now be number and many other things. It is ne-
1 For in this case, it would be at least two things ; since in addition to the impartible it would have speech. And the duad is the first multitude.
* Instead of ei μη here, it is necessary to read αμι*
2 The words και τούτο are omitted in the original.
cessary, therefore, that the nature which is intel¬ lective, should receive another and another, and
that the objects of its perception being intelligible,
should be various ; for otherwise there will not be
an intellectual perception of, but a contact with it
There will likewise be as it were, an adhesion only
ineffable, and without intellection, possessing an
energy prior to intelligence, intellects not yet exist¬
ing, in consequence of that which adheres not per¬
ceiving intellectually. It is necessary, however,
that the nature which sees intellectually, should
not itself remain simple, and especially when it
perceives itself. For it will itself divide itself, even
though it should be silently intellective. In the
next place, that which is entirely simple will not
be in want of a busy energy, as it were, about it¬
self. For what will it learn by intellectual percep¬
tion ? For prior to this perception, it exists that
which it is to itself. For again, knowledge is a
certain desire and as it were, an investigating disco-
very. Hence, that which is without any difference 1
in itself with respect to itself, is quiescent, and in¬
vestigates nothing respecting itself. But that
which evolves itself, will also be multitudinous.
1 For διάφορον here, it is necessary to read α διάφοροί'.
XI. Hence this intellect becomes manifold;
when it wishes to understand that which is beyond
intellect. Endeavouring, therefore, to come into
contact with it as with that which is simple, it falls
from it always receiving another multiplied nature
in itself. Hence, it originates from f it not as in¬
tellect, but as sight not yet seeing. But it proceeds
from it containing in itself that which it has mul¬
tiplied. Hence, it indefinitely desires another
thing, possessing at the same time a certain phan¬
tasm in itself. It proceeds, however, receiving
another thing in itself, which causes it to be multi¬
tudinous. For again, it has an impression * of the
vision [of that whieh is beyond itself], or it would
never become the recipient of it. Thus, therefore,
it becomes manifold from the one ; and thus as in¬
tellect it sees itself, and then becomes sight per¬
ceiving. This, however, is then intellect when it
possesses ; and as intellect it possesses.3 But prior
1 Instead of err αντω in this place, both the sense and the; version of Ficinus require that we should read απ' αυτόν .
α This impression is tke o?7e o f intellect, the summit and as it were flower of its nature, and a vestige of the ineffable. For by seeing the ineffable, it becomes stamped as it were with its super-essential nature.
3 Conformably to this, Aristotte says of intellect in his Metaphysics, evepyei be βχων, i. e. ** It energizes possessing/’’
Plot „ % E
to this, it is desire alone, and a formless sight. This
intellect, therefore, projects itself towards that
which is beyond intellect : and when it receives it,
it becomes [perceptive] intellect. But it is always
the recipient [of the ineffable], and always be¬
comes intellect, essence, and intelligence, when it
perceives intellectually. For prior to this it was
not intelligence, in consequence of not possessing
the intelligible ; nor intellect, because it was not
yet intellective. That, however, which is prior to
these, is the principle of these, but not as inherent
in them. For the first principle, or the from which ,
is not inherent in that of which it is the principle,
but the things of which a thing consists, are inherent
in that thing. That, however, from which each
thing is derived, is not each thing, but is different
from all things. Hence, it is not some one of all
things, but is prior to all things ; so that on this
account, it is also prior to intellect. For again,
all things are within intellect ; so that for this rea=
son likewise, it is prior to intellect. If, also, the
natures which are posterior to it have the order of
all things, and on this account likewise it is prior
to all things, it is not proper that it should be a
certain one of those things to which it is prior.
You must not, therefore, denominate it intellect.
Hence, neither must you call it the good \ if the
good signifies some one of all things. But if it sig¬
nifies that which is prior to all things, let it be thus
denominated. If, therefore, intellect is intellect
because it is multitudinous, and the intellection of
itself as it were intervening, though it is from itself,
multiplies itself, it is necessary that the nature
which is perfectly simple, and the first of all things,
should be beyond intellect. For if it possessed
intelligence, it would not be beyond, but would be
intellect. But if it were intellect, it would also be
multitude.
XII. What however hinders [it may be said,
the first principle of things], from being thus multi¬
tude, so long as it is one essence ? For multitude
here is not composition ; but the energies of it are
multitude. If, however, the energies of it are not
essences, but it proceeds from capacity into energy,
it will not be multitude indeed, vet it will be bn-
perfect in essence before it energizes. But if the
essence of it is energy, and the energy of it is mul¬
titude, its essence will be as multitudinous as its
energy. We admit, however, that this is the case
with intellect, to which we attribute the intellection
of itself ; but we do not assert this of the principle
of all things. For it is necessary that prior to mul¬
titude there should be the one , from which multitude
proceeds ; since in every number the one is first.
Our opponents, however, may say, that this is in¬
deed the case in number® For the things which
are in a consequent order to unity are composi-
tions ; but what necessity is there in beings, that
there should be a certain one from which the many
proceed P To this we reply, that the many without
the one would be divulsed from each other, one
thing casually proceeding to another, in order to
the composition of multitude. Hence, they also
say, that energies proceed from one intellect which
is simple ; so that they now admit there is some*
thing simple prior to energies. And in the next
place, they should know that energies which are
always permanent are hypostases. Energies, how¬
ever, being hypostases, are different from that from
which they proceed ; since this indeed remains
simple, but that which proceeds from it, is in itself
multitude, and is suspended from its simple cause.
