In the first place then what is that which we look to when we speak of that which is said to be divine ? From what has been said therefore, it is evident that every God subsists according to the highest union of beings. For to us ascending from bodies, the Gods have appeared to be sujxi essential unities, the generators, perfectors and measurers of essences, and who bind all first essences to themselves. But that which is divine, is not only hyparxis and the one in each order of being, but at the same time is that which participates and that which is participated ; of which the latter is a God, but the former is divine. Whether however, prior to the participated unities, there is something which is separate and partici- pated will he evident in what follows. But at present we shall define that which is divine to be a thing of this kind, viz. being* which partici- pates of the one, or the one subsisting contractedly together with being. For we assume all things in the Gods except the one, as suspended from them and secondary, viz. essence, life and intellect. For the Gods do not subsist in, but prior to these, and they produce and contain these in themselves, but are not defined in them. But it is necessary not to be ignorant that these are in reality thus distinguished from each other. In many places, however, Plato magnificently celebrates the participants of the Gods by the same names, and denominates them Gods. For not only the Athenian guest in the Laws calls a divine soul a God, but also Socrates in the Phsedrus. For he says " that all the horses and charioteers of the Gods are good and consist of things good ;" and afterwards still more clearly, " and this is the life of the Gods." But this is not yet wonderful. For is it not admirable that he should denominate those beings Gods who
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arc always conjoined with the Gods, and who together with them give completion to one series ? For in many places he calls daemons Gods, though they are essentially posterior to, and subsist about the Gods. For in the Phaidrus and Timrcus, and in other dialogues, you will find him ex- tending the appellation of the Gods even as far as to daemons. But what is still more paradoxical than these things, he does not refuse to call cer- tain men Gods; for in the Sophista he thus denominates the Elean guest.
From all that has been said therefore, this must be assumed, that with respect to a God, one thing is simply a God, another according to union, another according to participation, another according to contact, and an- other according to similitude. For of super-essential natures indeed, each is primarily a God ; of intellectual natures, each is a God according to union; and of divine souls, each is a God according to participation. But divine daemons are Gods according to contact with the Gods ; and the souls of men are allotted this appellation through similitude. Each of these however is, as we have said, rather divine than a God. Since the Athenian guest calls intellect itself divine ; but that which is divine is posterior to the first deity, in the same manner as that which is united is posterior to the one, that which is intellectual, to intellect, and that which is animated, to soul. And always those natures that are more uniform and simple have the precedency ; but the series of beings ends in the one itself. Let this, therefore, be the definition and distinction of that which is divine.
In the next place, let us survey the immortal. For with Plato there are many orders of immortality, pervading from on high as titr as to the last of things ; and the last echo, as it were, of immortality, is in those visible natures that are perpetual ; which the Elean guest, in his discourse about the circulation of the universe, says, are allotted from the fatlier a reno- vated immortality. For every body is allotted a being and a life depen- dent on another cause ; but is not itself naturally adapted to connect, or adorn, or preserve itself. The immortality of partial souls is, I tlrink, more manifest and more perfect than this ; which Plato evinces by many demonstrations in the Phacdo, and in the 10th book of the Republic.
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But I mean by the immortality of partial souls, that which has a more principal subsistence, as containing in itself the cause of eternal perma- nency. Wc shall not, however, err if prior to both these we establish the immortality of daemons. For the genera of these through which they subsist aie incorruptible, and they neither verge to mortality, nor are filled with the nature of things which are generated and corrupted. But I infer that the immortality of divine souls is still more venerable and es- sentially more transcendent than that of daemons; which divine souls we say are primarily self-motive, and are the fountains and principles of the life divided about bodies, and through which bodies obtain a renovated immortality. If, however, prior to these you conceive the Gods them- selves, and the immortality in them, and how in the Banquet Diotima does not attribute an immortality of this kind even to daemons, but defines it to subsist in the Gods alone, such an immortality as this will appear to you to be separate, and exempt from the whole of things. For there eter- nity subsists, which is the fountain of all immortality, and through it all things live and possess life, some things indeed a perpetual life, but others a life dispersed into non-being. In short, therefore, that which is divine is immortal so far as it generates and comprehends in itself a perpetual life. For it is immortal, not as participating of life, but as the supplier of a divine life, and as deifying life itself, whether you are willing to call such a life intelligible, or by any other name.
