1 i. e. The irrational, which is the image of the rational soul, is in the obscurity of the sensible life.
soul, indeed, which is attracted by body, will recol¬
lect every thing which the man did or suffered [in
the present life]. In the course of time, however,
after death, the recollection of other things also
from former lives will arise, so that some of these
will be dismissed and despised. For the soul be¬
coming in a greater degree purified from the body,
will recollect those things, the remembrance of
which she had lost in the present life. But wrhen
she becomes situated in another body, she will then
indeed departing [from an intellectual] speak of the
concerns of an external life. She will, likewise,
speak of the things w'hich she has just left, and also
of many things pertaining to a superior life. But
as many adventitious circumstances will arise in
the course of time, she will always be oppressed
with oblivion. What, however, will the soul which
becomes alone remember ? Or should we not first
consider to what power of the soul remembrance
belongs ?
XXVIII. Do we, therefore, remember through
the powers by wdiich we perceive sensibly and
learn ? Or do we remember the objects of desire
through the powTer by which we desire, and the
objects of anger through the irascible power? For
it may be said, that it is not one thing which en¬
joys, and another which remembers what that thing
enjoyed. The epithymetic power, therefore, is
again moved through memory to the objects which
it once enjoyed, when they present themselves to
its view. For why is it not moved by another
object, or not after the same manner ? What hin¬
ders us, therefore, from granting to it a sensation
of things of this kind? And why may we not,
therefore, attribute desire to the sensitive power,
and this in every respect, so that every thing may
be named according to that which predominates ?
Or shall we say, that we ascribe sense to each
thing in a different manner ? Thus, for instance, it
is sight indeed that perceives, and not the power
which desires. But the power which desires is
moved by sense, as it were in succession ; yet not
in such a way as that sense can tell what the
quality is of the desire, but so as to suffer without
perceiving what it is. Thus also with respect to
anger, sight sees the author of the injury, but
anger rises in opposition to the injurer ; just as
when a shepherd sees a wolf among his flock, the
dog, though lie does not himself see the wolf, yet is
Ss9
excited by impulse, or by the noise [which this cir¬
cumstance produces]. For the power, indeed,
which desires, possesses in itself a vestige of what
it formerly enjoyed, not as memory, but as a dis¬
position and passion. But it is another thing which
perceives the enjoyment, and possesses in itself the
remembrance of what has been done. That it is
so, however, this is an argument, that memory
frequently does not know what the things are of
which desire participates, though they still reside
in it.
XXIX. Shall we, therefore, ascribe memory
to the sensitive power, and will the sensitive power
be the same thing with us as that which remem¬
bers ? If, however, the image of the soul remenir
bers, as we have said, the sensitive power will be
twOfold. And if the sensitive power does not re¬
member, but something else, this something else
will have the power of remembering in a twofold
respect. Farther still, if the sensitive power is
capable of apprehending disciplines, it will also
apprehend the objects of the dianoetic power, [i. e.
the discursive power of reason], or something else
will apprehend the objects of each of these. Shalt
we, therefore, by admitting that the power which
apprehends is common, attribute to it the remem¬
brance of both these ? If, however, one and the
same thing apprehended sensibles and intelligibles,
something to the purpose would perhaps be
asserted. But if it is divided in a twofold respect,
there will nevertheless be two things. And if we
ascribe both to each soul, four things will be pro¬
duced. In short, what necessity is there that we
should remember through the same power by which
we perceive, and that both sensible perception and
recollection should be effected by the same pow'er,
and also that we should remember dianoetic ob¬
jects through the power by w?hich we energize dia=
noetically ? For the same persons do not excel in
dianoetically energizing and remembering, and
those whose sensible perceptions are equally acute,
do not remember equalty. Some also excel in
sensible perception, but others in memory whose
sensations are not acute. Again, however, if each
is different, it will be requisite that the power also
should be different which remembers what sense
had before perceived, and it will be necessary to
perceive that which it is requisite to remember.
Or may wo not say that nothing hinders a sensible
perception from being a phantasm to him who re»
members, and that memory and retention may
belong to the power of the phantasy, which is some¬
thing different from memory. For it is this power
in w hich sense ends ; and when sense no longer
energizes, the sensible spectacle is present with the
phantastic power. If, therefore, the imagination
of an absent object is present with this, it will now
remember it. And if it remains, indeed, but for a
little time, the remembrance will be little ; but if
for a long time the remembrance will be greater*
in consequence of this povrer being stronger, so
that not being easily perverted, it will not be com¬
pelled to lose its remembrance. Memory, there¬
fore, belongs to the power of the phantasy, and to
remember will consist of things of this kind. We
say, however, that souls are differently disposed
with respect to memory, either through differently
possessing the powers of it, or by frequently or not
frequently exercising it ; or by corporeal tempera¬
ments being or not being inherent, and producing
or not producing a change in quality, and causing
as it were perturbation. These things, however,
must be elsewdiere discussed.
