If, therefore, all things which are moved by themselves, are moved ac- cording to time, but the eternal form of motion is above tluit which is carried in time, the self-motive nature will be second in order, and not the first of beings. But that which moves others, and is moved by others, must necessarily be suspended from a self-motive nature : and not this alone, but likewise every alter-motive fabrication, as the Athenian guest demonstrates. For if all things, says he, should stand still, ualess self- motive natures had a subsistence among things, there would be tin such thing as that which is first moved. For that which is immoveable, is by no means naturally adapted to be moved, nor will there then be that Proc. Vol. I. F
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Os the Theology
Book L
which is first moved ; but the alter-motive nature is indigent of another moving power. The self-motive nature, therefore, alone, as beginning from its own energy, will move both itself and others in a secondary manner. For a thing of this kind imparts the power of being moved to alter-motive natures, in the same manner as an immoveable nature im- parts a motive power to all beings. In the third place, that which is moved only, must first of all be suspended from things moved by another, but moving others. For it is necessary, both that other things, and the series of things moved, which extends in an orderly manner from on high to the last of things, should be filled with their proper media.
All bodies, therefore, belong to those things which are naturally moved only, and are passive. For they are productive of nothing, on account ©f possessing an hypostasis endued with interval, and participating of magnitude and bulk ; since every thing productive and motive of others, naturally produces and moves, by employing an incorporeal power.
But of incorporeal natures, some are divisible about bodies, but others are exempt from such a division about the last of things. Those incorporeals, therefore, which are divisible about the bulks of bodies, whether they subsist in qualities, or in material forms, belong to the number of things moved by another, but at the same time moving others. For these, because they possess an incorporeal allotment, parti- cipate of a motive power ; but because they are divided about bodies, are deprived of the power of verging to themselves, are divided together with their subjects, and are full of sluggishness from these, they are indigent of a motive nature which is not borne along in a foreign seat, but possesses an hypostasis in itself. Where, therefore, shall \vc obtain that which moves itself? For things extended into natures possessing bulk and interval, or which are divided in these, and subsist inseparably about them, must necessarily either be moved only, or be motive through others. But it is necessary, as we have before observed, that a self-motive nature should be prior to these, which is perfectly established in itself, and not in others, and which fixes its energies in itself, and not in things different from itself. There is, therefore, another certain nature exempt from bodies, both in the heavens and in these very mutable elements, from which bo- dies primarily derive the power of being moved. Hence, if it be requisite
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Chap. Xiii. of Plato. 43
to discover what such an essence as this is, (rightly following Socrates, and considering what the end of things is,) which by being present to alter- motive natures, imparts to them a representation of self-motion, to which of the above mentioned natures shall we ascribe the power of things being moved from themselves? For all inanimate natures are alone alter-motive, and whatever the}' suffer, they are adapted to suffer, through a certain power externally moving and compelling. It remains, therefore, that animated natures must possess this representation, and that they are self-motive m a secondary degree, but that the soul which is in them, primarily moves itself, and is moved by itself, and that through a power derived from itself as it imparts life to bodies, so likewise it extends to them from itself a re- presentation of being moved by themselves.
If, therefore, the self-motive essence is more ancient than alter-motive matures, but soul is primarily self-motive, from which the image of self- motion is imparted to bodies, soul will be beyond bodies, and the motion of every body, will be the progeny of soul, and of the motion it contains. Hence it is necessary that the whole heaven and all the bodies it contains possessing various motions, and being moved with these different motions, according to nature (for a circulation is natural to every body of this kind) should have ruling souls, which are essentially more ancient than bodies, and which are moved in themselves, and supernally illuminate these with the power of being moved. It is necessary, therefore, that these souls which dispose in an orderly manner the whole world and the parts it con- tains, and who impart to every thing corporeal which is of itself destitute of life, the power of being moved, inspiring it, for this purpose, with the cause of motion, should either move all things conformably to reason, or after a contrary manner, which it is not lawful to assert. But if indeed, this world and every thing in it which is disposed in an orderly mauner, and is moved equally and perpetually according to nature, as is demon- strated, partly in the mathematical disciplines, and partly in physical dis- cussions, is suspended from an irrational soul, which moving itself moves also other things, neither the order of the periods, nor the motion which is bounded by one reason, nor the position of bodies, nor any other of those things which are generated according to nature, will have a stable cause,
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BOOK. I.
