' For ixww, it is necessary to read x*p4mr.
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Chap. xi.
of PLATO.
the evolutions from demonstrations, such must the order necessarily be of the things exhibited, it appears to me to be necessary, that such things as derive their beginning from the most simple principles, must be in every respect of a more primary nature, and must be arranged as con- joined with the one ; but that such as are always multiplied, and suspend- ed from various demonstrations, must have proceeded farther from the subsistence* of the one.
For the demonstrations which have two conclusions* must necessarily contain the conclusions prior to themselves ; but those which contain pri- mary, spontaneous, and simple conceptions, are not necessarily united with such as are more composite, which are exhibited through more abundant media, and which are farther distant from the principle of beings. It appears therefore, that some of the conclusions are indicative of more divine orders, but others, of such as are more subordinate; some, of more united, and others, of more multiplied orders ; and again, some, of more uniform, and others, of more multiform progressions. For demonstrations are universally from causes, and things first. If, there- fore, first are the causes of second conclusions, there is an order of causes, and things caused, in the multitude of the conclusions. For, indeed, to confound all tilings, and speculate them indefinitely in one, neither ac- cords with the nature of things, nor the science of Plato.
Again, therefore, let us discuss this affair in another way, and view with the dianbetic power, where any thing futile is delivered. For let it be said, if you please, and we will first of all allow it, that the conclusions of this second hypothesis are about true being. But as this is multitude, and* not only one itself, like the one prior to beings ; for being is that
• For acmetoffmi, it U necessary to read wm»i«(.
32 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK I.
which is passive to the one, as the Elcan guest in theSophista informs us ; and as it is universally acknowledged by our opponents, who establish that which is first as the one, but intellect, as one many, soul, as one and many, and body, as many and one : — as therefore, this has been asserted a thousand times, I mean that in true being there is multitude together with union, whether will they say that these things harmonise with the whole of being, but not with its parts, or both with the whole and its parts ? And again, we ask them, whether they attribute all things to each part of being, or whether they ascribe different things to different parts ?
If, therefore, they are of opinion, that each particular should alone harmonize with the whole of being, being will consist of non-beings, that which is moved, of things immoveable, that which abides, of things de- prived of permanency, and universally, all tilings will consist of their opposites, and we shall no longer agree with the discourse of Parmenides, who says that the parts of being characterized by the one, are in a certain respect wholes, and that each of them is one and being, in a manner similar to the whole. But if we attribute all things to each part, and there is nothing which we do not make all things, how can the summit of being, and that which is most eminently one, contain a wholeness, and an incomprehensible multitude of parts ? How can it at one and the same time contain the whole of number, figure, motion and permanency, and in short all forms and genera? For these differ from each other, and the hypothesis will assert things impossible. For things near to, will be simi- larly multiplied with things remote from the one, and that which is first, will not be a less multitude than that which is last ; nor again, will the last of things be a less one than the first, and things in the middle will have no difference with respect to division from the extremes.
As therefore, it is not proper to ascribe all this multitude of conclu- sions to the whole alone, nor to consider all things in a similar manner in all the parts of being, it remains that different conclusions must harmonize with different things. It is necessary, therefore, that either the enume- ration of the conclusions should be inordinate, or ordinate. But if they say they are inordinate, they neither speak agreeably to the dialectic method, nor to the mode of demonstrations, which always generate things
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Chap. I. of Plato, 33
secondary from such as are first, nor to the science of Plato, which always accompanies the order of things. But if they say the conclusions are re- gular, I think it is entirely necessary, that they should either begin from things first according to nature, or from things last. But if from things last being characterised by the one will be the last, and that which is moved according to time, the first. This, however, is impossible. For that which participates of time, must by a much greater priority participate of first being. But that which participates of first being, does not neces- sarily participate of time. First being, therefore, is above time. If then Plato begins from first being, but ends in that which participates of time, he proceeds supernal ly from the first to the last parts of true being. Hence, the first conclusions are to be referred to the first orders, the middle, for the same reason, to the middle orders, and the last, as is evi- dent, to such as are last. For it is necessary, as our discourse has evinced, that different conclusions should be assigned to different things, and that a distribution of this kind should commence from such things as are highest.
