VIII. What kind of intelligible, however, does
intellect see, and what does it perceive itself to be ?
With respect to the intelligible indeed, it is not
proper to investigate such a thing as colour or
figure in bodies : for i n tell igi hies are prior to these.
And the reason [or productive principle] in seeds
which produces these, is not these. For these
seminal principles also, are naturally invisible, and
still more so are intelligibles. There is likewise
the same nature of them and of the things that
possess them, after the same manner as the reason
which is in seed, and soul which participates of
these. The vegetable soul however does not see
the things which it possesses : for neither did it
generate these,1 but both itself, and the reasons it
contains are an image. But that from whence it
came is manifest and true, and primary. Hence,
also, it is of itself, and with itself· The vegetable
soul however, unless it pertained to, and was in
another thing, would not remain what it is. For it
belongs to an image, since it is of another thing, to
be generated in something different from itself, un¬
less it is suspended from it. Hence, neither does
* T«vra is omitted in the original,·
it see as not having sufficient light for this purpose»
And if it should see, since it is perfected in another
thing, it would behold another thing, and not itself.
Nothing, however, of this kind takes place with
pure intellect ; but vision is there, and that which is
visible is consubsistent with it. Such also is the
visible, as is the vision ; and the vision as the visi¬
ble. Who is it therefore, that will speak of the
visible such as it is ? He who sees it. But intel¬
lect sees it; since in the sensible region also, sight
being light, or rather being united to light, sees
light ; for it sees colour. There, however, sight
does not perceive through another thing, but through-
itself, because there is nothing external to it. With
another light, therefore, and not through another, it
sees another light. Hence, light sees another
light; and therefore itself beholds itself. This
light however, when it shines forth in the soul
illuminates it, i. e. it causes it to be intellectual.
And in consequence of this, the soul is in itself,
similarly with supernal light. If such, therefore, is
the vestige of light ingenerated in the soul, by con¬
ceiving supernal light1 to be of this kind, and to be
8 io e. Intelligible light.
still more beautiful and clear, you will approach
nearer to the nature of intellect and the intelligible.
For this when it shines forth, imparts to the soul a
clearer, but not a generative life. For on the com
trary it converts the soul to itself, and does not
suffer it to be dissipated, but causes it to love and
joyfully receive the splendor which is in it. Nei¬
ther does it impart a sensitive life. For this looks
to externals, but does not on this account perceive
more acutely. He, however, who receives that
light which is the fountain1 2 of truth, beholds as it
were more acutely visible objects ; but the contrary
is not true/ It remains, therefore, for the soul to
assume an intellectual life which is a vestige of the
life of intellect. For there realities subsist. But
the life and energy which are in intellect, are the
first light primarily shining in itself, and a splen¬
dor directed to itself, which at one and the same
time illuminates, and is illuminated. This also is
that which is truly intelligible, is intellect, and the
1 ΪΙηγην is omitted in the original, but is added from the version of Ficinus.
2 Instead of αλλα τουναντίον, it is necessary to read αλλ’ ου τουναντίον. The meaning of Plotinus is, that intelligible light is not seen more acutely by the perception of visible objects.
object of intellect, and is seen by itself. Nor is it
in want of another thing in order that it may see,
but for the purpose of perceiving is sufficient to
itself For that which sees is itself the thing which
is seen. This very thing also takes place with us, so
that the knowledge of it by us, is effected through it.
Or whence should we be able to speak concerning
it ? For it is a thing of such a kind as to have a
clearer apprehension of itself, and we likewise more
clearly perceive ourselves through it. Through
arguments, however, of this kind, we should elevate
our soul to it, considering also that our soul and its
life are an image ; a resemblance, and an imitation
of it ; and likewise that when it sees intellectually,
It becomes deiform, and has the form of intellect.
And if some one should inquire what the nature is
of this perfect intellect, whicli is every intellect, and
primarily knows itself, such a one should first be¬
come established in intellect, or should yield that
energy of his soul to intellect, which is employed
about things of which he retains the memory in
himself. But it will be possible for the soul thus
disposed, to show that it is able through itself as
an image to behold after a certain manner that pure
intellect, through [a life] more accurately assimi-
lated io it, as far as a part of the soul is capable of arriving at a similitude to intellect.
If
IX. It is necessary, therefore, as it seems, that
the soul in order that it may see the most divine
part of soul, ought to consider what that is which
intellect may know. Perhaps, however, this may
be effected, if you first separate body from the man,
viz. from yourself. And if after this, you separate
the soul which fashions the body, and as much as
possible take away sense, desire and anger, and
other trifles of this kind, as very much verging
to the mortal nature. For then, that which re¬
mains of the soul, is what we have denominated
the image of intellect, and which preserves some¬
thing of its light; so as to resemble the light proxi¬
mate to the sphere of the sun which emanating
from, diffuses its light about the sun. No one
therefore, will admit that light to be the sun, which
proceeds from, and shines about it. For this light
originates from the sun, and permanently surrounds
it ; but another light always proceeds from another
prior to it, until it arrives as far as to us and the
earth. All the light, however, which is about the
suri, must be admitted to be situated in something
else, in order that there may be no interval void of
body after the sun. But soul is a light derived
from, and subsisting about intellect. It also is sus¬
pended from intellect, which it surrounds, and is
not in any other thing. Nor is there any place in
which it is received ; for neither is intellect in
place. Hence, the light of the sun indeed, is in
the air ; but soul of this kind is so pure, that it is
visible of itself, so that it is seen by itself, and by
another soul similarly pure. Soul indeed, must
reason about, [in order to perceive] intellect, and
must investigate from itself what the nature of it is.
