* It is well observed by Damascius in his MS. treatise r epi αρχών, that neither the one nor all things accords in reality with the nature of the one . For these are opposed to each other, and distribute our conceptions. For if we look to the simple and the one , we destroy its immensely great perfection : and if we conceive all things subsisting together, we abolish the one and thesimple. But this is because we are divided, and look to divided peculiarities. In short, so far as it is the one , it is exempt from all things, and is without any multi¬ tude ; but so far as it is the principle of all things, it is all things prior to all.
Nor is it intellect. For thus it would be all things ;
intellect being all things. Nor is it being. For
being likewise is all things.
III. What then will the one be ; and what
nature will it possess ? Or may we not say that it
is not at all wonderful, it should not be easy to tell
what it is, since neither is it easy to tell what being
is, or what form is. But our knowledge is fixed in
forms. When, however, the soul directs its atten¬
tion to that wdiich is formless, then being unable to
comprehend that which is not bounded, and as it
were impressed with forms by a former of a various
nature, it falls from the apprehension of it, and is
afraid it will possess [nothing from the view].
Hence, it becomes weary in endeavours of this
kind, and gladly descends from the survey fre¬
quently falling from all things, till it arrives at
something sensible, and as it were rests in a solid
substance ; just as the sight also, when wearied
with the perception of small objects, eagerly con¬
verts itself to such as are large. When, however,
the soul wishes to perceive by itself, and sees itself
alone, then in consequence of being one with the
object of its perception, it does not think that it
yet possesses that which it investigates, because it
is not different from that which it intellectually
perceives. At the same time, it is requisite that
he should act in this manner, who intends to phi¬
losophize about the one. Since, therefore, that
which we investigate is one, and we direct our
attention to the principle of all things, to the good,
and the first, we ought not to be far removed from
the natures which are about the first of things, nor
fall from them to the last of all things, but pro¬
ceeding to such as are first, we should elevate our¬
selves from sensibles which have an ultimate sub¬
sistence. The soul, likewise, should for this pur¬
pose be liberated from all vice, in consequence of
hastening to the [vision of the] good ; and should
ascend to the principle which is in herself, and
become one instead of many things, in order that
she may survey the principle 1 of all things, and
the one . Hence it is requisite, that the soul of him
who ascends to the good should then become intel¬
lect, and that he should commit his soul to, and
establish it in intellect, in order, that what intellect;
* For αρχήν here, it is necessary to read αρχ ψ ; and it is also requisite to alter the punctuation conformably to tbs above translation.
sees, his soul may vigilantly receive, and may
ihrough intellect survey the one; not employing
apy^oneof the Senses, nor receiving any thing from
them, but with a pure intellect, and with the sum¬
mit [and as it were, flower] qf intellect, beholding
that which is most pure. When, therefore, he who
applies himself to the survey of a thing of this kind,
imagines that there is either magnitude, or figure,
or bulk about this nature, he lias not intellect for
the leader of the vision ; because intellect is not
naturally adapted to perceive things of this kind,
but such an energy is the energy of sense, and of
opinion following sense. But in order to perceive
the one , it is necessary to receive from intellect a
declaration of what intellect is able to accomplish.
Intellect, however, is able to see either things prior
to itself, or things pertaining to itself, or things
effected by itself. And the things indeed contained
in itself, are pure; but those prior to itself are still
purer and more simple ; or rather this must be
asserted of that which is prior to it. Hence, that
which is prior to it, is not intellect, but something
more excellent. For intellect is a certain one
among the number of beings ; but that is not a
certain one, but is prior to every thing. Nor is it
being ; for being has, as it were, the form of the
one.1 But that is formless, and is even without
intelligible form. For the nature of the one being
generative of all things, is not any one of them.
Neither, therefore, is it a certain thing, nor a qua·
lity, nor a quantity, nor intellect, nor soul, nor that
which is moved, nor again that which stands stiH.
Nor is it in place, or in time ; but is by itself uni¬
form, or rather without form, being prior to all
form, to motion and to permanency. For these
subsist about being which also cause it to be mul¬
titudinous. Why, however, if it is not moved,
does it not stand still ? Because it is necessary
that one or both of these should subsist about being.
And that which stands still, stands still through
permanency, and is not the same with it. Hence
permanency is accidental to it, and it no longer
remains simple. For when we say that the one is
the cause of all things, we do not predicate any
thing as an accident to it, but rather as something
which happens to us, because we possess something
8 Instead of του ovros here, it is necessary to read τον eyes. For it is absurd to suppose Plotinus would say, that being has as it were the form of being , and yet Ficinus so translates it ; if Nam ens velut for mam ipsam entis habet.”
from it, the ant in the mean time subsisting in itself.
It is necessary, however, when speaking accurately
of the one , neither to call it that , nor this. But we
running as it were externally round it, are desirous
of explaining the manner in which vre are affected
about it. And at one time, indeed, we draw near
to it, but at another time fall from it, by our doubts
about it.
