to extend their regard to the last of things, what is it which can restrain the presence of the Gods from pervading to all things ? What is it which can impede their unenvying and exuberant energy ? How can those who are capable of effecting greater things, be unable to govern such as are less? Or how can those who produce the essence even of the smallest things, not be tlie lords of the perfection of them, through a privation of power? For all these things are hostile to our natural conceptions. It remains, there- fore, that the Gods must know what is fit and appropriate, and that they must possess a power adapted to the perfection of their own nature, and to the government of the whole of things. But if they know that which is according to nature, and this to those who are the generating causes of all things is to take care of all things, and an exuberance of power, — if this be the case, they are not deprived of a providential attention of this kind. Whether, also, together with what has been said, is there a will of providence in them ? Or is this alone wanting both to their knowledge and power? And on this account are things deprived' of their providential care ? For if indeed knowing what is fit for themselves, and being able to accomplish what they know, they are unwilling to provide for their own offspring, they will be indigent of goodness, their unenvying exuberance will perish, and we shall do nothing else than abolish the hyparxis ac- cording to which they are essentialised. For the very being of the Gods is defined by the good, and in this they have their subsistence. But to provide for things of a subject nature, is to confer on them a certain good. How, therefore, can we deprive the Gods of providence, without at the same time depriving them of goodness? And how if we subvert their goodness is it possible, that we should not also ignorantly subvert their hyparxis which we established by the former demonstrations ? Hence it is necessary to admit as a thing consequent to the very being of the Gods that they are good according to every virtue. And again, it is con- sequent to this that they do not withdraw themselves from a providential attention to secondary natures, either through indolence, or imbecility, or ignorance. But to this I think it is also consequent that there is with
* For oTjagqrM it is requisite to read, xaj w*t«k
them the most excellent knowledge, unpolluted power, and unenvying and exuberant will. From which it appears that they provide for the trhole of things, and omit nothing which is requisite to the supply of good.
Let, however, no one think that the Gods extend such a providence about secondary things, as is either of a busy or laborious nature, or that this is the case with their exempt transcendency, which is established re- mote from mortal difficulty. For their blessedness is not willing to be de- filed with the difficulty of administration, since even the life of good men is accompanied with facility, and is void of molestation and pain. But all labours and molestation arise from the impediments of matter. If; however, it be requisite to define the mode of the providence of the Gods, it must be admitted that it is spontaneous, unpolluted, immaterial, and ineffable. For the Gods do not govern all things either by investigating what is fit, or exploring the good of every thing by ambiguous reasonings, or by looking externally, and following their effects as men do in the pro* vidence which they exert on their own affairs ; but pre-assuming in them- selves the measures of the whole of things, and producing the essence of every thing from themselves, and also looking to themselves, they lead and perfect all things in a silent path, by their very being, and fill them with good. Neither, likewise, do they produce in a manner similar to nature, energizing only by their very being, unaccompanied with deli- berate choice, nor energizing in a manner similar to partial souls in con- junction with will, are they deprived of production according to essence ; but they contract both these into one union, and they will indeed such things as they are able to effect by their very being, but by their very essence being capable of and producing all things, they contain the cause of production in their unenvying and exuberant will. By what busy energy, therefore, with what difficulty, or with the punishment of what Ixion, is the providence either of whole souls, or of intellectual essences, or of the Gods themselves accomplished, unless it should be said, that to impart good in any respect is laborious to the Gods ? But that which is according to nature is not laborious to any thing. For neither is it labo- rious to fire to impart heat, nor to snow to refrigerate, nor in short to
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bodies to energize according to their own proper powers. And prior to bodies, neither is it laborious to natures to nourish, or generate, or increase. For these are the works of natures. Nor again, prior to these, is it labo- rious to souls. For these indeed produce many energies from deliberate choice, many from their very being, and are the causes of many motions by alone being present. So that if indeed the communication of good is according to nature to the Gods, providence also is according to nature. And these things we must say are accomplished by the Gods with facility, and by their very being alone. But if these things are not according to nature, neither will the Gods be naturally good. For the good is the sup- plier of good ; just as life is the source of another life, and intellect is the source of intellectual illumination. And every tiling which has a primary subsistence in each nature is generative of that which has a secondary subsistence.
