V. Farther still, that which is multitudinous will seek itself, and will wish to verge to and be
co-sentient of itself. Where, however, will that
which is entirely one proceed to itself? And where
will it be in want of co-sensation? For this same
thing is more excellent than all co-sensation and
intellection. For intellectual perception is not the
first of things, either with respect to existence, or dignity of nature ; but it is the second thing, and
generated posterior to the subsistence of the good .
As soon as generated, also, it moved itself towards
the good . But being moved towards, it also knew
it. And intellectual perception is this , viz. a mo¬
tion towards the good , and an aspiration after it .
For desire generated intelligence, and is consub-
sistent with it. For sight is the desire of seeing.
The good , therefore, is not at all in want of intel¬
lectual perception. For there is not any thing else
beside itself which is the good of it ; since when
that also which is different from the good intellec¬
tually perceives it, it does this in consequence of
being boniform, and possessing a similitude to the
good . It likewise intellectually perceives that
which it sees, as good and desirable to itself ; and
in consequence of receiving as it were the imagina¬
tion of good. And if it is always thus affected, it
is always this [i. e. it is always boniform]. For
again, in the intellection of itself, it accidentally
perceives the good. For looking to the good, it
intellectually sees it, and also sees itself energizing.
But the energy of all things is directed to the good ,
VI. If, therefore, these things are rightly asserted, intelligence will have no place whatever
in the good. For the good which is present with
an intellective1 nature is different from the good
itself. Hence the good is unenergetic. For why
is it necessary that energy should energize ? For
in short, no energy whatever has again energy.
But if to other energies 'which are directed to ano¬
ther thing, we attribute something else, it is how¬
ever necessary, that the first energy from which
other energies are suspended, should be that very
thing which it is, and that nothing else should be
added to it. An energy, therefore, of this kind is
not intellectual perception. For it does not possess
that which it intellectually perceives ; since it is
the first energy. In the next place, neither does
intelligence intellectually perceive, but that which
possesses intelligence. Again, therefore, two things
take place in that which perceives intellectually.
But that which is first is by no means two. Far¬
ther still, the truth of this may be seen in a still
greater degree by him who considers how this two¬
fold nature subsists in every thing which is more
clearly intellective. For we say, indeed, that be-
2 instead of to row n in this place, it is necessary to read ?{t) roovvn .
Plot. 2 G
irigs as beings, that each thing itself [by itself,] and
truly existing beings, are in the intelligible place ;
and this not merely because some things abide in¬
variably the same in essence, but others, and these
are such as are in the sensible region, continually
flow and are not permanent.1 For perhaps there
are some things in sensibles of a permanent nature.
But we assert this of intelligibles, because they
possess the perfection of existence. For it is ne¬
cessary that the essence which is primarily so call¬
ed, should not be the shadow’ of existence, but
should have the fulness of being. Existence, how¬
ever, is then full, when it receives the form of intel¬
lectual perception, and of life. Hence, in [real]
being, to perceive intellectually, to live, and to
exist, are consubsistent. If, therefore, it is being,
it is also intellect, and if it is intellect it is being.
And intellectual perception is simultaneous with
existence. Hence, to perceive intellectually is
many things, and not one thing. It is necessary,
therefore, that with the nature w hich is not a thing
of this kind, there should not be intellectual per¬
ception. Hence, among the several forms con-
tained in true beings, there are man, and the intel- 1 Instead of ov yevei here, it is necessary to read ου /ue^et.
lectual perception1 of man ; horse, and the intel¬
lectual perception of horse ; the just, and the intel¬
lection of the just. Hence too, all things there
are double, and the one is two. And again, two
passes into one. But that which is the first of
things is not either of these ; nor does it consist of
all the things which are two; nor is it, in short,
two. It has been, however, elsewhere shown by
us, how two derives its subsistence from the one .
But since the one is beyond essence, it is also be¬
yond intellectual perception. There will be no
absurdity therefore, in asserting that the one does
not know itself. For being one it does not possess
with itself that which it may learn. But neither
is it necessary that it should know other things.
For it imparts to them something better and greater
than the knowledge of them ; and this is the good
of other things. But it rather imparts to them the
ability, as much as possible, of coming into con¬
tact with it in the same thing.