In the next place let us direct our attention to the intelligible. It is denominated, therefore, in opposition to that which is sensible and which is apprehended by opinion in conjunction with sense. For the intelligible is first unfolded into light in the most principal causes. For soul is in- deed intelligible, is of this allotment, is exempt from sensibles, and obtains an essence separated from them. Prior to soul also intellect is intelli- gible; for we rather think it fit to arrange soul in the middle, than to con- numerate it with the first essences. That likewise is denominated intelli- gible, which is more ancient than intellect, which replenishes intelligence, and is itself by itself perfective of it, and which Timams arranges prior to the demiurgic intellect and intellectual energy, in the order of a paradigm. But beyond these is the divine intelligible, which is defined according to
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Chap.Xxv1i. of Plato. 8.5
union itself, aud a divine hyparxis. For this is intelligible as the object of desire to intellect, as perfecting and comprehending intellect, and as the plenitude of being. In one way, therefore, we must denominate the intelligible as the hyparxis of the Gods ; in another way as true being and the first essence ; in another way as intellect and all intellectual life ; and in another way as soul and the psychical order. It is likewise neces- sary not to fashion the different natures of things conformably to names. Such, therefore, is the order of this triad; so that what is divine indeed is umningled and ranks as the first ; that which is immortal is the second ; and that which is intelligible the third. For the first of these is deified being ; the second is life subsisting according to the immortality of the Gods; and the third is intellect, which is denominated intelligible in con- sequence of being replete with union.
A fter this, it follows in the next place, that we should consider the uniform, the indissoluble, and that which has an invariable sameness of subsistence, from the same causes, and these as the precursors of, and pervading through all the divine orders. For the uniform, indeed, has the highest subsistence, is present with the divine monad, and appears to lie especially adapted to that which is primarily being,' and in which also every participable genus of unities ends. For the one is prior to these, as will be evident as we proceed. But the indissoluble is the second. For it comprehends and binds the extremes according to divine union ; since the dissoluble is such as it is through the want of connexion and of a power which collects multitude into one. And that which has an invari- able sameness of subsistence is eternal, and is full of the perpetuity of the
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BOOK 1.
Gods; from which also tl»e participation of immortality and eternal same- ness is derived to other things. The uniform, therefore, pertains to the same thing as the divine ; but the indissoluble to the same thing as the immortal ; and that which has an invariable sameness of subsistence we must refer to the intelligible.
And do you not see how these are severally after a manner co-adapted to each other? For the first of tliesc, through the first unity which is par- ticipated by being is, as it is fit it should be, uniform. For if a God sub- sists according to the one, that which is divine will doubtless be uniform. But that which through one cause of life is immortal, is also similarly in- dissoluble. For life is the bond of dissoluble natures ; which also Timaeus indicating to us, opposes the dissoluble to the immortal: " for you are not immortal, says the demiurgus, yet you shall never be dissolved, nor be subject ' to the fataJity of death." Every thing mortal, therefore, is dis- soluble ; but the immortal is indissoluble. That, however, which has a renovated immortality is for the same reason neither indissoluble, nor mortal. For being in the middle of both it is neither of the extremes, ac- cording to each opposition. But the third of these being established ac- cording to the plenitude of whole intelligible^ subsists at once and is in- variably the same. For tlie intelligible is the cause of sameness and of eternal permanency; and intellect through this is entirely eternal. These triads, therefore, proceed from the first and most principal causes, in the same manner as we demonstrated of the before-mentioned triads. But these things, indeed, we shall consider hereafter.
These things, therefore, being discussed, let us direct our attention to the uobegottcn in divine natures, and unfold what we assert it to be. For we say that all [true] being is without generation, and Socrates demon- strates in the Phajdrus, that souls are unbegotten. Prior to these, also, the Gods themselves are established above generations and a subsistence according to time. How, therefore, shall we define the unbegotten when applied to a divine nature, and according to what reason ? Is it because divinity is exempt from all generation, uot only from that which subsists
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CHAP. XXVII.
in the parts of time, such as wc assert the generation of material natures to be, nor from that only which is extended into the whole of time, such as Timseus demonstrates the generation of the celestial bodies to be, but also from the psychical generation ? Since Timseus denominates this to be unbegotten according to time, but to be the best of generated natures. And in short, a divine nature is exempt from all division and essential separation. For the progression of the Gods is always according to a union of secondary natures, which are uniformly established in the natures prior to them, the things producing containing in themselves the things produced. The indivisible, therefore, the unscparated and the united are- in reality unbegotten. So that if certain generations of the Gods are spoken of by Plato in fabulous figments, as m the fable of Diotima, the • generation of Venus is celebrated, and of Love at the birth of Venus, it is-