separated or cut off from that which is prior to itself. Hence, also, the soul of man is seen to
proceed as far as to plants. For after a certain
manner it proceeds into them, because that which
is in plants is derived from it. Nevertheless, the
whole of the human soul is not in plants, but it is
thus ingenerated in plants, because it so far proceeds
into an inferior nature, having made another hypo»
stasis by its progression into and propensity to that
which is subordinate ; since the soul which is prior
to this, being suspended from intellect, permits in¬
tellect to abide in itself.
II. The procession, therefore, of these is from
the principle to the extremity, each thing at the
same time being always left in its proper seat. But
that which is generated receives another order,
which is subordinate. Nevertheless, each thing
becomes the same with that which it follows, as
long as it follows it. When, therefore, soul [i. e.
the human soul] is ingenerated in a plant, there is
one part, viz. the part which is in the plant, which
is most rash and insane ; and as far as to this soul
‘ proceeds. But when the soul is in a brute,1 it is
1 “ When human souls/' says Sallust, in his golden treatise On the Gods and the World, u transmigrate into irrational animals, they follow externally, in the same manner as our
led by the sentient power, which then has dominion.
When, however, it is ingenerated in man, then in
short, either the motion is in the rational nature, or
from intellect, in consequence of the soul having
its proper intellect, and deriving from itself the
power of intellection, or of being moved* Again,
therefore, returning [whence we digressed], when
some one cuts off either the germinations, or cer¬
tain branches of a plant, w hither does the soul that
is in the plant depart ? Shall we say, to that from
w hence it came ? For it is not distant by place
from its source. It is, therefore, in its principle*
But if you cut off or burn the root, where is the
life which was in the root ? In soul, not proceeding
to another place, but it may also be in the same
place. It will, however, be in another place, if it
should run back. But if not, it will be in another
vegetable nature. For it is not contracted into a
narrow space. But if it should run back, it will
be in the power which is prior to it. Where, how¬
ever, is this powrer situated ? In the power prior to
presiding dcemons attend us in their beneficent operations. For the rational part never becomes the soul of the irrational na¬ ture.” This doctrine, which originated from Syrianus and Proclus, was universally adopted by all the succeeding Pla- tonists>
itself. And this again in another, as far as to in¬
tellect. But not in place. For no one o.f these
was in place. And much less is intellect in place;
so that neither is soul. Hence, soul being no
where, in that which is no where it is thus also
every where. But if soul proceeding to the super¬
nal realms, should stop in its progression in that
which is between, before it has entirely arrived at
the summit, it will have a middle life, and will be
established in that part of itself. Intellect, how¬
ever, is all these, and yet it is not. It is, indeed,
because they are from it ; and again, it is not, be¬
cause abiding in itself, it gave them to exist
Hence, there is an abundant life in the universe,
which is as it were extended into length, and has
each of its parts in a successive order. The whole,
however, is in continuity with itself, but the parts
are distinguished by a proper difference, that which
is prior not being destroyed in that which is pos¬
terior. What then is the soul which is ingenerated
in plants ? And does it generate nothing else than
that in which it is ? How this is effected, however,
must be considered by us, assuming for this pur¬
pose another principle*
Plot .
Ok
GNOSTIC HYPOSTASES,
THAT WHICH IS BEYOND THEM.
I. Is it therefore necessary, that intellect should
be in itself various, in order that by one of the
things contained in itself, having surveyed the rest,
it may be thus said to understand itself, as if it
would not be able to be converted to, and have an
intellectual perception of itself, if it was entirely
simple ? Or is it also possible for that which is not
a composite, to have the intellection of itself? For
that which is said to perceive itself intellectually
because it is a composite, and because by one of
the things in itself it understands the rest, just as if
by sense we should apprehend the form * of our-
s The word used here by Plotinus is μορφή , which, as we
have elsewhere observed, pertains to the colour, figure, and
magnitude of superficies.
selves, and the other nature of the body, will not
have a truly intellectual perception of itself. For
in a thing of this kind, the whole will not be known,
unless that which understands other things that are
with itself, understands also itself ; since otherwise
we shall not have the object of investigation, viz*
that which perceives itself, but we shall have one
thing perceiving another* It is necessary, there¬
fore, to admit that the intellectual perception of
itself is the province of a simple nature, and how
this is effected must, if possible, be considered ; or
we must abandon the opinion that there is some¬
thing which truly intellectually perceives itself. To
abandon, however, this opinion is not easy, since
the rejection of it is attended with many absurdi¬
ties. For if we do not admit that to assign this
power to the soul is not very absurd, yet not to
ascribe it to the nature of intellect is perfectly ab¬
surd ; viz. if we grant that it has indeed a know¬
ledge of other things, but has no knowledge and
science of itself. For sense, and not intellect, will
have an apprehension of things external ; and if
you are willing to grant it, this will also be the case
with the dianoetic power and opinion. But whe¬
ther intellect has a knowledge of these or not, it is
fit to consider. It is evident, indeed, that intellect
knows such things as are intelligible. Does it,
therefore, know these alone, or also itself that
knows these ? And does it thus far know itself, that
it knows these alone, but does not know what itself
is ? Hence, it will perceive that it knows some
things belonging to itself, but it will not know what
itself is ; or it will both know the things which are
its own, and itself. And what the mode of this
knowledge is, and how far it extends, must be con»
sidered.
