translation of Ficinus is, “ turn etiam quia sufficientia huic ex cunctis accumulata pendct cxtrinsecus.”
liies away from him who wishes to speak of and
energize discursively about the one ; since it is
necessary that the dianoetic power, in order that it
may speak of any thing, should assume another
and another thing. For thus there will be a dis¬
cursive energy. In that, however* which is per¬
fectly simple, there is nothing 1 discursive ; but it
is sufficient to come into contact with it intellec¬
tually. That, however, which comes into contact
with it, when it is in contact, is neither able to say
any thing, nor has leisure to speak ; but afterwards
[when it falls off from this contact] reasons about
it. Then also it is requisite to believe that we
have seen it, when the soul receives a sudden light.
For this light is from him, and is him. And then
it is proper to think that he is present, when like
another God entering into the house of some one
who invokes him, he fills it with splendour/ For
* It is necessary here to supply ov.
A Plotinus, in what he here says, doubtless alludes to the following lines in the 19th book of the Odyssey, when Ulysses and Telemachus remove the weapons out of the armory :
• - — 7 rapoiOe be XlaXXcts Αθηγη,
γρνσεον \υχνον eyovaa, (paos π epucaWes οποίοι*
Tore Ύηλομαχοε πρ οσοφωνοον ον πατορ cu\pa9
unless he entered, he would not illuminate it. And
thus the soul would be without light, and without
the possession of this God. But when illuminated,
it has that which it sought for. This likewise is
the true end to the soul, to come into contact with
his light, and to behold him through it; not by
the light of another thing ; but to perceive that
very thing itself through which it sees. For that
ω 7 τατερ, η μεγα θανμα rob ’ οφθαΧμοισίν ορωμαί ’
εμπης μοί τοιγοι μεγάρων, καΧαι τε μεσούμαί,
ειΧατιναι τε boKoi, και κίονες νψοσ εχοντες
ψαινοντ οφθαΧμοις ωσει πνρος αιθομενοίο.
η μαΧα τις θεός evhov , ol ονρανον ευρυν εχονσι*
τον δ’απαμειβομενος προσεφη ποΧνμητις Οδυσσενς,
σιγά, καί κατα σον νοον ίσγανε, μηΧ ερεεινε.
αντη τοι δίκη εστι θεών οι ΟΧνμι τον εγονσίν.
ί. ec “ Minerva preceded them, having a golden lamp, with which she produced a very beautiful light; on perceiving which, Telemachus thus immediately addressed his father : O father, this is certainly a most admirable thing which pre¬ sents itself to my eyes. For the walls of the house, the beau» tiful spaces between the rafters, the hr beams, and the columns, appear to me to rise in radiance, as if on fire. Certainly some one of the Gods is present who inhabit the extended heaven. But the wise Ulysses thus answered him : Be silent, repress your intellect, and do not speak. For this is the custom of the Gods who dwell in Olympus." Homer, therefore, indicates by this, that to the reception of divine illumination, silence, and a cessation of all mental energy, are requisite.
through which it is illuminated, is the very thing
which it is necessary to behold. For neither do
we see the sun through any other than the solar
light. How, therefore, can this be accomplished ?
By an ablation of all things.
That the
Nature Which Is Beyond Being
Is Not Intellective ; J
WHAT THAT IS WHICH IS PRIMARILY,
And Also
THAT WHICH IS SECONDARILY, INTELLECTIVE,
o ιέ kind of intelligence is the intellectual percep¬
tion of another thing, but another is the perception
of a thing by itself, or when a thing perceives it¬
self ; the latter of which flies in a greater degree
from duplicity, or doubleness in intellection. But
the former wishes also to avoid this diversity, but is
less able to accomplish its wish. For it has indeed
with itself that which it sees, but it is different from
itself. That, however, which intellectually per¬
ceives itself, is not separated essentially from the
object of its perception, but being co-existent with
it sees itself. Both, therefore, become one being*
Hence it perceives in a greater degree because it
possesses that which it perceives. It is also pri¬
marily intellective, because that which perceives
intellectually ought to be both one and two. For
if it is not one, that which perceives will be one
thing, and that which is intellectually perceived
another. Hence it will not be primarily intellec¬
tive, because in consequence of receiving the intel¬
lectual perception of another thing, it will not pos¬
sess that which it perceives, as something belong¬
ing to itself ; so that the thing perceived v\ ill not
be the perceiver itself. Or if it should possess it
as itself, in order that it may properly perceive in¬
tellectually, two things will be one. Hence it is
necessary that both should be one. Or if there is
indeed one thing, but again, this one does not con¬
sist of two things, it will not possess intelligence ;
so that neither will it perceive intellectually.
