number of beings if the one in no respect is; but all things and each thing will be not one. For the particle of number, the monad, is one, and every number itself is one. For if there are five monads, there is also the pentad ; and if three monads, the triad. But the triad itself is a certain unity, and so is the pentad. So that if there is no one, there will neither be any part, nor the whole of numbers. For

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Chap. I

how can there be any number the one not existing ? For the one is the principle of numbers. But the principle not existing, neither is it pos- sible that the things which proceed from this principle should exist. Hence the one not existing, neither will there be any number.

Again, therefore, neither will there be any knowledge of beings if the one is not. For it will not be possible either to speak or think of any being. For each thing itself, and every thing of which we can speak, and in which we impress the nature of the one, will have no existence, because neither does the one exist. Hence neither will there be any discourse nor any knowledge. For discourse is one thing consisting of many things, if it is perfect. And knowledge then exists, when that which knows be- comes one with that which is known. .But union not existing, there will at tin; same time be no knowledge of things, and it will be impossible to speak about things which we know. To which we may add, that the in- explicable in the several infinites, will necessarily always fly from the bound of knowledge. For immediately each apparent infinite which he who possesses knowledge desires to understand, will escape the gnostic power hastening to come into contact with, and adhere to it, since it in incapable either of contact or adhesion. If, therefore, the many alone have an existence, the one having no subsistence whatever, so many ab- surdities, and a still greater number must necessarily happen to those who adopt such an hypothesis.

But if the one which is the one itself alone has a subsistence, and there is nothing else (for if there were there would not only be one but many things ; since one and another thing are more than one, and are not one thing only) if this be the case, there will neither be among all things either % whole, or that which has parts. For every thing which has parts is many, and every whole has parts. But the one is in no respect many. Neither therefore will there be a whole, nor that which has parts. Farther still, neither is it possible that there should be a beginning, or end of any thing. For that which has a beginning, a middle, and an end, is divisible. But the one is not divisible, because neither has it any parts. Hence, neither has it a beginning, nor a middle,nor an end. Again, if the one alone has a subsist- ence, no being will have figure. For every thing which has figure is either rectilinear or circular, or mixt from these. But if indeed it is rectilinear,

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it will have for its parts, the middle, and the extremes. If it is circular, there will be one thing in it as a middle, but other things as extremes, to which the middle extends. And if it is mixed from the right and circular line, it will consfst of many things, and wHl not be one.

Moreover, neither will any being be in itself, nor in another thing. For that which is in another thing is different from that in which it is. Bui the one alone existing and nothing else (for it will by no means be in another thing) there will be no being which is in another thing. Hut that which is in itself will at the same time comprehend and be compre- hended ; and in this, to comprehend will not be the same thing as to be comprehended ; nor will there be tlie same * definition of both. There will therefore be two things, and no longer the one alone. Again, neither will any being be moved. For being moved indeed, it must necessarily be changed. But being changed it must be in another thing. If the one however alone has an existence, it is not possible for any thing to appear to be in something else. I^ence it is not possible for any being to be changed. But every .thing which stands still is necessarily in the same thing. And that which is in the same is in a certain same thing. The one however is in no same thing. For that which is in a certain thing, is either in itself, or in something else. But it has been demonstrated, that it is neither in itself, nor in another. Hence neither is it in a certain same thing. Neither therefore does any being stand still.

Moreover, it is impossible for any thing to be the same with, or different from any thing. For if there is nothing besides the one itself, there is not any thing which will be either the same with, or different from another thing. For there will not be any other being. And the one itself will not be different from itself ; for it would be many and not one. Nor will it be the same with itself. For this thing which is same is in another, and same is not the one itself. For the one is simply one, because it is not many. But that which is same is the same with another thing. Again, neither is it possible for any thing to be similar or dissimilar to any thing. For every thing similar suffers a certain same passion ; but every

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thing dissimilar a certain different passion. The one, however, "cannot suf- fer any thing, nor can this he the case with any thing else besides the one ; since no tiling else has any existence whatever, if the one alone has a sub- sistence.

Farther still, in addition to these things we say that neither is it possible for any thing to be touched, nor to be separate, if there is nothing else besides the one. For how can things which have no existence be separate, or conic into contact with any thing? But neither can the one either be separate from itself, or touch itself. For it would thus be passive to the being touched, and the being separate. But the one suffers no other tlung besides itself. It is likewise requisite that no one thing should either be equal or unequal to any thing. For that which is equal to another thing, is said to be so with reference to another thing. And the like may be said of that which is unequal. Another thing, however, has no existence, if the one alone has a subsistence. But neither can the one be equal or unequal to itself. For if unequal, there will be one thing in it as greater, but another as less ; so that it will be two things and not one. And if the one is equal to itself, the one will measure itself. This however is im- possible. For the one will measure and be measured by itself, so that it will not be the one itself. Neither therefore will there be any equality or inequality in beings. If however these things are impossible, neither can any being come into contact with another, and be separate, nor be similar or dissimilar, nor be same or different, nor again, stand still, or be moved, or in short be in any thing, or have figure, or be a whole, or have parts, if the om alone has a subsistence which is void of multitude, and is without all these things. Neither however, i3 it possible for the many alone to have a subsistence, as was before demonstrated. And hence it is necessary that every being should be both many and one.

If this however is the case, either the many must participate of the one, or the one of the many, or both must participate of each other, or neither of each other; but the many indeed must, be separate, and the one must also be separate, in order that the many and the one may subsist, as reason evinces. If, therefore, neither the one participates of the many, nor the many of the one, the same absurdities will ensue as we brought together in Proc. Vol. I. N

On the 'Ideology

HOOK II.