For if they subsist, that from which they proceed
at the same time in a certain respect energizing,
there also there will be multitude. But if they are
first energies producing that which is secondary,
nothing prevents that which is prior to the energies
from abiding in itself, and from conceding energies
to that which is second, and which consists of
energies. For that which is prior to energies is
one thing, but the energies which proceed from it
another ; because from that not energizing, [these
derive their subsistence]. For if this were not the
case, intellect would not be the first energy. For
[that which is entirely simple] did not as it were
desire that intellect should be generated, and after®
wards intellect was generated, this desire subsisting
between the simple principle, and its offspring in¬
tellect. Nor in short, did this principle desire.
For thus it would be imperfect, and the desire
would not yet have that which it wished to obtain *
Nor again, does it partly obtain the object of its
wish, and partly not. For there is nothing to which
the extension [of its desire is directed]. But in¬
deed, if any thing subsists after it, it subsists in
consequence of this principle abiding in its accus¬
tomed habit. It is necessary, therefore, in order
that something else may subsist, that this principle
should be every where quiescent in itself, For if
not, either it will be moved prior to being moved,
and will perceive intellectually prior to intellectual
perception, or its first energy will be imperfect,
being an impulse alone. To what, therefore, can
it thus be impelled ? For either we must admit
that the energy flowing as it were from it, is ana¬
logous to the light proceeding from the sun, which
energy is every intelligible and intellectual nature,
and that this principle being established at the
summit of the intelligible world reigns over it, with¬
out separating from itself, that which is unfolded
into light from it ; or we must admit that there is
another light prior to this light, which emits its
splendor, perpetually abiding in the intelligible.
For that wdiich proceeds from this principle is not
separated from it, nor again, is the same w ith it.
Nor is it a thins; of such a kind as not to be essence*
Nor is it, as it were, blind; but it sees and know^s
itself, and is primarily gnostic. The principle it¬
self, however, as it is beyond intellect, so likewise
it is beyond knowledge. And as it is not in want
of any thing, it is not in want of knowledge ; but
knowledge subsists in the nature which is next to
this. For to know is one certain thing ; but this
principle is one without the addition of certain .
For if it was a certain one , it would not be the one
itself \ For itself is prior to a certain or some par¬
ticular thing.
XIII. Hence, it is in reality ineffable* For of
whatever you speak, you speak of as a certain
thing. But of that which is beyond all things, and
which is beyond even most venerable intellect* it is
alone true to assert that it has not any other name
[than the ineffable], and that it is not some one of
all things. Properly speaking, however, there is
no name of it, because nothing can be asserted of
it. We, however, endeavour as much as possible
to signify to ourselves something respecting it. But
when we say doubting, it has therefore no percep¬
tion nor intellection of itself, and consequently does
not know itself, we ought to consider this, that
when we assert these things, we should convert
ourselves to their contraries. For we make it to
be multitudinous, when we admit that it is know-
able and has knowledge : and by attributing intel¬
lection to it, we make it to be in want of intelli¬
gence. But if it subsists together with intellection,
intellectual perception will be superfluously added
to it. For in short, intellection appears to be the
co-sensation of the whole [of that which is intellec¬
tive] many things concurring in one and the same,
when any thing itself intellectually perceives itself,
in which also intellection properly so called con¬
sists. Each of these many, howeveiy is itself one
certain thing unattended with investigation. But
if intelligence is of that which is external, it will be
something indigent, and not properly intellectual
perception. That, however, which is perfectly
simple, and truly self-sufficient, is not in want of
any thing. But that which is secondarily self-
sufficient, being in want of itself, is in want of the
intellectual perception of itself. And that which
is indigent with respect to itself, produces from the
whole of itself the self-sufficient, becoming suffi¬
cient from all [the particulars of which it consists],
dwelling w-ith itself, and being conversant with it¬
self by intellection ; since co-sensation also, is the
sensation of a certain multitude, as its name testi¬
fies. Intelligence, likewise, which is prior to sense,
converts that w'hich is intellective, and which is
evidently multitudinous, to itself. For if it should
alone say this, I am being , it w7ould say this, as
having discovered that it is so. And it would
make this assertion reasonably. For being is mul-
titudinous ; since when it extends itself to that
which is simple, and says, I am being, it does not
meet either with itself, or with being. For it does
not speak of being as of a stone, when it speaks of
it truly ; but by one word it pronounces many
things.1 For this existence, which is truly exist¬
ence, is not spoken of as having nothing more than
a vestige of being ; since this is not being, and
therefore may be said to have the relation of an
image to its archetype. Hence, true being con¬
tains in itself multitude. What then ? will it not
intellectually perceive each of the many it contains ?
May we not say, that if you wish to assume the
solitary and alone, you will not have intellectual
perception ? Existence itself, however, is in itself
multitudinous. And though you should speak of
something else, that something else has existence.
If, however, this be the case, if there is something
which is the most simple of all things, it will not
have an intellectual perception of itself. For if it
had, [it would also have a subsistence somewhere]. a