Proclus' Theology of Plato (Six Books) — trans. Thomas Taylor (1816)

Hence if men properly attend to the welfare of men in governing them, honoring some, but disgracing others, and every where giving a proper direction to the works of vice by the measures of virtue, it is much more necessary that the Gods should be the immutable governors of the whole of things. For men are allotted this virtue through similitude to the Gods. But if we acknowledge that men who corrupt the safety and well-being of those whom they govern, imitate in a greater degree the providence of the Gods, we shall ignorantly at one and the same time entirely subvert die truth concerning the Gods, and the transcendency of virtue. For this I think is evident to every one, that what is more similar to the Gods is more happy than those things that are deprived of them ' through dissimi- litude aud diversity. So that if among men indeed, the uncorrupted and un deviating form of providence is honorable, it must undoubtedly be in a much greater degree honorable with the Gods. But if with them, mortal gifts are more venerable than the divine measures of justice, with men also earth-born gifts will be more honorable than Olympian goods, and the blandishments of vice than the works of virtue. With a view therefore to the most perfect felicity, Plato in the Laws delivers to us through these demonstrations, the hvparxis of the Gods, their providential care extend- ing to all things, and their immutable energy ; which things, indeed, are common to all the Gods, but are most principal and first according to nature in the doctrine pertaining to them. For this triad appears to per- vade as far as to the most partial natures in the divine orders, originating supernally from the occult genera of Gods. For a uniform hyparxis, a power which providentially takes care of all secondary natures, and an undeviating and immutable intellect, are in all the Gods that are prior to and in the world.

' For mm* it ii necemry to re*d mrrm

Chap. Xv!

Ac a ix, from another principle we may be able to apprehend the theo- logical demonstrations in the Republic. For these are common to all the divine orders, similarly extend to all the discussion about the Gods, and unfold to us truth in uninterrupted connexion with what has been before said. In the second book of the Republic therefore, Socrates describes certain theological types for mythological poets, and exhorts his pupils to purify themselves from those tragic disciplines, which some do not refuse to introduce to a divine nature, concealing in these as in veils the arcane mysteries concerning the Gods. Socrates therefore, as I have said, nar- rating the types and laws of divine fables, which afford this apparent meaning, and the inward concealed scope, which regards as its end the beautiful and the natural in the fictions about the Gods, — in the first place indeed, thinks fit to evince, according to our un perverted concep- tion about the Gods and their goodness, that they are the suppliers of all good, but the causes of no evil to any being at any time. In the second place, he says that they are essentially immutable, and that they neither have various forms, deceiving and fascinating, nor are the authors of the greatest evil lying, in deeds or in words, or of error and folly. These therefore being two laws, the former has two conclusions, viz. that the Gods are not the causes of evils, and that they are the causes of all good* The second law also in a similar manner has two other conclusions ; and these are, that every divine nature is immutable, and is established pure from falsehood and artificial variety. All the things demonstrated there- fore, depend on these three common conceptions about a divine nature, viz. on the conceptions about its goodness, immutability and truth. For

the first and ineffable fountain of good is with the Gods ; together with eternity, which is the cause of a power that has an invariable sameness of subsistence : and the first intellect which is beings themselves, and the truth which is in real beings.

Proc.

Vol. L

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Book I

CHAPfER XVII.

That therefore, which has the hyparxis of itself, and the whole of its essence defined in the good, and which by its very being produces all things, must necessarily be productive of every good, but of no evil. For if there was any thing primarily good, which is not God, perhaps some one might say that divinity is indeed a cause of good, but that he does not impart to beings every good. If, however, not only every God is good, but that which is primarily boniforra and beneficent is God, (for that which is pri- marily good will not be the second after the Gods, because every where, things which have a secondary subsistence, receive the peculiarity of their hyparxis from those that subsist primarily)— this being the case, it is per- fectly necessary that divinity should be the cause of good, and of all such goods as proceed into secondary descents, as far as to the last of things, lor as the power which is the cause of life, gives subsistence to all life, as the power which is the cause of knowledge, produces all knowledge, as the power which is the cause of beauty, produces every thing beautiful, as well tl>e beauty which is in words, as that which is in the phenomena, and thus every primary cause produces all similars from itself and binds to itself the one hypostasis of things which subsist according to one form,— after the same manner I think the first and most principal good, and uniform hyparxis, es- tablishes in and about itself, the causes and comprehensions of all goods at once. Nor is there any thing good which does not possess this power from it, nor beneficent which being converted to it, does not participate of this cause. For all goods are from thence produced, perfected and preserved ; and the one series and order of universal good, depends on that fountain. Through the same cause of hyparxis therefore, the Gods are the suppliers of all good, and of no evil. For that which is primarily good, gives subsist- ence to every good from itself, and is not the cause of an allotment con- trary to itself; since that which is productive of life, is not the cause of the privation of life, and that which is the source of beauty is exempt from the nature of that which is void of beauty and is deformed, and from