1 It is requisite here, to supply tli£ words ανύρωπον νοησ is
On the Good* or the One·
I. All beings are beings through the one , both
Such as are primarily beings, and such as in any
respect whatever are said to be classed in the order
of beings. For what would they be, if they were
not one? For if deprived of unity, they are no
longer that which they were said to be. For
neither would an army, or a choir exist [as such],
unless each of them was one. Nor would a herd
exist, if it were not one. But neither would a
house or a ship have an existence, unless they pos¬
sessed the one ; since a house is one thing, and
also a ship, which one if they lose, the house will
no longer be a house, nor the ship a ship. Con¬
tinued magnitudes, therefore, unless the one is pre¬
sent with them, will not have an existence. Hence,
when they are divided, so far as they lose the one ,
they change their existence. The bodies, also, of
plants and animals, each of which is one, if they fly
from the one , in consequence of being broken into
multitude, lose the essence which they before pos¬
sessed, no longer being that which they were, but
becoming instead of it other things, and continuing
to be these so long as they are one. Health, like¬
wise, then has a subsistence, when the body is
congregated into one [i. e. when it possesses sym¬
metry], and beauty then flourishes when the nature
of the one coniines 'the parts of the body. Virtue
also exists in the soul when the soul tends to unity,
and is united in one concord. Since, therefore,
the soul conducts all things to one, by fabricating,
fashioning, forming and co-arranging them, is it
necessary to assert when we have arrived as far as
to soul, that she supplies the one , and that she is
the one itself? Or must we not say, that as when
she imparts other things to bodies, such as morphe
and form, it is not herself which she imparts, but
things different from herself, thus also it is requisite
to think if she imparts the one, that she imparts it
as something different from herself ; and that look¬
ing to the one , she causes each of her productions
to be one, in the same manner as looking to man^
she fabricates man, assuming together with mao
the one contained in man.1 For of the things
which are denominated one, each is in such a man¬
ner one as is the being which it possesses/ So
that things which are in a less degree beings, pos¬
sess in a less degree the one ; but those that have
more of entity have also more of the one . More~
over, soul being different from the one , possesses
more of it in proportion as it is more truly soul, yet
is not the one itself, \ For soul is one, and in a
certain respect the one which it possesses is an
accident. And these are two things, soul and one,
in the same manner as body and one. That indeed
which is discrete multitude, as a choir, is more re¬
mote from the oney but that which is continuous is
nearer to it. But soul which has more alliance
with, participates more abundantly of the one . If,
how'ever, because soul cannot exist unless it is one,
x The original here is defective, which deficiency may be supplied from the version of Ficinus, by reading ωσι rep και v pos άνθρωπον βλεπονσαν άνθρωπόν δημωνργει, instead of ώσ¬ περ και πρθ5 άνθρωπον άνθρωπον.
% i. e. The nature of its being depends on the nature of the unity which it participates ; so that its being is more or less excellent according as this unity partakes in » greater or less degree of the one itself*
it should , be said that soul and the one are the
same, we reply in the first place, that other things
also are what they are in conjunction with being
one, but at the same time the one is different from
them. For body and one are not the same ; but
body participates of the one . In the next place,
each soul is a multitude, though it does not consist
of parts. For there are many powers in it, viz.
those of reasoning, appetition, and apprehension,
which are connected by unity as by a bond. Soul,
therefore, being itself one imparts the one to other
things. But she also suffers [i. e. participates] this
one from something else.
II. Shall we say, therefore, that in each of the
things which subsist according to a part, the
essence of it and the one are not the same ? In
true being indeed, and true essence, essence, being,
and the one , are the same. So that he who dis¬
covers being in these, will also discover the one ,
and will find that essence itself is the one itself \
Thus, for instance, if essence is intellect, the one
also is here intellect, viz. an intellect which is pri¬
marily being, and primarily one. And when it
imparts existence to other things, thus, and so far
as it imparts this, it also imparts the one . For
what else besides intellect and being, can the one
of these be said to be ? For either the one is the
same with being, as a man is the same thing as one
man ; or it is as a certain number of each thing, as
when you speak of a certain two. And thus the
one is asserted of a certain thing alone. If, there¬
fore, number pertains to beings, it is evident that
the one also pertains to them : and what it is must
be investigated. But if the one is nothing more
than the energy of the soul attempting to number,
the one will have no existence in things themselves.
Reason however has said, that whatever loses the
one , loses entirely at the same time its existence.
It is necessary, therefore, to consider whether each
thing that has a being, and each thing that is one
are the same, and whether in short, being and the
one are the same. If, however, the being of each
thing is multitude, but it is impossible for the one
to be multitude, each of these will be different from
the other. Man, therefore, is an animal, is rational,
and has many parts, and this multitude is bound
together by unity. Hence, man is one thing, and
unity another ; since the former is partible, but the
latter impartible. Moreover, being which ranks as
a whole, and contains all beings in itself, will rather
be many beings [than one], and will be different
from the one. But by assumption and participa¬
tion, it will possess the one. Being, likewise, has
life and intellect : for it is not deprived of life.
Hence, being is many things. If also it is intel¬
lect, it is thus again necessary that it should be
multitudinous ; and this in a still greater degree,
if it comprehends in itself forms or ideas. For
idea is not unity, but is rather number. And this
is true both of each idea, and of that which is all
ideas collectively. Idea, likewise, is in such a
manner one, as the world is one. In short, the
one is the first of things, but intellect, forms, and
being are not the first. For each form consists of
many things, and is a composite, and posterior.
For those things from which each form consists
have a priority of subsistence. But that it is not
possible that intellect can be the first of things, is
evident from the following considerations. It is
necessary that intellect should consist in intellectual
perception ; and that the most excellent intellect,
and which does not look to what is external to,
should intellectually perceive that which is prior to
itself. For being converted to itself, it is [at tbf
same time] converted to the principle of itself
And if indeed it is both intellective and intelligible,
it will be twofold and not simple, and therefore not
the one. But if it looks to something different from
itself, it will entirely look to that which is more
excellent than, and prior to itself. If, however, it
both looks to itself, and to that w'hich is better
than itself, it will thus also be secondary. And it
is requisite to admit that such an intellect as this,
is present indeed with the good , and with that
which is first, and that it beholds it. It likewise
associates with, and intellectually perceives itself,
and knows that it is itself all things. By no means,
therefore, since it is thus various, is it the one.
Neither,, therefore, will the one be all things ; *
since if it were, it would no longer be the one .