the hypothesis of the many alone having a subsistence. For again there will be the many separate from the one. For if the one subsists by itself, and the many do not in any respect participate of the one, the many will be infinitely infinite, they will be similar and dissimilar, same and different, moved and stable, and there will neither be any number nor any know- ledge of the many. For the absence of the one compels all thc»e conse- quences to be apparent in the many. It is impossible therefore, that neither the many should participate of the one, nor the one of the many.
If however, the one participates of the many, and the many of the one, and both these are in each other, itis necessary that there should be another nature besides these, which is neither one nor many. For both these being mingled in each other, it is necessary that there should be a cause of their mixture which conjoins multitude to the one, and the one to multitude. For it is necessary that every thing that is mingled, should have a cause of the mixture. For in short, if the one and multitude participate of each other, neither the one is the cause of essence to multitude, nor multitude to the one, but a certain third thing is the cause of essence to both, and which is prior to these. For what will that be which makes this to be multitude, and that to be one ? And what is the cause of this communica- tion and association with each other, the one so far as it is one never having any communication with the many ? For the many so far as many, and the one so far as one arc different from each other. And so far as neither is from neither, they have no sympathy with each other. What therefore is it which collects these into one, since they fly from and are unmingled with each other? For being thus discordant with each other, they cannot desire each other, or if they did their congress must be fortuitous. For if this should happen to be the case, there was a time when these were separate from each other, since now also they subsist together casually. It is however impossible for the many to subsist separate from the one. The mixture therefore is not casual. But neither is the mixture from the. many, if neither the one is the cause of the many, nor the many of the one. What, therefore is this more excellent thing [which is the cause of the mixture?] For it is either one, or not one. But if indeed, it is the one itself, we must again inquire concerning this, whether it participates of
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Chap. I. of Plato. 99
multitude or of nothing. For if this participates, it is evident tbat some other thing prior to this, will for the same reason present itself to the view, and this will be the case to infinity. But if a thing of this kind is entirely roid of multitude, again that which was asserted at first will not be true, viz. that the many do not participate of the one, nor the one of the many. I mean however that which is the most principal and primarily one. But there is indeed a certain one in the many, and there is also the imparticipa- blc one, and which is simply one, and nothing else. If however that which is prior to both, is not ' one, it is necessary that this not one should be more excellent than the one. All things however arc, and are gene- rated what they are, through the one. And together with the one indeed every being is preserved ; but separate from the one proceeds to the cor- ruption of itself. The mixture also of the one and multitude, which the non-one affords to beings, is communion and union. The one* therefore, and that which is not one, ' are the cause of nothing else to beings than of their being one. If however the one is the cause of a thing of this kind, that which is not one will not be the cause of that which is more excellent [than union.] But it is every where necessary that what is more excel- lent should be the cause to beings of another more excellent thing, accor- ding to its own power. For thus it will be more excellent as being more good, and as the cause from its own nature of a greater and more excel- lent good to those things to which a less good is the cause of less good- ness. From these things therefore it is necessary, that the many should participate of the one, that the one should be unmingled with multitude, and that nothing should be better than the one, but that this should also be the cause of being to the many. For every thing which is deprived of the one, flies immediately into nothing, aud to its own corruption. But that which is not mauy, is dot at one and the same time not many and nothing. For to the one that which is nothing, or not one, is opposed, and to the many that which is not many is opposed. If, therefore, the one and the
' Ou% is omitted in the original.
* Instead of to or it is necessary to read to «.
' The » in the original which immediately precedes o«x n seems to be superfluous, and is therefore omitted in the translation.
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many are not the same, the not being many will not be the same with nothing. From thus considering the affair therefore, it appears that the one is beyond multitude, and is the cause of being to the many.
