Hence also the Gods being present every where, arc similarly exempt from all things, and containing all things are vanquished by no one of the things they contain ; but they are unminglod with all things and unde- filed. In the third place, this world indeed is said to subsist with inva- riable sameness, so far as it is allotted an order in itself which is always preserved indissoluble. At the same time however, since it possesses a corporeal form, it is not destitute of mutation, as the Elean guest observes. The psychical order likewise is said to obtain an essence always established iu sameness ; and this is rightly said. For it is entirely impassive accord- ing to essence; but it has energies extended into time, and as Socrates says in the Pbaedrus, at different times it understands different intelligibles, and in its progressions about intellect comes into contact with different forms. Besides these also, much-honored intellect is said both to subsist and to understand with invariable and perpetual sameness, establishing at once in eternity its essence, powers, and energies. Through the multitude however of its intellections, and through the variety of intelligible species and genera, there is not only an invariable sameness, but also a difference v of subsistence in intellect. For difference there is consubsistent with sameness. And there is not only a wandering of corporeal motions, and of the psychical periods, but likewise of intellect itself, so far as it pro- duces the intelligence of itself into multitude; and evolves the intelligible. For soul indeed evolves intellect, but intellect the intelligible, as Plotinus somewhere rightly observes, when speaking of the intelligible subjections. For such are the wanderings of intellect and which it is lawful for it to make. If therefore we should say that a perpetual sameness of subsistence is pri- marily in the Gods alone, and is especially inherent in them, we shall not deviate from the truth, and we shall accord with Plato, who says in tlie Politicus, that an eternally invariable sameness of subsistence alone per- tains to the most divine of all things. The Gods, therefore, bind to them- selves the causes of a sameness of this kind, and guard with immutable
' nx is omitted in the original.
Digitized by Google
Chap. Xix. of Plato. ^
sameness their proper hyparxis established accord ing to the uuknown union of themselves. And such is the immutability of the Gods, which is con- tained in self-sufficiency, impassivity and sameness.
I n the next place, let us consider what power the simplicity of the Gods possesses ; for this Socrates adds in his discourse concerning a divine nature, not admitting that which is various, and multiform, and which appears different at different times, but referring to divinity the uniform and the simple. Each of the divinities therefore, as he says, remains simply in his own form. What then shall we conclude respecting this simplicity? That it is not such as that which is defined to be one in number. For a thing of this kind is composed of many things, and abun- dantly mingled. But it appears to be simple so far as it has distinctly a common form. Nor is it such as the simplicity which is in many things according to an arranged species or genus. For these are indeed more simple than the individuals in which they are inherent, but are replete with variety, communicate with matter, and receive the diversities of material natures. Nor is it such as the form of nature. For nature is divided about bodies, verges to corporeal masses, emits many powers about the composition subject to it, and is indeed more simple than bodies, but has an essence mingled with their variety. Nor is it such as the psychical sim- plicity. For soul subsisting as a medium between an impartible essence, and an essence which is divided about bodies, communicates with both the extremes. And by that which is multiform indeed in its nature it is conjoined with things subordinate, but its head is established on high, and according to this it is especially divine, and allied to intellect.
Nor again is the simplicity of the Gods such as that of intellect. For every intellect is impartible and uniform, but at the same time it possesses multitude and progression ; by which it is evident that it has a habitude
Digitized by Google
ON TliK THEOLOGY'
to secondary natures, to itself, and about itself. It b also in itself, and is not only uniform, but also multiform, and as it is said, is one nwny. It is therefore allotted au essence subordinate to the first simplicity. But the Gods have their hyparxis defined in one simplicity alone, being exempt indeed from all multitude so far as they are gods, and transcending all di- vision and interval, or habitude to secondary natures, and all composition. And they indeed are in inaccessible places, expanded above the whole of things, and eternally ride on beings. But the illuminations proceeding from them to secondary natures, being mingled iu many places with their participants which are composite and various, are filled with a peculiarity similar to them. Let no one therefore wonder, if the Gods being essentia alized in one simplicity according to transcendency, various phantasms are hurled forth before the presence of them ; nor, if they being uniform the appearances are multiform, as we have learnt in the most perfect of the mysteries. For nature, and the demiurgic intellect extend corpo- real-formed images of things incorporeal, sensible images of intelligible, and of tilings without interval, images endued with interval. For So- crates also in the Phadrus indicating things of this kind, and evincing that the mysteries into which souls without bodies are initiated are roost blessed, and truly perfect, says, that they are initiated into entire, simple and immoveable visions, such souls becoming situated there, and united with the Gods themselves, but not meeting with the resemblances which are emitted from the Gods into these sublunary realms. For these are more partial and composite, and present themselves to the view attended with motion. But illuminated, uniform, simple, and, as Socrates says, immoveable spectacles exhibit themselves to the attendants of the Gods, and to souls that abandon the abundant tumult of generation, and who ascend to divinity pure and divested of the garments of mortality. And thus much is concluded by us respecting the simplicity of the Gods. For it is necessary that the nature which generates things multiform should be simple,' and should precede what is generated, in the same manner as the uniform precedes the multiplied. If, therefore, the Gods are the causes of