But likewise, the order of the hypotheses, as it appears to me, is a suffi- cient argument of the truth of our assertion. For with us the one which is exempt from all multitude, is allotted the first order, and from this the evolution of all the arguments commences. But the second order after this, is about true beings, and the unity which these participate. And the third order in regular succession, is about soul. Whether, therefore, is it about every soul or not? In answer to this, we shall observe, that our leader Syrianus has beautifully shown, that the discourse about whole souls is comprehended in the second hypothesis. If, therefore, the order of these three hypotheses proceeds according to the nature of things, it is evident that the second is produced from the first, and the last from the second. For I would ask those who are not entirely unskilled in discourses of this kind, what can be more allied to the one, than being characterized by the one, which the first of the conclusions of the second hypothesis un« folds? Or what can be more allied to soul, than that which participates of time, which subsists divisibly, and which is the last thing exhibited in this hypothesis? For the life of partial as well as of total souls is according
Proc. Vol. I. E
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to time. And first being is that which first participates of the one, and through its connexion with being, has a redundant hyparxis with respect to the imparticipable unity. But if this hypothesis is the middle, and if we aptly harmonize the highest conclusions with things highest, we should doubtless harmonize middles with middles. For this hypothesis com- mencing from first being, proceeds through all the genera posterior to it, till it ends in a nature participating of time.
But, farther, from the common confession of those interpreters of Plato, who were skilled in divine concerns, we can demonstrate the same things ns we have above asserted. For Plotinus, in his book On Numbers, en- quiring whether beings subsist prior to numbers, or numbers prior to beings, clearly asserts that the first being subsists prior to numbers, and that it generates the divine number. But if this is rightly determined by him, and being is generative of the first number, but number is produced by being, it is not proper to confound the order of these genera, nor to collect them into one hypostasis, nor, since Plato separately produces first being, and separately number, to refer each of the conclusions to the same order. For it is by no means lawful, that cause and the thing caused, should have either the same power, or the same order : but these are distinct from each other; and the science concerning them is likewise distinct, and neither the nature, nor the definition of them is one and the same.
But, after Plotinus, Porphyry in his treatise On Principles, evinces by many and beautiful arguments, that intellect is eternal, but that at the same time, it contains in itself something prior to the eternal, and through which it is conjoined with the one. For the one is above all eternity, but the eternal has a second, or rather third order in intellect. For it appears to me to be necessary that eternity should be established in the middle of that which is prior to the eternal, and the eternal. But of this hereafter. At the same time, thus much may be collected from what has been said, that intellect contains something in itself better than the eternal. Ad- mitting this, therefore, we ask the father of this assertion, whether this something better than the eternal is not only being characterized by the one, but is a whole and parts, and all multitude, number and figure, that which is moved, and, that which is permanent; or whether we are to
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CHAP. XI.
ascribe some of the conclusions to it, but not others ? For it is impossible that all these can accord with a nature prior to eternity, since every in- tellectual motion, and likewise permanency, are established in eternity. But if we are to ascribe some of the conclusions to it, and not others, it is evident that other orders in intellect are to be investigated, and that each of the conclusions is to be referred to that order, to which it appears par- ticularly adapted. For intellect is not one in number, and an atom, as it appeared to be to some of the ancients, but it comprehends in itself the whole progression of first being.
But the third who makes for our purpose after these, is the divine Jam- blichus, who, in his treatise Concerning the Gods, accuses those who place the genera of being in intclligibles, because the number and variety of these is more remote from the one. But afterwards he informs us where these ought to be placed. For they are produced in the end of the intellectual order, by the Gods which there subsist. How the genera of being, how- ever, both are, and arc not in intclligibles, will be hereafter apparent. But if, according to his arrangement of the divine orders, intelligibles are exempt from the genera of being, much more are they exempt from similitude and dissimilitude, equality and inequality. Each of the con- clusions, therefore, ought not in a similar manner to be accommodated to all things, so as to refer them to the whole breadth of the intelligible, or intellectual order. Hence from what the best of the interpreters have said, when philosophizing according to their own doctrines, both the multitude of the divine orders, and of the Platonic arguments, are to be considered as proceeding according to an orderly distinction.
In addition, likewise, to what has been said, this also may be asserted, that we cannot, on any other hypothesis, obtain a rational solution of the many doubts which present themselves on this subject, but shall igno- rantly ascribe what is rash and vain to this treatise of Plato. For in the . first place, why are there only so many conclusions, and neither more nor less ? For there are fourteen conclusions. But as there are so many, we cannot assign the reason of this, unless we distribute them in conjunction with things themselves. In the second place, neither shall we be able to find the cause of the order of the conclusions with respect to each other,
hook f.