IV. In this affair, however, a doubt especially
arises, because the perception of the highest God
is not effected by science, nor by intelligence, like
other intelligibles, but by the presence of him,
which is a mode of knowledge superior to that of
science. But the soul suffers an apostacy from the
one , and is not entirely one when it receives scien¬
tific knowledge. For science is reason, and «reason
is multitudinous. The soul, therefore, in this case,
deviates from the one, and falls into number and
multitude. Hence it is necessary to run above
science, and in no respect to depart from a subsis¬
tence which is profoundly one ; but it is requisite
to abandon science, the objects of science, every
other thing, and every beautiful spectacle. For
fcvery thing beautiful is posterior to the supreme*
and is derived from him, in the same manner
as all diurnal light is derived from the sun.
Hence Plato says, he is neither effable, nor to be
described by writing. We speak however, and
write about him, extending ourselves to him, and
exciting others by a reasoning process to the vision
of him ; pointing out, as it were, the way to him
w ho wishes to behold something [of his ineffable
nature]. For doctrine extends as far as to the
way and the progression to him. But the vision of
him is now the work of one who is solicitous to
perceive him. He, however, will not arrive at the
vision of him, and will not be affected by the sur¬
vey, nor w ill have in himself as it w^ere an amatory
passion from the viewr, (which passion causes the
lover to rest in the object of his love) nor receive
from it a true light, which surrounds the whole soul
with its splendor, in consequence of becoming
nearer to it ; he, I say, will not behold this light,
who attempts to ascend to the vision of the supreme
while he is drawn dow nwards by those things which
are an impediment to the vision. He will likewise
not ascend by himself alone, but will be accom¬
panied by that which will divulse him from the onet
or rather he will not be himself collected into one*
For the one is not absent from any thing, and yet
is separated from all things ; so that it is present*
and yet not present with them. But it is present
with those things that are able, and are prepared
to receive it, so that they become congruous, and
as it were pass into contact with it, through simili¬
tude and a certain inherent power allied to that
which is imparted by the one . When, therefore,
the soul is disposed in such a w>ay as she was when
she came from the one , then she is able to perceive
it, as far as it is naturally capable of being seen.
He, therefore, who has not yet arrived thither* but
either on account of the abovementioned obstacle
is deprived of this vision, or through the want of
reason which may conduct him to it, and impart
faith respecting it ; such a one may consider him¬
self as the cause of his disappointment through
these impediments, and should endeavour by sepa¬
rating himself from all things to be alone. But
with respect to arguments in the belief of which he
is deficient* he should conceive as follows :
V. Whoever fancies that beings are governed by
fortune and chance* and are held together by corpo-
Plot, 2 H
real causes, is very remote from God, and the con¬
ception of the one . Our arguments, likewise, are
not addressed to these, but to those who admit that
there is another nature besides bodies, and who
ascend [at least] as far as to soul. It is necessary,
therefore, that these should be well acquainted with
the nature of soul, both as to other things, and to its
being derived from intellect ; from which also parti¬
cipating of reason, it possesses virtue. After these
things, however, he should admit the subsistence of
another intellect, different from that which reasons,
and which is denominated rational. He should
likew ise consider reasonings to subsist now as it were
in interval and motion, and sciences to be such-like
reasons in the soul, with an [evolved] and manifest
subsistence ; in consequence of intellect which is
the cause of sciences being now infused into the
soul. Hence in this ease, the soul has as it were a
sensible perception of intellect, through apprehend¬
ing it incumbent on soul, and containing in itself
the intelligible world, a tranquil intellect, and a
quiet motion, and having and being all things, — a
multitude without separation, and again a separate
multitude. For it is neither separated like the
reasons [i. e, forms or ideas in the human soul]
which are perceived by our intellect one at a time/
[and not simultaneously,] nor is it a confused mul¬
titude. For each of the forms contained in it pro¬
ceeds separate from the rest ; in the same manner
as in the sciences, where all things subsisting in an
impartible nature, at the same time each is separate
from the rest. This multitude, therefore, subsisting
at once is the intelligible world, which is imme-
diately united to the first principle of things, and
which the same reason that demonstrates the exist¬
ence of soul says has a necessary subsistence.
This, however, has a more principal subsistence
than soul, yet is not the first of things, because it
is not [profoundly] one, and simple. But the onei
and the principle of all things, is simple. Hence
that which is prior to the most honourable thing
among beings/ if it is necessary there should be
1 In the original, owe γαρ διακεκριται ως οι Χογοι οι ηδη καθ' εν νοούμενοι , which Ficinus not understanding has erroneously translated as follows: “ Neque enim discernitur sicut rationes in probatione solcnt, sed tanquam rationes jam secundum unum quiddam excogitante." For the human intellect perceives only one form or idea at a time ; but a divine intellect sees all forms at once.