1 After a»Aw» ia.che original, it U requisite to insert hvm mi.
Digitized by Google
Chap Xx
all competition, and produce from themselves the variety of beings, it is certainly neoessary that me aw of their nature which is generative of the whole of tilings, should have its subsistence in (simplicity. For as incor- poreal causes precede bodies, immoveable causes things that are moved, and impartible causes all partible natures, after the same manner uniform intellectual powers precede oiuitiibrm natures, unmingled powers, things that are mingled together, and simple powers, things of a variegated na- ture.
Iir the next place, let us speak concerning the troth which is in the Gods ; for this in addition to what has been said is concluded by Socrates, because a divine nature is without falsehood, and is neither the cause of deception or ignorance to us, or to any other beings. We most under- stand therefore, that divine truth is exempt from the truth which consists in words, so far as this truth is composite, and in a certain respect is mingled with its contrary, and because its subsistence consists of things that are not true. For the first parts do not admit of a truth of this kind, unless some one being persuaded by what Socrates asserts in the Cratyl us, should say that these also are after another manner true. Divine truth also is ex- empt from psychical truth, whether it is surveyed in opinions or in scien- ces^ far as it is inacertain respect divisible, and is not beings themselves, but is assimilated to and co-harmoniied with beings, and as being perfected in motion and mutation falls short of the truth which is always firm, stable and of a principal nature. Divine truth is likewise again exempt from intellectual truth, because though this subsists according to essence, and is said to be and is, beings themselves, through the power of sameness, yet again, through difference, it is separated from the essence of them, and preserves its peculiar hypostasis unconfirmed with respect to them. The
Book I
truth therefore of the Gods alone, is the undivided union and all-perfect communion of them. And through this the ineffable knowledge of the Gods, surpasses all knowledge, and all secondary forms of knowledge participate of an appropriate perfection. But this knowledge alone of the Gods contractedly comprehends these secondary forms of knowledge, and all beiogs according to an ineffable union. And through this the Gods know all things at once, wholes and parte, beings and non-beings, things eternal and tilings temporal, not in the same manner as intellect by the universal knows a part, and by being, non-being, but they know every thing immediately, such things as are common, and such as are particulars, though you should speak of the most absurd of all things, though you should speak of the infinity of contingencies, or even of matter itself.
If, however, you investigate the mode of the knowledge and truth of the Gods, concerning all things that have a subsistence in any respect whatever, it is ineffable and incomprehensible by the projecting energies of the human intellect ; but is alone known to the Gods themselves. And 1 indeed admire those Platonists that attribute to intellect the knowledge of all things, of individuals, of things preternatural, and in short, of evils, and on this account establish intellectual paradigms of these. But I much more admire those who separate the intellectual peculiarity from divine union. For intellect is the first fabrication and progeny of the Gods. These therefore assign to intellect whole and first causes, and such as are according to nature, and to the Gods a power which is capable of - adorning and generating all things. For the one is every where, but whole • is not every where. And of the one indeed matter participates and every being; but of intellect and intellectual species and genera, all things do not participate. All things therefore are alone from the Gods, and real truth is with them who know all things unically. For on this account also, in oracles the Gods similarly teach all things, wholes and parts, things eternal, and such as are generated through the whole of time. For being exempt from eternal beings, and from those that exist in time, they con- tract in themselves the knowledge of each and of all things, according to one united truth. If therefore any falsehood occurs in the oracles of the Gods, we must not say that a thing of this kind originates from the Gods,
Digitized by Google
bat from the recipients, or the instruments, or the places, or the times. For all these contribute to the participation of divine knowledge, and when they are appropriately co-adapted to the Gods, they receive a pure illumination of the truth which is established in them. But when they are separated from the Gods through inaptitude, and become discordant with them, then they obscure the truth which proceeds from them. What kind of falsehood therefore can be said to be derived from the Gods, who produce all the species of knowledge? What deception can there be with those wh«» establish in themselves the whole of truth ? In the same man- ner, as it appears to me, the Gods extend good to all things, but always that which is willing and able receives the extended good, as Socrates says in the Phaedrus. And a divine nature indeed is causeless of evil, but that which departs from it, and gravitates downward, is elongated through, itself ; thus also, the Gods indeed are always the suppliers of truth, but those natures are illuminated by them, who are lawfully their participants. For the Elean wise man says, that the eye of the soul in the multitude, is not strong enough to look to the truth.