1 Instead of αλλ’ ονκ ειρηκε μιη. ρησει πολλά ill this place, it is necessary to read αλλ’ ουν ειρηκε κ . λ.
α The words within the brackets are wanting in the original, and are supplied from the version of Ficinus. After ei γαρ
Neither, therefore, does it intellectually perceive itself, nor is there any intellectual perception of it,
XIV. How, therefore, can we speak of it?
W e are able indeed to say something of it, but we
do not speak it. Nor have we either any know¬
ledge, or intellectual perception of it. How, there¬
fore, do we speak of it, if we do not possess it ?
May we not say, that though we do not possess it
by knowledge, yet we are not entirely deprived of
the possession of it ; but we possess it in such a
way that we can speak of it, but cannot speak it ?
For we can say what it is not, but we cannot say
what it is ; so that we speak of it from things pos¬
terior to it. We are not, however, prevented from
possessing it, though we cannot say what it is.
But in the same manner as those w7ho energize
enthusiastically, and become divinely inspired, per¬
ceive indeed, that they have something greater in
c£ee, therefore, it is requisite to add €%ei και πον eivcu. But the meaning of Plotinus in this place is, that if the most simple of all things had an intellectual perception of itself, it would be in itself ; and consequently would be somewhere. For an intellectual essence because self-subsistent, is said to be in it¬ self. For so far as it is the cause of, it comprehends itself; but so far as it is caused, it is comprehended by itself.
themselves, though they do not know what it is ;
but of the things by which they are excited they
speak, and from these receive a certain sensation
of the moving power, which is different from them ;
— in this manner also we appear to be affected
about that which is perfectly simple, when possess¬
ing a pure intellect we employ it, and conclude that
this is the inward intellect which is the source of
essence, and of other things which belong to this
arrangement. We are sensible, therefore, that the
nature ■which is perfectly simple is not these
things, but that it is something more excellent,
more ample, and great, than that which we deno¬
minate being, because it is also superior to reason,
intellect, and sense, imparting, but not being
these.
XV. But how does it impart them? Shall we
say by possessing, or by not possessing them ? If,
however, it indeed possesses them, it is not simple.
But if it does not possess them, how does multitude
proceed from it ? For perhaps some one may ad¬
mit that one simple thing may proceed from it,
though even in this case it may be inquired how
any thing can proceed from that which is entirely
one* At tiie same time, however, it may be said,
that one simple thing may flow from it, in the same
manner as a surrounding splendor from light. But
how do many things proceed from it ? May we
not say, that what proceeds from is not the same
with it ? If, therefore, it is not the same with, it is
not better than it. [For what is better, or in short,
more excellent than the one ? It is therefore infe¬
rior to it. But this is more indigent].® For what
is in a greater degree indigent than the one , except
that which is not one ? This, therefore, that is more
indigent is many. At the same time, however, it
aspires after the one . Hence it is one many. For
the one saves every thing which is not one ; and
every thing is what it is through the one . For un¬
less it becomes one, though it should consist of
many things, it cannot yet be denominated being.
And though it may be possible to say what each
thing is, yet this is only in consequence of each
thing being one, and participating of sameness.
That, however, which has not multitude in itself, is
1 The words within the brackets are supplied from the ver¬ sion of Ficinus ; so that in the original, after ovbe ye βεΧτω vt it is necessary to supply rt yap βεΧτων τον evost η οΧω$ xpetr- τον ; χεφον αρα . τοντο $e cvbcecrrepov*
not one by the participation of one, but is the one
itself, not from another, but because it is this ;
from which other things also derive their subsist¬
ence, some indeed, proximately, but others re·
motely. But since that which is next to the one is
characterized by sameness, and is posterior to the
one , it is evident that the multitude of it is every
where one. For being multitude at the same time
it subsists in sameness, and without separation,
because all things in it exist collectively at once [in
impartible union]. Each also of the natures which
proceed from it, as long as it participates of life, is
one many. For it cannot exhibit itself to the view
as one all . That, however, from which this origi¬
nates is one all , because it is a great principle. For
the principle is in reality and truly one. But that
which is next to the principle, being thus after a
manner [exuberantly full of ] and heavy with the
one , becomes all things through its participation of
the one ; and whatever it contains is again all and
one. What therefore is this all ? Is it not those
things of which the one is the principle ? But how
is the one the principle of all things ? Is it not be¬
cause it is the saviour of them, causing each of
them to be one ? Or is it also because it gave sub-
sistence to them ? After what manner therefore ?
Is it not because it antecedently contained them ?
We have however before observed, that thus it will
be multitude. They are contained in it, therefore,
in such a way as to subsist without distinction and
separation.1 Eut the things contained in the
second principle [after the one ] are separated by
reason : for they are now in energy. The one ,
however, is the power of all things. But what is
the mode of this power ? For it is not said to be in
power or capacity in the same manner as matter,
because it receives : for matter suffers [in conse¬
quence of being passive] ; and thus the power of
matter has an arrangement opposite to that of effi¬
ciency. How, therefore, does it produce the things
which it has not? For it does not produce them
casually ; nor having considered what it is to do,
does it then produce them. It has been said,
therefore, by us, that if any thing proceeds from
the one , it is different from it ; but being different,
it is not one. For this is what the one was. If,
however, that which proceeds from the one is not
one, it is now necessary that it should be two
* As all things proceed from the one} hence the one is all things prior to all.
things, and should be multitude. For it is now
same and different, quality, and other things. That
the offspring of the one , therefore, is not one [alone]
has been now demonstrated. But that it is mul¬
titude, and a multitude of such a kind as that
which is surveyed in what is posterior to it, is
deservedly a subject of doubt And the necessity
of the subsistence of that which is posterior to it,
still remains to be investigated.