It is necessary however, that discussing the same subject after another manner, we should again see if we can in a certain respect follow what has been said, and refer it to the same end. It is necessary therefore, that there should either be one principle, or many principles ; or rather, we should begin from hence. And if there are many principles, they must either possess sympathy with each other, or they must be divulscd from each other, and they must be either finite or infinite. But if there is one principle, this must either be not essence, or essence. And if it is essence, this must either be corporeal or incorporeal. And if incorporeal, it must cither be separate from, or inseparable from bodies. And if separate, it must either be moveable or immoveable. But if it is not essence, it must either be inferior to all essence, or participated by essence, or imparticipable. If therefore there are many principles, and which have no sympathy with each other, no being will originate from them [conjointly,] nor will they be common to all things, but each will produce by itself. For what commu- nication can there be between things which are naturally foreign, or tvhat co-operation between things which are entirely of* a different kind? In addition also to these things, there will be the many which do not partici- pate of the one. For if there is a certain one common in all of them, they will not be perfectly separated essentially from each other. If therefore they are different, and there is nothing which is the same about them, they are alone many and by no means one. But if there are many principles, and which possess sympathy with each other, they will have something
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common, which leads all of them to sympathy, and similarly unfolds all of them to the view. For we call those things sympathetic, which happen to be passive to the same thing. But similars are entirely similar from participating one form and one nature. If however this be the case, it is necessary that that all [or universal] which is every where, and in all the principles, should be of a more principal nature than the many. This therefore gives them the power to generate sympathy with each other, and affords them communion according to nature.
Again, if there are indeed infinite principles, either the things which proceed from them are infinite, and there will thus be the infinite twice, or they are finite, and thus all the principles will not be principles. For things finite in number, will entirely proceed from finite principles. The principles therefore are in vain infinite. To which may be added, that in- finity makes both the principles to be unknown, and the things which proceed from them. For the principles being unknown, it is necessary that the things which proceed from them should be unknown ; since we then think that we know any thing when we know the causes and the first principles of it. But if the principles are finite, it is evident that there will be a certain number of them : for we say that number, is a definite multitude. If however, there is a number of the principles, it is necessary that there should be a cause of the whole number of them. For every number is from one ; and this, viz. the one is the principle of numbers. This therefore will be the principle of principles, and the cause of finite multitude, since number itself is one, and the end in the many is one, and it bounds the many by that which is one. But the principle being one, and this being essence, it is necessary if this is admitted to be cither cor porcal or incorporeal, that it must be acknowledged to be the principle of other things.
If therefore, body is the cause of the generation of beings, it is neces- sary indeed, that it should be divisible and have parts. For every body is in its own nature divisible ; since every magnitude is a certain whole and that which is a whole consists of parts. These parts therefore, (but I mean each of them) must either severally participate a certain one, or not participate it. If therefore they do not participate it, they wdl be
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BOOK. If.
many alone, and by no means one. Hence, neither will that which con- sists from them be a whole. For there being no one, that which consists of all of them will not be one. But if each of the parts participates of something of this kind, and there is something which is the same in all of them, a thing of this kind must necessarily be incorporeal, and impar- tible according to its own nature. For if this also is itself corporeal, it is either wholly in each of the parts, or not wholly. If therefore, it is in- deed wholly in each, it will itself be separated from itself. For the parts in which it is are separate from each other. But if it is not wholly in each of the parts, this also will be divisible, aud will have parts after the same manner as the above mentioned parts ; and there will again be the same inquiry concerning these, viz. whether in these also there is something common, or nothing ; since if there is nothing common, we shall place the many separate from the one.
Let us however consider the whole ; for every body is a whole, and has parts. What therefore will that be which is connective of the parts, since they are many ? For it is necessary to say either that the whole is unific of the parts, or the parts of the whole, or that some third thing prior to both, which is neither a whole, nor has any part, connects and unites the whole with its parts, and the parts with the whole. But if the whole indeed is connective of the parts, the whole will be incorporeal and impartible. For if it is a body, this also will be partible, and will be in- digent of a nature which is capable of connecting the parts ; and this will be the case to infinity. But if the parts are connective of the whole, how can the many be connective of 'Ac one ; and things divided, of that which consists from them? For on the contrary, it is necessary that the one should have the power of uniting the many, and not the many of uni- ting the one. And if that which connects both, is neither a whole nor has parts, it will be perfectly impartible. But being impartible, itis also necessarily without interval. For every thing which has interval has parts, and is divisible. But being without interval it is incorporeal ; for every body possesses interval.
Farther still, it is necessary that the principle should be perpetual ; for every being is perpetual or corruptible. Hence it must be admitted that the principle of beings is perpetual or corruptible. But if we should grant that