Hence it is necessary that the nature which is in¬
tellective should be simple and at the same time not
simple. He, however, who ascends from soul will in
a greater degree apprehend that an intellective na¬
ture is a thing of this kind. For here [i. e. in soul]
it is easy to divide, and duplicity may here be easily
perceived. If some one, therefore, should make a
twofold lights soul, indeed, according to the less
pure, but the intelligible of it according to the
purer light, and afterwards should cause that which
sees to be a light equal to that which is seen, not
having any further occasion to separate by differ¬
ence, — he who does this, will admit that these
two are one. And this perceives intellectually, in¬
deed, because it is two things ; but it sees because
it is now’ one thing. Thus, therefore, such a one
will apprehend intellect and the intelligible. Hence
we, by a reasoning process, have made two things
from one. On the contrary, however, it is two
things from one, because it intellectually perceives,
making itself to be two ; or rather being two be¬
cause it intellectually perceives ; and because it is
one thing [being intellective.]
II. If, therefore, there is that which is primarily
intellective, and also that which is after another
manner [i. e. secondarily] intellective, that w’hich is
beyond the first intelligent nature, will not perceive
intellectually. For it is necessary that it should
become intellect in order that it may have intellec¬
tual perception. But being intellect it will also
have the intelligible. And if it is primarily intel¬
lective, it will have the intelligible in itself. It is
not, however, necessary that whatever is intelligible
should have that which is intellective in itself, and
perceive intellectually. For in this case, it will not
only be intelligible, but also intellective. But be¬
ing two things it will not be that which is first.
Intellect, likewise, which possesses the intelligible,
could not subsist without the existence of an
essence which is purely intelligible ; and which
with respect to intellect, indeed, will be intelligible,
but with reference to itself will be properly neither
intellective, nor intelligible. For that which is in¬
telligible, is intelligible to another thing. And
intellect which darts itself forward by intelligence
would have a vacuum, unless it received and com¬
prehended in itself the intelligible which it intellec¬
tually perceives. For it is not intellective without
the intelligible. Hence it is then perfect when it
possesses the intelligible. It is necessary, how¬
ever, prior to its perceiving intellectually, that it
should have with itself a perfect essence. Hence,
that with which the perfect is essentially 1 present,
will be perfect prior to intellectual perception. To
this, therefore, nothing of intellectual perception is
1 There is an omission in the original here of κατ ονσιαν , but both the sense and the version of Ficinus require it should be inserted.
necessary. For prior to this it is sufficient to
itself. Hence it does not perceive intellectually.
There is, therefore, that which is not intellective ;
there is also that which is primarily intellective ;
and there is that which is intellective in a secondary
degree. Farther still, if that which is first per-
ceives intellectually, something is present with it.
Hence it is not the first, but that which is second.