II. In the first place, however, we must inquire
concerning the soul, whether the knowledge of it*
self is to be attributed to it, what the gnostic power
of it is, and how it subsists. With respect to the
sensitive power, therefore, of the soul, we must
immediately say that its energy is directed to ex¬
ternals alone. For though there is a co-sensation
of things which inwardly take place in the body,
yet here the apprehension is of things which are
external to sense : for then there is a sensation of
the passions which are in the body. But the power
in the soul which reasons, and which forms a judg¬
ment of the phantasms adjacent from sense, collects
and divides them, surveys the impressions as it
were which are derived from intellect, and pos¬
sesses about these the same power [as intellect].
It likewise assumes intelligence, as knowing and
adapting new and recently acceding impressions to
those in itself which are ancient. And this know¬
ledge and adaptation, we say, are the reminiscences
of the soul. The intellect of the soul, also, stops
as far as this in its power. [It must be investi¬
gated, therefore, whether the reasoning power
also,1] is converted to, and knows itself, or whether
this must be referred to intellect. For if we attri¬
bute a knowledge of itself to this part, we must
admit that it is intellect ; and in this case, we must
investigate in what it differs from a superior intel¬
lect. But if we do not grant that it has a know-
ledge of itself, by a reasoning process we must pro¬
ceed to the intellect which is superior, and we must
consider what it is for this to know itself. And if
we grant that this is also the province of the
reasoning power, we must investigate what the dif-
* It appears from the version of Ficinus, that it is necessary here after the word Ιυναμει in the original, to supply and read as follows: Ζητητεον apa , et το λογιζομενον καί -as eavror.
ferc-nce is between the two in self-knowledge. For
if there is no difference, then this our intellect is
the highest. This dianoetic part, therefore, of the
soul, is it converted to itself, or not ? Or has it
[only] a knowledge of the impressions which it re¬
ceives both from intellect and sense ? And in the
first place, it must be investigated how it possesses
this knowledge.
III. For sense, indeed, sees a man, and trans¬
mits the figure of him to the dianoetic part. But
what does this part say ? Perhaps it does not yet
say any thing, but only knows that it is a man, and
there stops. Unless, indeed, it should consider
with itself, who this is, if it happens that it has be¬
fore met with him, and should say, employing
memory for this purpose, that it is Socrates. If,
however, it should also evolve the form of the man,
it will then distribute into parts those things which
it received from the imagination. And if it should
also say, Is he a good man ? it will make this
inquiry from the information which it derived
through sense. But that which it says on this
occasion, it will now possess from itself, containing
in itself a role by which it forms a judgment of
good. How then does it contain the good in it¬
self? May we not say, so far as it is boniform, and
is corroborated to the perception of a thing of this
kind, in consequence of intellect shining upon it?
For the pure part of the soul is this, and receives
the supervening vestiges of intellect. Why, how¬
ever, is not this intellect, but the rest beginning
from the sensitive power is soul ? May we not say,
because it is necessary that soul should consist in
the discursive energies of reason ? But all these^
are the works of the reasoning power. Why, how¬
ever, do we not grant to this part the power of
intellectually perceiving itself, and thus become
liberated from doubt ? Is it because we assign to
it the office of considering, and being busily em¬
ployed about externals ; but we conceive it to be
the province of intellect, to survey both itself, and
the forms which it contains ? If, however, some
one should say, what therefore prevents this part
from considering things pertaining to itself, by ano¬
ther power ? He who says this, does not investigate
either the dianoetic or reasoning power, but assumes
a pure intellect. What then prevents a pure intel¬
lect from existing in the soul ? We reply, nothing
prevents this. But farther still, it is necessary to
inquire, whether this pure intellect is something
belonging to soul? 1 We reply, it does not belong
to the soul, and yet it is our intellect, being dif¬
ferent from the dianoetic power, and proceeding on
its summit. At the same time, however, it is ours,
though we must not con-numerate it with the parts
of the soul. Or we may say, that it is ours, and
yet not ours. Hence we use, and do not use it ;
but we always employ the dianoetic power. And
it is ours indeed, when we use it, but not ours
when we do not use it .* But what is it to use a
* Both the sense of this passage, and the version of Ficinus require that instead of αλλ’ eri bei Xeyeiv, ψυχής τουτο3 we should read, aXX' ert bei Xeyeiv, ei tl ψυχής τούτο ;