and how some have a prior, and others a posterior establishment, accord- ing to the reason of science, unless the order of the conclusions proceeds in conjunction with the progression of beings. In the third place, why do some of the conclusions become known from things proximately de- monstrated, but others from preceding demonstrations ? For that the one is a whole and contains parts, is demonstrated from being, which is cha- racterized by the one ; but its subsistence in itself and in another, is placed in a proximate order, after the possession of figure, but is demonstrated from whole and parts. Or why are some things often demonstrated, from two of the particulars previously evinced, but others from one of them ? For we shall be ignorant of each of these, and shall neither be able scien- tifically to speculate their number, nor their order, nor their alliance to each other, unless following things themselves, we evince that this whole hypothesis is a dialectic arrangement, proceeding from on high through all the middle genera, as far as to the termination of first being.
Again, if we should say, that all the conclusions demonstrate syllogisti- cally only, in what respect shall we differ from those, who assert that the whole of this discussion consists of doxastic arguments, and only regards a mere verbal contest ? But if it is not only syllogistic, but likewise de- monstrative, it is doubtless necessary, that the middle should be the cause of, and by nature prior to the conclusion. As, therefore, we make the conclusions of the preceding reasons, the media of those that follow, the things which the arguments respect, must doubtless have a similar order as to being, and their progeny must be the causes of things subject, and generative of such as are secondary. But if this be admitted, how can we allow that all of them have the same peculiarity and nature ? For cause, and that which is produced from cause, are separated from each other.
But this likewise will happen to those who assert that one nature is to be explored in all the arguments, that they will by no means perceive how in the three first conclusions, the one remains unseparated from being, but is first separated in the fourth conclusion. But in all the following conclusions, the one is explored considered as subsisting itself by itself. Is it not therefore necessary, that these orders must differ from each
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CHAP. xt.
other? For that which is without separation, in consequence of having an occult and undivided subsistence, is more allied to the one, hut that which is separated, has proceeded farther from the first principle of things.
Again, if you are willing to consider the multitude of the arguments, and the extent of the hypothesis, how much it differs from that which follows it, — neither from this will it appear to you to be entirely about one and an unseparated nature. For reasonings about divine concerns, are con- tracted in the more principal causes, because in these the occult is more abundant than the perspicuous, and the ineffable than the known. But they become multiplied and evolved, by proceeding to divine orders more proximate to our nature. For such things as are more allied to that which is ineffable, unknown, and exempt iu inaccessible places, are allotted an hyparxis more foreign from verbal enunciation. But such things as have proceeded farther, are both more known to us, and more apparent to the phantasy, than such as have a prior subsistence.
This, therefore, being abundantly proved, it is necessary that tlie second hypothesis, should unfold all the divine orders, and should pro- ceed on high, from the most simple and unical to the whole multitude, and all the number of divine natures, in which the order of true being ends, which indeed is spread under the unities of the Gods, and at the same time is divided in conjunction with their occult and ineffable pecu- liarities. If, therefore, we are not deceived in admitting this, it follows, that from this hypothesis, the continuity of the divine orders, and the pro- gression of second from first natures, is to be assumed, together with the peculiarity of all the divine genera. And indeed, what their communion is with each other, and what their distinction proceeding according to measure, likewise, the auxiliaries which may be found in other dialogues respecting the truth of real beings, or the unities which they contain, are all to be referred to this hypothesis. For, here we may contemplate the total progressions of the Gods, and their all-perfect orders, according to theological science. For as we have before shown that the whole treatise of the Parmenides has reference to the truth of things, and that it was not devised as a vain evolution of words, it is doubtless necessary, that the nine hypotheses which it discusses, employing the dialectic method,
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but speculating with divine science, should be about things and certain natures, which are either middle or last. If, therefore, Parmenides ac- knowledges that his whole discourse will be about the one, and how it subsists with respect to itself, and all other things, it is evident that the speculation of the one, must commence from that which is highest, but end in that which is the last of all things. For the hyparxis of the one proceeds from on high, as far as to the most obscure hypostasis of things.
As the first hypothesis, however, demonstrates by negations the inef- fable supereminence of the first principle of things, and evinces that he is exempt from all essence and knowledge, — it is evident that the hypothesis after this, as being proximate to it, must unfold the whole order of the Gods. For Parmenides does not alone assume the intellectual and essen- tial peculiarity of the Gods, but likewise the divine characteristic of their hyparxis through the whole of this hypothesis. For what other one can that be which is participated by being, than that which is in every being divine, and through which all things are conjoined with the imparticipable one ? For as bodies through their life are conjoined with soul, and as souls through their intellective part, are extended to total intellect, and the first , intelligence, in like manner true beings through the one which they contain are reduced to an exempt union, and subsist in unproceeding union with this first cause.