It is also not one, but is now' 1 many ; and is all
such things as it intellectually perceives. For if it
only intellectually perceived itself, it would be
many.*
III. If, however, it should be said, that nothing hinders this same thing which is the first from being
1 For εώη here, it is necessary to read ηδη,
r The intelligible is prior to intelligence; for the former is characterized by essence , but the latter by intellect . And be¬ ing is prior to intellect. The intelligible, however, contains in itself intellect causally. Hence it has a knowledge which is beyond intellect. Much more, therefore, is the ineffable prin¬ ciple of things, who is beyond the intelligible, above the pos¬ session of intellectual perception. For his knowledge like his nature is more impartible than every centre, and more ineffa¬ ble than all silence. For it is, if it be lawful so to speak, a darkness which transcends all gnostic illumination. Hence by energizing about it, knowledge is refunded into ignorance.
many, we reply that in these many there will be a
subject. For it is not possible for the many to
subsist, unless the one exists, from which, or in
which they subsist ; or in short, unless there is a
one which is prior to other things that are num¬
bered among themselves, and which it is necessary
to receive itself in itself alone. But if it subsists in
conjunction with other things, it is necessary having
received this wdth other things, but wThich at the
same time is different from them, that we should
suffer it to be with other things, but that we should
also investigate this subject, no longer in conjunc¬
tion with other things of which it is the subject, but
itself by itself. For that which is the same in other
things, will indeed be similar to this , but will not
be this.' It is necessary, however, that it should
be alone, if it is to be seen in other things, unless
it should be said that the being of it has its hypo¬
stasis in conjunction with other things. Hence,
there will not be that which is itself simple ; nor
will there be that which is composed of many
a For the imparticipable or exempt one, is not consubsistent with any thing, but the participable one is consubsistent cither with being, or life, or intellect, or soul, or body. See nty translation of Proclus’ Elements of Theology.
things. For since that which is simple has no
subsistence, neither will that which is a composite
of many things subsist. For because each simple
thing is unable to exist, no one certain simple thing
subsisting from itself, hence since that which is
multitudinous is not able to have an hypostasis by
itself, nor to impart itself to another thing, because
it has no existence, how7 can there be that which is
composed of all things, when it must consist of non¬
entities, which are not merely negations of a cer¬
tain thing, but have no subsistence whatever? If,
therefore, a certain thing is multitude, it is necessary
there should be one prior to the many . Hence, if
that which is intellective is a certain multitude, it
is necessary that there should not be intellectual
perception in that which is not 1 multitude. This,
however, is the first [principle of things]. In the
natures, therefore, posterior to it, there will be
intellectual perception and intellect.
IV. Farther still, if it is necessary that the good
should be simple and iinindigent, it will not be in
want of intellectual perception. But that which is
1 μη is omitted in the original.
not necessary to it, will not be present with it;
since, in short, nothing is present with it. Intellec¬
tual perception, therefore, will not be inherent in
it, because neither will any thing else. Besides,
intellect is something different from the good. For
it becomes b on i form by the intellectual perception
of the good . Again, as in two things wfoere there
is one and another thing, it is not possible for this
one which subsists in conjunction with something
else to be the one itself ’ but it is necessary that the
one which is one by itself, should be prior to that
which is with another ; thus also it is necessary,
that where a certain one which is in a certain re¬
spect simple subsists in conjunction with another
thing, there should prior to it be the one which is
perfectly simple, and which has nothing in itself of
the things contained in that which subsists in con¬
junction with others. For wdience could one thing
be in another, unless prior to these that had a
separate subsistence, from which the thing that is
another is derived ? For that which is simple, can¬
not be derived from another. But that which is
multitudinous or two, must necessarily be suspend¬
ed from another thing. Hence, that which is first
may be assimilated to light ; that which is next to
it, to the sun ; but that which is the third, to the
moon, deriving light from the sun. For soul, in¬
deed, has an adventitious intellect, which, as soul
is of an intellectual nature, colours it [with a light
derived from the good]. Intellect, however, con¬
tains in itself an appropriate light of its own ; for
it is not light alone, but that which is illuminated
essentially. But that which imparts this light,
since it is not any thing else, is a simple light,
affording to intellect the power of existing that
which it is. Why, therefore, should this simple
light be in want of any thing? For it is not the
same with that which is in another ; since that
which is in another is different from that which
subsists itself by itself.