Proclus' Theology of Plato (Six Books) — trans. Thomas Taylor (1816)

with form, rule over the subject nature ; but again receding to that which is partial, from their proper wholeness, and participating of partibHity, im- becility, war and the division which is the source of generation, they are necessarily all-variously changed. Neither, therefore, is every being perfectly good ; for there would not be the corruption and generation of bodies, nor the purification and punishment of soak. Nor is there any evil in wholes : for the world would not be a blessed god, if the most principal parts of which it consists were imperfect. Nor are the Gods the causes of evils, in the same manner as they are of goods ; but evil originates from the imbecility of the recipients of good, and a subsistence in the last of things. Nor is the evil which has a shadowy subsistence in partial natures unmingled with good. But this participates of it in a certain respect, by its very existence being detained by good. Nor in short, is it possible for evil which is perfectly destitute of all good to have a subsistence. For evil itself is even beyond that which m no respect whatever has an existence, just as the good itself fa beyond that which is perfectly being. Nor is the evil which is in partial natures left in a dis- ordered state, but even this is made subservient to good purposes by the Gods, and on this account justice purifies souls from depravity. But another order of gods purifies from the depravity which is in bodies. All things however are converted as much as possible to the goodness of the Gods. And wholes indeed remain in their proper boundaries, and also the perfect and beneficent genera of beings. But more partial and imperfect natures are adorned and arranged in a becoming manner, become subservient to the completion of wholes, are called upward to the beautiful, are changed, and in every way enjoy the participation of the good, so far as this can. be accomplished by them.

For there cannot be a greater good to each of these, than what the Gods impart according to measures to their progeny : but all things, each sepa- rately, and all in common, receive such a portion of good, as it is pos- sible for them to participate. But if some things are filled with greater, and others with less goods, the power of the recipients, and the measures of the distribution must be assigned as the cause of this. For different things are adapted to different beings according to their nature. But the

Gods always extend good, in the same manner as the sun always emits light- For a different thing receives this light differently according to its / order, and receives the greatest portion of light it is capable of receiving. For all things are led according to justice, and good is not absent from any thing, but is present to every thing, according to an appropriate boundary of participation. And as the Athenian guest says, all things are in a good condition, and are arranged by the Gods. Let no one therefore sav, that there are precedaneous productive principles of evil in nature, or in- tellectual paradigms of evils, in the same, manner as there are of goods, o or that there is a malific soul, or an evil-producing cause in the Gods, nor x r let him introduce sedition and eternal war against the first good. For all these are foreign from the science of Plato, and being more remote from the truth wander into barbaric folly, and gigantic mythology. Nor if certain persqns speaking obscurely in arcane narrations, devise things of , this kind, shall we make any alteration in the apparent apparatus of what they indicate. But the truth indeed of those things is to be investigated, and in the mean time, the science of Plato must be genuinely received in the pure bosoms of the soul, and must be preserved undefiled and un- mingled with contrary opinions.

In the next place, let us survey the immutability and simplicity of the Gods, what the nature of each of them is, and how both these appear to be adapted to the hyparxis of the Gods, according to the narration of Plato. The Gods, therefore, are exempt from the whole of things. But filling these, as we have said, with good, they are themselves perfectly good ; each of them according to his proper order possesses that which is most excellent ; and The whole genus of the Gods is at once allotted predomi- nance according to an exuberance of good. But here again, we must

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CHAP. XVIII. OF PLATO- 6s

oppose those who interpret in a divisible manner that which is most excel- lent in the Gods, and who say, that if the first cause is roost excellent, that which is posterior to the first is not so. For it is necessary, say they, that what is produced should be inferior to that by which it is pro- duced. And this indeed is rightly asserted by them. For it is necessary in the Gods, to preserve the order of causes unconfused, and to define separately their second and third progressions. But together with a pro- gression of this kind, and with ' the unfolding into light of things secon- dary from those that are first, that which is most excellent must also be surveyed in each of the Gods. For each of the Gods in his own charac- teristic peculiarity is allotted a transcendency which is primary and per- fectly good. One of them indeed, that we may speak of something known, is allotted this transcendency, and is most excellent as possessing a prophetic power, another as demiurgic, but another as a perfector of works. And Timfeus indicating this to us, continually calls the first de- miurgus the best of causes. For the world, says he, is the most beautiful of generated natures, and its artificer is the best of causes ; though the intelligible paradigm, and which is the most beautiful of intelligibles is prior to the demiurgus. But this is most beautiful and at the same time most excellent, as the demiurgic paradigm ; and the maker and at the same time father of the universe is most excellent, as a demiurgic God. In the Republic also, Socrates speaking of the Gods, very properly observes, that each of them being as much as possible most beautiful and most excellent, remains always with a simplicity of subsistence in his own form. For each of them being allotted that which is first and the summit in his own series, does not depart from his own order, but contains the blessed- ness and felicity of his own proper power. And neither does he exchange his present for a worse order ; for it is not lawful for that which possesses all virtue to be changed into a worse condition ; nor does he pass into a better order. For where can there be any thing better than that which is most excellent? But this is present with each of the divinities according to his own order, as wc have said, and also with every genus of the Gods.

