z The intellect which is ours when we use it, and not ours when we do not, is a partial intellect of the Mi nerval series, which is proximately participated by daemoniacal souls, and illuminates ours when we convert ourselves to it, and render our rational part intellectual. This in the Phaedrus is said to be the governor of the soul, and to be the only thing which perceives real being. But the soul also perceives it in con¬ junction with this intellect, when she is nourished by the sum¬ mit of her reasoning power and by science. This intellect, likewise, is spoken of in the Tim* us, and is denominated intel¬ ligence. For it is there said, that true being is apprehended by intelligence in conjunction with reason . Hence, as Proclus beautifully observes, “ when reason intellectually perceives eternal being, as reason indeed, it energizes transitively, but as perceiving intellectually , it energizes with simplicity, under-
pure intellect? Is it to pronounce ourselves as be¬ coming either such an intellect, or conformable to
standing each thing as simple, yet not understanding all things at once, but passing from some things to others. At the same time, however, it perceives each of the things which it sees transitively as one simple thing.”
In another part of his Commentary on the Timaeus, (p. 321.) he also admirably observes respecting this partial intellect as follows : “ What the impartible is in each partial soul (i. e. in a soul such as ours) is truly dubious. For it must not be admitted, that there is an intellect in each, and this partial. May we not say, therefore, that each partial soul is essentially suspended from a certain daemon ; and as every daemon has a daemoniacal intellect above itself, a partial soul also has this same intellect arranged as an impartible essence prior to it¬ self? Hence, the daemoniacal soul participates piimarily of this intellect ; but the partial souls that are under it, seconda» rily ; and which also causes them to be partial. For each partial soul has the partible as its peculiarity, but has the im¬ partible in common with the drnmons that are above these souls and whose peculiarity is the impartible. Hence, too, d®mons remain on high, but partial souls at a certain time descend, and divide themselves about bodies, as being more adapted to these. For if in partial souls, the genus of differ¬ ence is exuberant, which is the reason why they are not always able to energize according to all their powers, it is necessary that they should be in a greater degree adapted to a life divisi¬ ble about body, and in a greater degree be separated from an impartible essence ; by this means preserving an analogy to each of the extremes. Just as it is necessary that the most divine of souls, through their similitude to intellect, should in a greater degree be exempt from partible natures, but be more united to the impartible essences above them, and from which
it? For we are not intellect. We subsist, there¬
fore, conformable or according to it, the first rea¬
soning power being the recipient of it. For we
are sentient through sense, and we ourselves per¬
ceive sensibly. Are we therefore thus dianoetically
perceived, and do we thus dianoetically energize ?
Or shall we say that we indeed are reasoning
beings, and that we intellectually perceive the con¬
ceptions which are in dianoia ? For we are this.
But the conceptions arising from the energies of
intellect, are in such a way above us, as those
they are connascently suspended. They also have an intellec¬ tual arrangement among souls. And it is reasonable to sup¬ pose, that the intellect of each daemon, so far as it is a whole and one, is the intellect of the daemon which proximately [i. c. immediately] participates it, but that it comprehends in itself the number of souls that are under it, and the intellectual paradigms of them. Each partial soul, therefore, will have its appropriate paradigm in this intellect, and not simply the whole of this intellect, in the same manner as the daemon who is essentially the leader of these souls. Defining, therefore, more accurately, we may say, that the impartible of each par¬ tial soul, is the form that is above it, which is comprehended in the one intellect that is allotted the government of the demoniacal series, under which each partial soul is arranged. And thus both the assertions are true, viz. that the intellect alone of each of these souls ranks among things which are al¬ ways established on high, and that every partial soul is the medium of the impartible above it, and the partible nature posterior to it/'
arising frofm the energies of sense are beneath us.
And we are this peculiarity of soul, viz. the middle
of a twofold power, the worse and the better ;
sense being the worse, but intellect the better
power. And with respect to sense, indeed, it
seems that we always grant it to be ours ; for we
are always sentient ; but this is dubious with re¬
spect to intellect, because we do not always use it s
and because it is separate. But it is separate be¬
cause it does not verge to us, but we rather looking
on high, tend to it. Sense, however, is our mes¬
senger, but intellect is our king. <
IV, We also reign when we energize according
to it. But wre energize according to it in a twofold
respect; either because letters as it were, which
are as laws, are inscribed in us by intellect ; or be1-
cause we are filled with it ; or when it is present,
are able to see and be sentient of it. We also
know by such a spectacle, that we are able to learn
other things through a thing of this kind ; so that
we either learn the nature of the power which
knows such an object as this, learning by the power
1 Instead of και ore μη avro aet. in this place, it is necessary to lead, και on μη αντψ γρωμζθα a ei.
itself ; or we become a thing of this kind.1 Hence,
that which knows itself is twofold ; one indeed be¬
ing the dianoetic part of the soul, but the other be¬
ing superior to this. And, therefore, that which
knows itself has a subsistence conformable to pure
intellect itself. It also intellectually perceives it¬
self through this, not as any longer man, but as
having entirely become something else ; and hastily
withdrawing itself to that which is on high, it alone
draws upward together with itself, the more excel¬
lent part of the soul, which is alone able to be
winged with intelligence, in order that he who pos¬
sesses it may there deposit what he knew. Does
not the dianoetic part, therefore, know that it is
dianoetic, and that it receives the knowledge of
things external ; that it forms a judgment also of
the things wdiich it investigates, and this by the
rules in itself which it derives from intellect? Does
it not also know that there is something better than
itself which does not a investigate, but possesses
every thing in itself? If, therefore, it says that it
is from intellect, and is the second after, and the
* i. e. We become intellect.
