necessary not to be ignorant after what manner things of this kind are as- serted, and that they are composed for the sake of symbolical indication v and tliat fables for the sake of concealment call the ineffable unfolding into light through causes, generatioti. For in the Orphic writings, indeed, the first cause is on this account denominated Time ; since again, for another' reason, it is thus denominated, in order that a subsistence according to cause may be the same as a subsistence according to time. And the pro- gression of the Gods from the liest of causes is properly denominated ge- neration according to time. To Plato, therefore, mythologizing, it is adapted to devise things of this kind conformably to theologists; but when lie is discoursing dialectically, and investigating and unfolding divine natures intellectually and not mystically, it is then adapted to him to celebrate the unbegotten essence of the Gods. For the Gods primarily establish in themselves the paradigm of non-generation. But an intellec- tual nature is in a secondary degree unbegotten, and after this the psy- chical essence. And in bodies there is an ultimate resemblance of unbe- gotten power; which some posterior to Plato perceiving, have indefinitely shown that the whole heaven is unbegotten. The Gods, therefore, arc unl>egotten. But there is an order in them of first, middle, and last pro- gressions, and a transcendency and subjection of powers. There are also in them uniform comprehensions of causes ; but multiform progenies of
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88 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK I.
things caused. And all things, indeed, are consubsistent in each other ; but the mode of subsistence is various. For some things as replenishing subsist prior to secondary natures ; but others, as being 61led aspire after more perfect natures, and participating of their power become generative of things posterior to themselves, and perfective of their hyparxis.
Looking to these things, therefore, we may unfold what is said of pa- • ternal causes, and of the prolific powers of mothers in fables. For every where, we may suppose that the cause of a more excellent and more uni- form nature is paternal ;* but we may say that the cause of a more sub- ordinate and partial nature pre-exists in the order of a mother. For with the Gods a father is analogous to the monad, and the cause of bound ; but a mother, to the duad, and to the infinite power which is generative of beings. The paternal cause, however, is with Plato uniform, and is es- tablished in a more elevated order than the natures which proceed from it, and subsists prior to its progeny in the allotment of the desirable. Again, the maternal cause has the form of the duad ; and at one time presents itself to the view in fables as more excellent than its progeny, but at another time as essentially subordinate to it ; as in the Banquet, Plato calls Poverty the mother of Love. And this is not only the case in fabulous figments, but also in the philosophic theory of beings, as is evi- dent in the Timaeus. For there Plato calls being the father, but matter the mother and nurse of generation. The powers, therefore, which are prolific and perfective of secondary natures, and the suppliers of life and causes of separation are mothers, being established above the natures produced by them. But the powers which receive the natures that pro-
• »rfwr is onytted in the original.
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CHAP. XXtX. OF JfLATO. 8g
ceed into light, which multiply their energies, and extend even the subor- dinate allotment of the progeny, are also themselves called mothers. Again, however, the progeny of such like causes, at one time indeed, pro- ceed according to union from their proper principles, and are filled from both the paternal and maternal cause ; but at another time they contain the bond of them, being arranged in the middle, conveying the gifts of the fathers to the maternal bosoms, and converting the receptacles of them to the completions of primary causes. But of the natures which subsist from twofold preexisting principles, some arc assimilated to the paternal cause ; and such like genera of Gods are productive, defensive, and com- prehensive. For to produce, to contain, and to defend, pertain to the cause of bound. But others are assimilated to the maternal cause, and arc prolific, and vivific, and the suppliers of motion, of the multiplication of powers, of variety and progressions. For all these are the progeny of infinity and the first multitude.
Chapter Xxix.'
Thus much therefore may suffice concerning the unbegotten hyparxis of the Gods. It now remains, I think, to speak of divine names. For Socrates in the Cratylus thinks fit to unfold in a remarkable degree the rectitude of names in divine natures. And Parmenides indeed, in the first hypothesis, as he denies of the one every thing else that is known, and all knowledge, so likewise he denies of it name and language. But in the second hypothesis, besides all other things he shows that this one may be spoken of and ' that it has a name. In short therefore, it must be admitted that the first, most principal and truly divine names are es- tablished in the Gods themselves. But it must be said that the second names, which are the imitations of the first, and which subsist intellectu-
' ** it omitted in the original. Proc. Vol. I. M
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ON THE THEOLOGY OF PLATO.