That however, which is especially the illustrious prerogative of the Platonic theology, I should say is this, that according to it, neither is the exempt essence of the Gods converted to secondary natures, through a pro- vidential care for things subordinate, nor is their providential presence with all things diminished through their transcending the whole of things with undefiled purity, but at the same time it assigns to them a separate subsist* ence, and the being unmingled with every subordinate nature, and also the beipg extended to all things, and the taking care of and adorning their own progeny. For the manner in which they pervade through all things is not corporeal, as that of light is through the air, nor is it divisible about bodies, in the same manner as in nature, nor converted to subordinate natures, in the same manner as that of a partial soul, but it is separate from body, and without conversion to it, is immaterial, unmingled, unre- strained, uniform, primary and exempt. In short, such a mode of the providence of the Gods as this, must at present be conceived. For it is evident that it will be appropriate according to each order of the Gods. For soul indeed, is said to provide for secondary natures in one way, and intellect in another. But the providence ot divinity who is prior to intel- lect is exerted according to a transcendency both of intellect and soul. And of the Gods themselves, the providence of the sublunary is different from that of the celestial divinities. Of the Gods also who are beyond the
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world, there are many orders, and the mode of providence is different according to each.
The third problem after these we shall connect with the former, and survey how we are to assume the unpervertible in the Gods, who perform all things according to justice, and who do not in the smallest degree subvert its boundary, or its undeviating rectitude, in their providential attention to all other things, and in the mutations of human affairs. I think therefore, that this is apparent to every one, that every where that which governs according to nature, and payB all possible attention to the fehcity of the governed, after this manner becomes the leader of that which it governs, and directs it to that which is best. For neither has the pilot who rules over the sailors and the ship any other precedaneous end than the safety of those that sail in the ship, and of the ship itself, nor does the physician who is the curator of the diseased, endeavour to do all things for the sake of any thing else than the health of the subjects of his care, whether it be requisite to cut them, or administer to them a purgative medicine. Nor would the general of an army or a guardian say that they look to any other end, than the one to the liberty of those that are guarded, and the other to the liberty of the soldiers. Nor will any other to whom it belongs to be the leader or curator of certain persons, endeavour to subvert the good of those that follow him, which it is his business to pro- cure, and with a view to which he disposes in a becoming manner every thing belonging to those whom he governs. If therefore we grant that the Gods are the leaders of the whole of things, and that their providence ex- tends to all things, since they are good, and possess every virtue, how is it possible they should neglect the felicity of the objects of their provi- dential care? Or how can they be inferior to other leaders in the provi-
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dence of subordinate natures? Since the Gods indeed always look to that which is better, and establish this as the end of all their government, but other leaders overlook the good of men, and embrace vice rather than virtue, in consequence of being perverted by the gifts of the depraved.
And universally, whether you arc willing to call the Gods leaders, or rulers, or guardians, or fathers, a divine nature will appear to be in want of no one of such names. For all things that are venerable and honor- able subsist in them primarily. And on this account indeed, here also some things are naturally more venerable and honorable than others, because they exhibit an ultimate resemblance of the Gods. But what occasion is there to speak further on this subject ? For I think that we hear from those who are wise in divine concerns paternal, guardian, ruling and peeonian powers celebrated. How is it possible therefore that the images of the Gods which subsist according to nature, regarding the end which is adapted to them, should providentially attend to the order of the things which they govern, but that the Gods themselves with whom there is the whole of good, true and real virtue, and a blameless life, should not direct their government to the virtue and vice of men ? And how can it be admitted, on this supposition, that tbey exhibit virtue victorious in the universe, and vice vanquished? Will they not also thus corrupt the measures of justice by the worship paid to them by the depraved, subvert the boundary of undeviating science, and cause the gifts of vice to appear more honorable than the pursuits of virtue ? For this mode of providence is neither advantageous to these leaders, nor to those that follow them. For to those who have become wicked, there will be no liberation from guilt, since they will always endeavour to anticipate justice, and pervert the measures of desert. But it will be necessary, which it is not lawful to assert, that the Gods should regard as their final end the vice of the subjects of their providence, neglect their true salvation, and consequently be alone the causes of adumbrant good. This universe also «tnd the whole world will be filled with disorder and incurable perturbation, depravity remaining in it, and being replete with that discord which exists in badly governed cities. Though is it not perfectly impossible that parts
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should be governed according to nature in a greater degree than wholes, human than divine concerns, and images than primary causes P