a For ο ζητεί here, it is necessary to read » μη ζητεί.
image of intellect, having all things as it were writ¬
ten in itself, as there he who writes and has written,
will he, who thus knows himself, stop as far as to
these things ? Shall we, however, employing ano¬
ther power, survey intellect knowing itself, or shall
we assuming it, since it also is ours, and we are of
it, thus both know intellect, and ourselves? Or
is not the latter of these necessary, if we are to
know what that is in intellect, for itself to know it¬
self? Then, however, some one becomes himself
intellect, w hen dismissing other things pertaining to
himself, he beholds intellect through intellect, and
by it also surveys himself, just as intellect likewise
beholds itself.
V. Does intellect, therefore, by one part of itself
behold another part ? In this case, however, one
part will be that which sees, but another, that which
is seen. And this is not for the same thing to see
itself. What then ? If the whole is a thing of
such a kind as to consist of similar parts, so that
the perceiver differs in no respect from the thing
perceived, in this case, the perceiver seeing that
part which is the same with itself, will also see
itself. For the perceiver does not at all differ from
the thing perceived. Or may we not indeed in the
first place say that this division of intellect is ab¬
surd? For how is the division to be made? since
it cannot be casually. Who likewise is it that
divides it? Is it he who arranges himself in the
order of the perceiver, or he who arranges himself
as the thing perceived ? In the next place, how
will the perceiver know himself, when in perceiving
he arranges himself in the order of that which is
seen ? For that w hich sees was not supposed to be
in that which is seen. Or will not he who thus knows
himself, understand himself to be that which is per¬
ceived, but not that which perceives ? So that he will
not know all, nor the whole of himself. For that
which he knows he knows as a thing seen, hut not
as a thing that sees, and thus he wall be the per-
ceiver of another thing, and not of himself. May
he not, however, of himself add, that he is also
that which sees, in order that he may perfectly
know himself? But if he comprehends in himself
that which sees, he also at the same time compre¬
hends the things that are seen. If, therefore, in
the perceiver the things perceived are contained, if
indeed, they are impressions of the things seen, he
will not contain the things themselves. But if he
possesses the things themselves, he does not see
them through dividing himself [into the perceiver
and the thing perceived ;] but prior to the division
of himself, he both beheld and possessed them. If,
however, this be the case, it is necessary that
contemplation should be the same with the object
of contemplation, and intellect the same with the
intelligible. For if it is not the same, there will
not be truth. For unless this is admitted, he who
is said to possess beings, will only possess an im-
pression different from beings, which is not truth.
For truth ought not to be of another thing, but that
which it says, that also it should be. Thus, there¬
fore, intellect, the intelligible, and being are one ;
and this is the first being, and the first intellect,
possessing beings ; or rather, it is the same with
beings. If, however, intelligence and the intelli¬
gible are one, how on this account does that which
is intellective intellectually perceive itself? For
intelligence, indeed, as it were, comprehends the
intelligible, or is the same with it Intellect, how¬
ever, which intellectually perceives itself, is not yet
manifest. But intelligence and the intelligible are
the same ; for the intelligible is a certain energy,
since it is neither power, nor void of life, nor again
is its life adventitious, nor its intellection in some¬ thing different from itself, as in a stone, or a cer¬ tain inanimate thing, and it is also the first essence. If, therefore, it is energy, and the first energy, in¬ telligence likewise will be most beautiful, and will be essential intelligence. For intelligence of this kind is most true, is the first, and subsists prima¬ rily, and will therefore be the first intellect. For this intellect is not in capacity, nor is this one thing, but intelligence another; since thus again, the essential of it would be in capacity. If, there¬ fore, it is energy, and the essence of it is energy, it will be one and the same with energy. Since, however, being and the intelligible are one and the same with energy, all will be at the same time one, viz. intellect, intelligence, and the intelligible. If, therefore, the intelligence of it is the intelligible, but it is the intelligible, hence it will itself intellec¬ tually perceive itself. For it will perceive itself by intelligence, which it is, and will understand the intelligible which also it is. According to each of these, therefore, it will intellectually perceive itself, both so far as it is intelligence, and so far as it is the intelligible, and will understand by intelligence, which it is,
VI. Reason, therefore, demonstrates that there
is something which properly and principally itself
intellectually perceives itself. This however, when
it is in soul, intellectually sees in one way, but in
intellect more principally. For soul, indeed, knows
itself, that it is the progeny of another thing ; but
intellect knows that it is from itself, and what its
nature is, and who it is ; and this by a natural con¬
version to itself. For beholding beings it beholds
itself and beholding is in energy ; and the energy
is itself. For intellect and intelligence are one.