XVI. That it is necessary, therefore, there
should be something after the first, has been else¬
where asserted by us. And, in short, we have said
that this which is next to the first [principle of
things] is power, and an inestimable power. This,
likewise, is rendered credible from all other things,
because there is nothing even among the last of
things which has not a generative power. Now,
however, we must say, that in things which are
generated, the progression is not to the upward,
but to the downward, and to a greater multitude,
and that the principle of particulars is itself more
simple [than its effects]. Hence, that which pro¬
duced the sensible world will not be itself the sen¬
sible world, but intellect and the intelligible world.
Hence, too, that which is prior to the intelligible
world, and which generated it, is something more
simple than intellect and the intelligible world.
For that which is multitudinous does not originate
from multitude, but from that which is not multi¬
tude. For if the source of it was multitudinous, it
would not be the principle, but the principle would
be some other thing prior to it. It is necessary,
therefore, to refer all things to that which is truly
one, and which is superior to all multitude, and to
every kind of [participable] simplicity, if it is truly
simple. But how is that which is generated from
it, multitudinous and universal reason, since it is
evident it is not itself reason ? If however it is not
reason, how can reason proceed from that which is
not 1 reason ? And how can that which is boniform
proceed from the good? For what does it possess
in itself that can cause it to be denominated boni¬
form ? Is it because it subsists with invariable
sameness ? But what does this contribute to the
good? For we seek after a sameness of subsistence
when good is present. Or do we not first investi¬
gate that from which it is not proper to depart,
because it is good ? But if it is not good, it is better
1 μη is omitted in the original.
to abandon the pursuit of it. Is it therefore con¬
sidered by us as boniform, to live abiding in good
voluntarily, and with invariable sameness ? Hence,
if intellect is satisfied with living after this manner,
it evidently seeks after nothing else. It appears,
therefore, that a sameness of subsistence is desira¬
ble, because what is present is sufficient. All
things, however, being now present to intellect, to
live is desirable ; and this when all things are in
such a manner present with it, as not to be different
from it: But if all life is present with this, and a
life perspicuous and perfect ; in this, soul and every
intellect subsist, and nothing is wanting to it either
of life or intellect. Hence it is sufficient to itself,
and seeks after nothing farther. But if this be the
case, it possesses in itself, that which it would
investigate if it were not present. It possesses,
therefore, in itself the good , or a thing of such a
kind as we call life and intellect, or something else
which is accidental to these. If, however, this is
the good , there will be nothing beyond these. But
if the good is beyond these, a life tending to this,
suspended from it, having its subsistence from, and
living according to it, will evidently be good. For
the good is the principle of intellect. It is neces-
Plot. 2 F
sary, therefore, that the good should be more ex¬
cellent than life and intellect. For thus intellect,
and the life which it contains, will be converted to
it, since the life of intellect possesses in itself an
imitation of the good , according to which intellect
lives, and this is also the case with intellect itself,
whatever this imitation may be.
XVII. What then is better than a most wise,
irreprehensible, and unerring life ? What more ex¬
cellent than an intellect possessing all things ? Or
than all life, and every intellect ? If, therefore, we
should say that the maker of these is more excel¬
lent, and should relate how he made them, and
show that nothing better than him can present
itself to our view7, our reasoning will not proceed
to any thing else, but will stop there. It is neces¬
sary, however, to ascend, both on account of many
other considerations, and because self-sufficiency to
this intellect is the result of all the things of which 1
1 Instead of eic πάντων εζω εστιν , it is necessary to read εκ πάντων e| cv εστιν. The necessity of this emendation was not seen by Ficinus, whose translation of this part is consequently very erroneous. For how can the sufficiency of intellect con¬ sist of an accumulation of all things externally? But the
it consists. But each of these is evidently indigent,
because each participates of the same one, and par¬
ticipates of one in consequence of not being the
one itself. What then is that of which this intel¬
lect participates, and which causes it to exist, and
to be all things at once ? If, however, it causes it
to be every thing, and the multitude of it is suffi¬
cient to itself through the presence of the one , and
if also it is evidently effective of essence and self-
sufficiency, it will not be essence, but beyond this,
and beyond self-sufficiency. Is what we have said
therefore sufficient, or is the soul yet parturient
with something else, and in a still greater degree ?
Perhaps, therefore, it is requisite that the soul
should now become impelled towards the one , being
filled with parturient conceptions about it. Again,
however, let us try if we cannot find a certain
charm for this parturiency. Perhaps, indeed, he
will accomplish this, who frequently enchants him¬
self from wffiat has now been said. What other
new* enchantment, therefore, as it were, is there ?
For the charm which runs above all realities, and
above the truths which we participate, immediately