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CHAP. XVII. OF PLATO. 5g

the causes of this. Hence, of that which primarily constitutes good, it is not lawful to assert that it is the cause of contrary progeny ; but the na- ture of goods proceeds from thence undefiled, unmingled and uniform.

And the divine cause indeed of goods is established eternally in itself, extending to all secondary natures, an unenvying and exuberant partici- pation of good. Of its participants, however, some preserve the partici- pation with incorruptible purity, receiving their proper good in undented bosoms, and thus through an abundance of power possess inevitably an al- lotment of goods adapted to them. But those natures which are arranged in the last of the whole of things, entirely indeed enjoy according to their nature the goodness of the Gods ; for it is not possible that things perfectly destitute of good should either have a being, or subsist at first ; but re- ceiving an efflux of this kind, they neither preserve the gift which pervades to them, pure and unmingled, nor do they retain their proper good stably, and with invariable sameness, but becoming imbecil, partial and material, and filled with the privation of vitality of their subject, they exhibit to order indeed, the privation of order, to reason irrationality, and to virtue, the contrary to it, vice. And with respect indeed to the natures which rank as wholes,' each of these is exempt from a perversion of this kind, things more perfect in them always having dominion according to nature. But partial natures through a diminution of power always diverging 1 into multitude, division and interval, obscure indeed the participation of good, but substitute the contrary in the mixture with good, and which is van. quished by the combination. For neither here is it lawful for evil to subsist / unmingled, and perfectly destitute of good ; but though some particular thing may be evil to a part, yet it is entirely good to the whole and to the universe. For the universe is always happy, and always consists of perfect parts, and which subsist according to nature. But that which is preter- natural is always evil to partial natures, and deformity, privation of sym- metry, perversion, and a resemblance of subsistence are in these. For that which is corrupted, is indeed corrupted to itself, and departs from its proper perfection, but to the universe it is incorruptible and inde- structible.

' For aM«n it is necessary to read o\x*. 1 For rfifiaiKirrst read txfbuwna.

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CO ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK I.

And every thing which is deprived of good, so fur indeed- as pertains to itself, and its own subsistence, is deprived of it through imbecility of na-

\ turc ; but it is good to the whole, and so far as it is a part of the universe' For it is not possible that either a privation of life, or deformity and im-

y moderation, or in short privation can be inserted in the universe ; but its whole number is always perfect, being held together by the goodness of wholes. And life is every where present, together with existence, and the being perfect, so far as each thing gives completion to the whole. Di. vinity therefore, as we have said, is the cause 1 of good ; but the shadowy subsistence of evil does not subsist from power, but from the imbecility of the natures which receive the illuminations of the Gods. Nor is evil in wholes, but in partial natures, nor yet in all these. For the first of partial natures and partial intellectual genera are eternally boniform. But the media among these, and which energize according to time, con- necting the participation of the good with temporal mutation and motion, are incapable of preserving the gift of the Gods immoveable, uniform and simple; by their variety obscuring* the simplicity of this gift, by their multiform its uniform nature, and by their commixture its purity and incorruptibility. For they do not consist of incorruptible first generar v.ox have they a simple essence, nor uniform powers, but such as arc composed of the contraries to these, as Socrates somewhere says in the Phaedrus. And the last of partial natures and which are also materia), in a much greater degree pervert their proper good. For they are mingled with a privation of life, and have a subsistence resembling that of an image, since it is replete with much of non-entity, consists of things hostile

I to each other, and of circumstances which are mutable and dispersed through the whole of time, so that they never cease to evince in every thing that they are given up to corruption, privation of symmetry, deformity, and all-various mutations, being not only extended in their energies, like the natures prior to them, but being replete both in their powers and energies with that which is preternatural, and with material imbecility. For things which become situated in a foreign place, by co-introducing whole together

• It is necessary here to supply the word «ru».

' For .afWTMuatyvra it U requisite to read mftnmtfirr*.

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chap. xvir.