With the whole of itself also it perceives the whole,
and not a part by a part. Does, therefore, reason
demonstrate it to be a thing of such a kind as to
have an energy which is merely an object of belief ;
or is it indeed necessary that it should be such as
it is, but that it should not have persuasion ? For
necessity indeed is in intellect , but persuasion in
soul . Hence we investigate as it seems, rather for
the purpose of persuading ourselves, than to behold
truth in a pure intellect. For as long as we con¬
tinued on high, and adhered to th® mature of intel¬
lect we were satisfied, energized intellectually, and
contemplated, collecting all things into one. For
it was intellect that then energized, and spoke of
Plot. % D
itself. But soul was quiet, yielding to the energy
of intellect. When, however, we descended hither,
we were desirous of producing persuasion in the
soul, wishing to behold the archetype in an image.
Perhaps, therefore, it is requisite to teach our soul,
how its intellect once beheld itself ; and to teach
that part of the soul this, which is in a certain re¬
spect intellectual, and which we assume to be dia-
noetic ; by this appellation latently signifying, that
it is a certain intellect, or that it is a power through
intellect, and that it derives its subsistence from
intellect. It is fit, therefore, that this part should
know, that it also knows such things as it sees, and
such things as it says. And if it were the things
which it says, it would after this manner know itself.
Since, however, the things which it sees are present
with, or are supernally imparted to it from that re»
gion whence it also originates, it happens to this
part likewise since it is reason, and receives things
allied to itself, that by an adaptation of the vesti-
gies which it contains, it is enabled to know itself.
It may, therefore, transfer the image to true intel¬
lect which is the same with the things that are truly
the objects of intellectual perception, and which
have a real and primary subsistence. For it is not
possible that such an intellect as this should be ex-
ternal to itself. Hence, if it is in and with itself,
and is [truly] that which it is, it is intellect. But
intellect can never be deprived of intellect; so that
the knowledge of itself is necessarily present with
it; and this because it is in itself, and its employ¬
ment and essence consist in being intellect alone.
For this is not a practical intellect, as looking to
that which pertains to external action, and which
in consequence of not abiding in itself, is a certain
knowledge of externals. There is, however, no
necessity if intellect is practic, that it should know
itself ; but this is the province of that intellect
which is not engaged in practical affairs. For ap¬
petite is not in pure intellect ; but this being ab¬
sent, the consequent conversion to itself, not only
demonstrates that the knowledge of itself is reason¬
able, but also necessary. For otherwise what
would be the life of it, when liberated from action,
and established in intellect ?
VII. It may however, be said, that pure intel¬
lect beholds deity. But if it is acknowledged that
it knows God, he who grants this, must also neces¬
sarily admit that it knows itself For such things
as it possesses from deity it knows, and also what
he imparts, and what he is able to impart. But
learning and knowing these things, it will likewise
through this know itself. For divinity is one of the
things imparted, or rather he is all that is imparted.
If, therefore, intellect also knows him, and learns
the powers that he possesses, it will likewise know
itself to be generated from thence ; and that it de¬
rives from him all that it is able to receive. If,
however, it is unable to see him clearly, since to
see is perhaps the very thing that is seen, on this
account especially that which remains to it, will be
to see and know itself, if to see is to be the very
thing itself which is seen. For what else can we
confer upon it? By Jupiter, quiet. The quiet of
intellect however, is not mental alienation, but is
the tranquil energy of intellect, withdrawing itself
from other things ; since to other natures also that
are at rest from other employments, their own
proper energy remains ; and especially to those
things whose existence is not in capacity, but in
energy. Where, therefore, existence is energy, and
there is nothing else to which energy is directed,
there energy is directed to itself. Hence intellect
perceiving itself, is thus with itself, and has its
energy directed to itself. For if something else is
suspended from it, that something else is in itself,
because its energy is directed to itself. For it is
necessary that it should first be in itself, and after¬
wards that its energy should be directed to some¬
thing else, or that something else should proceed
from it, assimilated to it : just as fire, which is first
in itself, and has the energy of fire, and thus is ena¬
bled to produce the vestigie of itself in something
else. For again, intellect indeed, is energy in it¬
self; but soul is so in proportion as it tends as it
were internally to its own intellect. But so far as
it departs from intellect, so far it tends to that
which is external. And partly indeed, it is assi¬
milated to that from whence it came ; but partly,
though it becomes dissimilar, yet here also it retains
a similitude to it, whether it acts, or produces.
For when it acts, at the same time it contemplates ;
and when it produces, it produces forms, which are
as it were intellections derived from first intelligi-
bles. Hence, all things are vestigies of intelligence
and intellect, proceeding conformably to their
archetype ; those that are near to it, imitating it
in a greater degree; but such things as are last
preserving only an obscure image of it.