But because this hypothesis commences from that which is one being, or being characterized by the one, and establishes the' summit of intelligibles as the first after the one, but ends in an essence which participates of time, and deduces divine souls to the extremities of the divine orders, it is ne- cessary that the third hypothesis should demonstrate by various con- clusions, the whole multitude of partial souls, and the diversities which
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Chap. Xh. of Plato. ^
they contain. And thus far the separate and incorporeal hypostasis proceeds.
After this follows that nature which is divisible about bodies, and in- separable from matter, which the fourth hypothesis delivers supernally suspended froni the Gods. And the last hypothesis is the procession of matter, whether considered as one, or as various, which the fifth hypo- thesis demonstrates by negations, according to its dissimilar similitude' to the first But sometimes, indeed, the negations are privations, and sometimes the exempt causes of all the productions. And what is the most wonderful of all, the highest negations are only enunciative, but some in a supereminent manner, and others according to deficiency. But each of the negations consequent to these is affirmative ; the one para- digmatically, but the other iconically, or after the manner of an image. But the middle corresponds to the order of soul, for it is composed from affirmative and negative conclusions. But it possesses negations co-or- dinate to affirmations. Nor is it alone multiplied, like material natures/ nor does it possess an adventitious one ; but the one which it contains, though it is still one, yet subsists in motion and multiplication, and in its progressions is, as it were, absorbed by essence. And such are the hypo- theses which unfold all beings, both separable and inseparable, together with the causes of wholes, as well exempt, as subsisting in things them- selves, according to the hyparxis of the one.
But there are four other hypotheses besides these, which by taking away the one, evince that all things must be entirely subverted, both beings and things in generation, and that no being can any longer have any subsist- ence ; and this, in order that he may demonstrate the one to be the cause of being and preservation, that through it ail things participate of the nature of being, and that each has its hyparxis suspended from the one. And in short, we syllogistically collect this through all beings, that if the one is, all things subsist as far as to the last hypostasis, and if it is not, no being has any subsistence. The one, therefore, is both the hypostatic and
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preservative cause of all things ; which Parmeoides also himself collects at the end of the dialogue. With respect, however, to the hypothesis of the Parmenides, its division, and the speculation of its several parts, we have sufficiently treated in our commentaries on that dialogue ; so that it ' would be superfluous to enter into a prolix discussion of these particulars at present. But as from what has been said, it appears whence we may assume the whole of theology, and from what dialogues we may collect into one the theology distributed according to parts, we shall in the next place treat about the common dogmas of Plato, which are adapted to sacred concerns, and which extend to all the divine orders, and shall evince that each of these is defined by him according to the most perfect science. For things common are prior to such as are peculiar, and are more known according to nature.
In the first place, therefore, we shall assume the things which are de- monstrated in the Laws, and contemplate how they take the lead, with respect to the truth about the Gods, and are the most ancient of all the other mystic conceptions about a divine nature. Three things, therefore, are asserted by Plato in these writings ; that there are Gods ; that their providence extends to all things ; and that they administer all things ac- cording to justice, and suffer no perversion from worse natures.
That these then obtain the first rank' among all theological dogmas, is perfectly evident. For what can be of a more leading nature, than the hyparxis of the Gods, or than boniform providence, or immutable and undeviating power ? Through which they produce secondary natures uni- formly, preserve themselves in an undefiled manner, and convert them to themselves. But the Gods indeed govern other things, but suffer nothing
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from subordinate natures, nor are changed with the variety of the things to which their providence extends. We shall learn, however, how these things are defined according to nature, if we endeavour to embrace by a reasoning process the scientific method of Plato about each of them ; and prior to these, survey by what irrefragable arguments he proves that there are Gods ; and thus afterwards consider such problems as are conjoined with this dogma.
Of all beings, therefore, it is necessary that some should move only, but that others should be moved only, and that the natures situated be- tween these, should both move and be moved. And with respect to these test it is necessary, either that they should move others being themselves moved by others, or that they should be self-motive. These four hypo- stases likewise, are necessarily placed in an orderly series, one after another; that which is moved only and suffers, depending on other primary causes ; that which moves others, and is at the same time moved, being prior to this ; that which is self-motive, and which is beyond that which both moves and is moved, beginning from itself, and through its own motion imparting the representation of being moved, to other things ; and that which is immoveable, preceding whatever participates either producing or passive motion. For every thing self-motive, in consequence of pos- sessing its perfection in a transition and interval of life, depends on an- other more ancient cause, which always subsists according to sameness, and in a similar manner, and whose life is not in time, but in eternity. For time is an image of eternity.