and which is able to distribute every thing in an orderly manner, and accord- ing to an invariable sameness of subsistence. For every tiling irrational is naturally adapted to be adorned by something different from itself, and is indefinite and unadorned in its own nature. Hut to commit all heaven to a thing of this kind, and. a circulation revolving according to reason, and with. an invariable sameness, is by no means adapted, either to the nature of tilings, or to our undisciplined conceptions. If however, an intellectual soul, and which employs reason, governs all things, and if every thing which is moved with a perpetual lation, is governed by a soul of this kind, and there is no one of the wholes in the universe destitute of soul (for no body is. honorable if deprived of such a power as this, as Theophrastus somewhere says) if this be the case, whether docs it possess this intellectual, perfect, and beneficent power, according to participation, or according to essence? For if, according to essence, it is necessary that every soul should be of tliis kind, since each according to its own nature is self-motive. But if, according to participation, there will be another intellect subsisting in energy, more ancient than soul, which essentially possesses intellection, and by its very being pre-assumes in itself the uniform knowledge of wholes ; since it is also necessary that the soul which is essentialized ac» cording to. reason, should possess that which pertains to intellect through participation* and that the intellectual nature should be twofold ; the one subsisting primarily in a divine intellect itself; but the other, which, proceeds from this, subsisting secondarily in. soul. To which, you may add, if you please, the presence of intellectual illumination in body. For whence is the whole of this heaven either spherical or moved in a circle, and whence does it revolve with a sameness of circulation according to one definite order? For how could it always be allotted the same idea and power immutably according to. nature, if it did not participate of specific formation accordiug to intellect? For soul, indeed, is the supplier of motion; but the cause of a firm establishment, and that which reduces the unstable mutation of things that are moved, into sameness, and also a life which is bounded by one reason, and a circulation which subsists with invariable sameness, will evidently be superior to soul.
Body, therefore, and the whole of this sensible nature belong to things
Chap. Xul of Plato". 45
which are alter-motive. But soul is self-motive, binding ro itself all cor- poreal motions ; and prior to this is intellect which is immoveable. Let ho one, however, suppose that I assert this immobility of intellect to re- semble that which is sluggish, destitute of life,' and without respiration, but that it is the leading eause of all motion, and the fountain, if you are willing so to denominate it, of all life, both of that which is- converted to itself, and of that which has its hypostasis in other things. Through these causes also, the world is denominated by Timccus, an animal endued with soul and intellect ; being called by him an animal according to its own nature, and the life pervading to it from soul, and which is distributed about it, but animated or endued with soul, according to the presence of a divine soul in it, and endued with intellect, according to intellectual domination. For the supply of life, the government of soul, and the par- ticipation of intellect connect and contain the whole of heaven.
If, however, this intellect is essentially intellect, since Timaeus indi- cating that the essence of intellect is the same with its intellection, deno- minates it divine ; for he says, that soul receiving a divine intellect led aa upright and wise life ; if, therefore, this be the case, it is necessary that the whole world should be suspended from its divinity, and that motion in- deed should be present to this universe from soul, but that its perpetual permanency and sameness of subsistence should be derived from intellect, and that its one union, the conspiration in it and sympathy, and its all- perfect measure should originate from that unity,* from which intellect is uniform, soul is one,' every being is whole and perfect according to its own nature, and every thing secondary together with perfection in its own proper nature, participates of another more excellent peculiarity, from an order which is always established above it. For that which is corporeal being alter-motive, derives from soul the representation of self- motive power, and is through it an animal. But soul being self-motive participates of a life according to intellect, and energizing according to time, possesses a neverrceasing energy, and an ever-vigilant life from its
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4C OS THE THEOLOGY BOOK I.
proximity to intellect. And intellect possessing its life in eternity, always subsisting essentially in energy/ and fixing all its stable intellection at once in intellect, is entirely deific through the cause prior to itself. For it has two-fold energies as Plotinus says, some as intellect, but others as being inebriated with nectar. And elsewhere he observes, that this in- tellect, by that which is prior to itself and is not intellect, is a god ; in the same manner as soul, by its summit which is above soul, is intellect; and as body, by the power which is prior to body, is soul.
All things therefore, as we have said, are suspended from the one through intellect and soul as media. And intellect indeed has the form of unity ; but soul has the form of intellect ; and the body of the world is vital. But every thing is conjoined with that which is prior to itself. And of the natures posterior to these, one in a more proximate, but the other in a more remote degree, enjoys that which is divine. And divinity, indeed* is prior to intellect, being primarily carried in an intellectual nature ; but intellect is most divine, as being deified prior to other things ; and soul is divine, so far as it requires an intellectual medium. But the body which participates of a soul of ttxis kind, so far as body indeed, is also itself divine ; for the illumination of divine* light pervades supernally as far as to the last dependencies ; yet it is not simply divine; but soul, by looking to intellect, and living from itself, is primarily divine.