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(J4 on the Theology

It is necessary therefore that every divine nature should he established immutably, abiding in its own accustomed manner. Hence from these things the selfcsufficiency, undefiled purity, and invariable sameness of sub' sistence of the Gods is apparent For if they are nol changed to a more excellent condition of being, as possessing that which is best in their own nature, they are sufficient to themselves, and are not in want of any good. Aod if they are not at any time changed to a worse condition, they re- main undefiled, established in their own transcendencies. If also they guard the perfection of themselves immutably, they subsist always with invariable sameness. What the self-sufficiency therefore of the Gods is, what their immutability, and what tlieir sameness of subsistence, we shall in the next place consider.

The world then is said to be self-sufficient, because its subsistence is per- fect from things perfect, and a whole from wholes ; and because it is filled with all appropriate goods from iU generating father. But a perfection and self-sufficiency of this kind is partible, and is said to consist of many tilings coalescing in one, and is filled from separate causes according to participation. The order of divine souls also, is said to be self-sufficient, as being full of appropriate virtues, and always preserving the measure of its own blessedness without indigence. But here likewise the self-suffi- ciency is in want of powers. For these souls have not their intellections directed to the same intelligibles ; but they energize according to time, and obtain the complete perfection of their contemplation in whole periods of time. The self-sufficiency therefore of divine souls, and the whole- perfection of their life is not at once present. Again, the intellectual world is said to be self-sufficient, as having its whole good established in eternity, comprehending at once its whole blessedness, and being indigent of nothing, because all life and all intelligence are present with it, and nothing is deficient, nor does it desire any thing as absent. But this, in- deed, is sufficient to itself in its own order, yet it falls short of tho self- sufficiency of the Gods. For every intellect is boniform, yet is not good- ness itself, nor primarily good ; but each of the Gods is a unity, hy- parxis and goodness. The peculiarity however of hyparxis changes the progression of the goodness of each. For one divinity is a perfcetwe

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CHAP. XVIII.

goodness, another is a goodness connective of the whole of things, and another is a collective goodness. But each is simply a goodness sufficient to itself. Or it may be said, that each is a goodness possessing the self- sufficient and the all-perfect, neither according to participation, nor illumi- nation, but by being that very thing which it is. For intellect is sufficient to itself by 'participation, and soul by illumination, but this universe, ac- cording to a similitude to a divine nature. The Gods themselves, however, are self-sufficient through and by themselves, filling themselves, or rather subsisting as the plenitudes of all good.

But with respect to the immutability of the Gods, of what kind shall we say it is ? Is it such as that of a [naturally} circulating body ? For neither is this adapted to receive any thing from inferior natures, nor is it filled with the mutation arising from generation, and the disorder which occurs in the sublunary regions. For the nature of the celestial bodies is immaterial and immutable. But this indeed is great and venerable, as in corporeal hypostases, yet it is inferior to the nature of the Gods. For every body possesses both its being, and its perpetual immutability from other precedaneous causes. But neither is the impassive and the immu- table in the Gods such as the immutability of souk. For these commu- nicate in a certain respect with bodies, and are the media of an impartible essence, and of an essence divided about bodies. Nor again is the im- mutability of intellectual essences equivalent to that of the Gods. For intellect is immutable, impassive, and umuingled with secondary natures, on account of its union with the Gods. And so far iodeed as it is uniform, it is a thing of this kind ; but so far as h is manifold, it has something which is more excellent, and something which is subordinate, m itself. But the Gods alone having established their onions according to-this trans- cendency of beings, are immutable dominations, are primary and impassive. For there is nothing in them which is not one and byparxis. lint as fire abolishes every thing which is foreign to it and of a contrary power, as light expels all darkness, and as lightning proceeds through all things with- out defilement, thus also the unities of the Gods unite all multitude, and abolish every thing which tends to dispersion and all-perfect division. But they deify every thing which participates of them, receiving nothing from

Froc. Vol. I. I

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66 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK I.

their participants, and do not ' diminish their owu proper union by the participation.