ally, are erf" a demoniacal allotment. And again, we may say that those names which are the third from the truth, which are logically devised, and which receive the ultimate resemblance of divine natures, are unfolded by scienti6c men, at one time energizing divinely, and at another intel- lectually, and generating moving images of their inward spectacles. For as the demiurgic intellect establishes resemblances about matter of the first forms contained in himself, and produces temporal images of things eternal, divisible images of things indivisible, and adumbrated images as it were of true beings, — after the same manner I think the science that is with us representing intellectual production, fabricates resemblances of other things, and also of the Gods themselves, representing that which is void of composition in them, through composition ; that which is simple, through variety ; and that which is united, through multitude ; and thus fashioning names, ultimately exhibits images of divine natures. For it generates every name as if it were a statue of the Gods. And as the theurgic art through certain symbols calls forth the exuberant and unenvy- ing goodness of the Gods into the illumination of artificial statues, thus also the intellectual science of divine concerns, by the compositions and divisions of sounds, unfolds the occult essence of the Gods. Very pro- perly therefore, does Socrates in the Pbilebus say, that on account of his reverence of the Gods, he is agitated with the greatest fear respecting their names. For it is necessary to venerate even the ultimate echos of the Gods, and venerating these to become established in the first para- digms of them. And thus much concerning divine names, which at pre* sent may be sufficient for the purpose of understanding the theology of Plato. For wc shall accurately discuss them when we speak of partial powers.
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The most proper beginning however of the theory proposed by us is that from which we may be able to discover the first cause ' of all beings. For being impelled from this in a becoming manner, and having our con- ceptions purified respecting it, we shall with greater facility be able to dis- tinguish other things. About these things therefore we must speak from the beginning as follows : It is necessary that all beings, and all the natures of beings should either be many only, there being no one in them, neither in each, nor in all of them ; or that they should be one only, there being no multitude, but all things being compelled into one and the same power of existence ; or it is necessary that they should be both one and many, and that being should be one in order that neither multitude itself by itself may vanquish beings, nor that we may be forced to bring together into the same thing all things and their contraries at once. These things therefore being three, which of them shall we chuse ? And to which of the above mentioned assertions shall we give our suffrage. It is necessary therefore severally to discuss the absurdities which attend these positions, and thus to survey after what manner the truth subsists.
* For ewr.«r it u Decenary to read arnca.
ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK If.
If then beings are many, and in such a manner many, as we have men- tioned from the Ijcginning, so that the one is not any where to be found, many absurdities will hap|>en to be the result, or rather all the nature of beings will at once from the first be destroyed, as there will immediately be nothing which is capable of participating the one. For it must be admitted that every being is either one certain thing, or nothing. And that indeed which is a certain being, is also one ; but that which is not even one being, has not any existence whatever. Hence, if many things have a subsistence, each of the many is something or a certain one. But if each of them is nothing, or not even one thing, neither is it possible for the many to exist ; for the many are many so far as each individual of the multitude exists. If, therefore, the many alone have a subsistence, and the one in no respect is, neither will the many exist. For things which are in no respect one have not any existence whatever. But if the one is not, by a much greater priority neither have the many an existence. For it necessarily follows that none of the things from which the many consist will have a subsistence.
Farther still, if the many aloue have a subsistence (as has been said) art things will be infinitely infinite ; and if you receive any one of the in- finites whatever, this also will be immediately infinite. And with respect to the things from which this consists and which are infinite, each of these likewise will be infinite. For let something of the many be assumed* which we say is not one, this therefore will be multitude according to its own nature, since it belongs to beings, but is not nothing. If however it is multitude, this also will consist of many things, and will be many. And if you assume something of these manys, this will immediately appear to you not to be one, but many. There will likewise be immediately the same reasoning in these, and in a similar manner each, (because we falsely speak of each) will be multitude in energy. And each, as I may say, will be infinite, or rather will be infinitely infinite. For there is nothing which will not be something of this kind ; since a part is many, and in a similar manner the part of a part ; and this to infinity. For multitude proceeding will never stop, nor infinity, in consequence of being deprived of the nature of the one. To make beings however, to be infinitely infinite, is impossible both with respect to truth, and to the thing proposed by us.
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Of Plato
For if being is infinitely infinite, being can neither be known, nor disco- vered ; since the infinite is entirely incomprehensible and unknown. If also being is infinitely infinite, there will be something more infinite than the infinite. But if that something is more infinite, this will be less infinite. That, however, which is less infinite, since it is not perfectly infinite, will evidently be finite, so far as it falls short of the nature of the infinite. If, therefore, there is something which is itself according to multitude more infinite than that which is infinite in multitude there will be something more than the infinite, and the infinite will be less, yet not according to multitude. This however is impossible. Hence there is not the infinitely infinite.