But intellect beholds itself without reasoning about
itself. For it is always present with itself. But
we are present with ourselves and with intellect
when we tend to it. For our life is divided, and
consists of many lives. But intellect is not at all
in want of another life, or of other things ; but
what it imparts, it imparts to others, and not to
itself. For it is not indigent of things inferior to
itself ; nor, since it possesses the universe, does it
confer on itself that which is less. Nor does it
contain first natures in itself as vestiges ; or rather,
it does not contain, but is itself these very things.
If, however, some one is incapable of having such
a primary soul, which perceives intellectually with
purity, let him assume a doxastic soul, and after¬
wards, from this ascend [to intellect.] But if he
cannot even assume this, let him employ sense,
bringing with itself more dilated forms : I mean
sense in itself, together with the things which it is
able to contain, and which now exists in forms»
If some one however, wishes to descend, let him
proceed to the generative power, and as far as to
its effects. Afterwards, let him from hence ascend
from the last to the last forms, or rather to those
that are the first.
X. And thus much concerning these particulars.
If, however, not 1 only forms that are produced,
are in intellect, for they are not the last of things,
[when they are considered as having an intellec-
tual subsistence ;] but their productive forms are
the first of things, whence also they are first ; — if
this be the case, it is necessary, that the producing
cause of forms should also be there, and that both
the productive cause and the forms produced should
be one. For if this is not admitted, intellect will
again be in want of something else. What then,
will that which is beyond this be again in want ?
1 ov is omitted in the original.
Or is not this, indeed, which is indigent intellect ?
Will not, therefore, that which is beyond intellect
see itself? Or must we not rather say, that this is
not at all in want of vision. But of this hereafter.
Now, however^ we shall resume what we were be¬
fore discussing. For the speculation is not about
a casual thing. Again, therefore, we must say that
this intellect is in want of the vision of itself ; or
rather that it possesses the perception of itself.
And in the first place, it sees that it is manifold.
In the next place it sees that it is the perception of
something else [i. e. of the intelligible,] and hence,
that it is necessarily perceptive of the intelligible.
It likewise sees that the essence of itself is vision.
For in consequence of there being a certain other
thing, it is necessary there should be vision ; since
if there were nothing else, vision would be in vain.
Hence, it is necessary that in intellect there should
be more things than one, in order that there may
be vision. It is also necessary that vision should
concur with the visible ; and that what is seen by
intellect should be multitude, and not entirely one.
For that which is entirely one has not any thing
about which it may energize? but being alone
and solitary, it is perfectly quiescent. For so far
as it energizes, it is another and another. For if it
were not another and another, what would it do, or
where would it proceed ? Hence it is necessary
that the nature which energizes, should either ener¬
gize about another thing, or be itself something
manifold, if it intends to energize in itself. If, how¬
ever, it does not proceed into any thing else, it will
be quiescent But when it is entirely quiescent, it
will not perceive intellectually. Hence it is neces¬
sary that the nature which is intellective, should,
when it perceives intellectually, be in two things;
and that either one of the two should be external,
or that both should be in the same thing, and that
intelligence should always subsist in difference, and
also from necessity in sameness. Those things
also which are properly the objects of intellectual
perception are the same and different. And
again, each of intelligibles co-introduces with itself
this sameness and difference. Or what will that
perceive intellectually, which does not contain in
itself another and another ? For if each of the ob¬
jects of intellectual vision is reason,1 it is a multi-
1 i. e. If it is a distributed cause. For this is what reason and reasoning signify when ascribed to intelligible, and intel¬ lectual, or divine essences.
tude. Intellect, therefore, will learn that it is it»
self a various eye, or that it consists as it were of
various colours. For if it should apply itself to
the one , and to the impartible, it would be silent.
For what would it have to say, or discuss about it?
Indeed, if it were requisite that the impartible should
entirely speak of itself, it would be necessary that
it should first say what it is not. So that thus it
would be many in order that it may be one/ [which
is absurd.] In the next place, when it says “ I
am* this thing/5 if it says this thing as something
different from itself, it asserts what is false ; but if
as an accident to itself, it says that it is a multitude.
Or it will say this, I am , I am , and /, /. What
then, if it should be alone two things, and should
say I, and this ? 5 Will it not in this case neces¬
sarily be more than two things ? For these two are
to be considered as different from each other, and
different in a certain respect Hence, there will