XXX, What, however, shall we say of the
conceptions of the dianoetic power? Does the
phantastic power pertain also to these ? If, indeed,
imagination followed every intellection, perhaps this
imagination remaining, and being as it were an
image of the dianoetic conception, there will thus
be a remembrance of the thing known ; but if not,
something else must be investigated. Perhaps,
however, memory will be a reception into the phan¬
tastic power of reason following the conception.
For a conception is impartible, and not yet having
proceeded as it were outwardly, it latently remains
within. But reason evolving and educing into the
phantastic power from each conception, exhibits
the conception as it were in a mirror : and thus
the apprehension, permanency, and remembrance
of it are effected. Hence, since the soul is always
moved to intelligence, when it perceives intellec·
tually, then the apprehension of what it perceives
is produced in us. For intelligence is one thing,
and the apprehension of intelligence another. And
we always indeed perceive intellectually, but we
do not always apprehend that we do so. This,
however, is because the recipient not only receives
intellections, but also the senses, and this alter-
XXXI. If, however, memory pertains to the
phantastic power, but each soul is said to remem¬
ber, there will be two powers of the phantasy.
The two souls, therefore, being separate, each will
possess a phantastic power. But since they are
with us in the same thing, how will they be two,
and in which of them will memory be ingenerated ?
For if in both, there will always be twofold imagi¬
nations. For it must not be said, that the remem¬
brance of intelligihles pertains to the one, but of
sensibles to the other ; since thus there will in every
respect be two animals, having nothing in common
with each other. If, therefore, there is memory in
both what will be the difference ? In the next
place, what should hinder us from knowing this ?
Shall we say that we are then ignorant of the dif¬
ference, when the one powder is in "symphony with
the other ; the phantastic powers not being sepa¬
rate, but that which is the more excellent of the
two prevailing, one phantasm is produced, since
the one follows the other like a shadow, and is
subservient to it like a less to a greater light.
When, however, there is a contest and dissonance
between the two, then the one shines forth through
itself ; but it is concealed in the other, because in
short that there are two souls is concealed from us»
For both coalesce in one, and the one is diffused
but not the other* The one, therefore, sees all
things, and possesses some things indeed, proceed¬
ing from it, but dismisses others, as pertaining to
the other power. Just as when we have some¬
times conversed with persons of a viler character,
and afterwards betake ourselves to those who are
more worthy, we remember but little of our con¬
versation with the former, but much of it with the
latter.
XXXII. What, however, ought we to say con¬
cerning the remembrance of friends, and children,
and wives ; and also of our country, and other
things which it is not absurd to recollect ? Shall
we say that the image of the soul will remember
each of these accompanied with passion, but that
the superior soul will recollect these impassively?
For passion, perhaps, was from the first in this
image. And such of the passions as are of an
elegant nature, are in the worthy [i. e. the superior]
soul* so far as it communicates with the other. It
is fit, however, that the inferior soul should also
desire the recollection of the energies of the other
soul, and especially when it has likewise become
itself elegant and worthy. But this inferior soul
may from the first become better, in consequence
of being disciplined by the more excellent soul.
The latter, however, will gladly resign to oblivion
the concerns of the former. For it may happen,
that the latter soul being worthy, the former which
is of an inferior nature, may be forcibly restrained
by the superior soul. And in proportion as this
more excellent soul hastens to the intelligible, it
will forget the concerns of this world, unless the
whole of its life here, has been such as to preserve
the remembrance alone of things of the most
exalted nature. For here also it is beautiful to
abandon human pursuits : [and this is the work of
perfect virtue *]. A forgetfulness, therefore, of
such pursuits, is necessary in another life. Hence,
he who says that the worthy soul is oblivious, will
in such a way as we have mentioned speak rightly.
1 It appears from the version of Ficinus* that the words και τοντο τψ reXeias aper?j$ epyor, are wanting in the original in this place.
f or it will fly from the many, and will collect mul¬
titude into one, dismissing that which is infinite.
For thus it will not associate with multitude, but
expelling it will live bv itself : since here also,
when it wishes to be in the intelligible world, while
an inhabitant of earth, it dismisses all other con¬
cerns. Hence, when it is there, it remembers but
few things of a terrestrial nature ; but it remem¬
bers more of them when it is in the heavens. And
Hercules, indeed, [when in Hades] may speak of
his own fortitude ; but in the intelligible world, he
will consider these things as trifling, being trans¬
ferred into a more sacred place, and strenuously
engaging even above himself, in those contests in
which the wise wish to engage.
Ox the
Generation and Order of Things
After
The First·
I. The one is all things, and yet no one of alt
For the principle of all is not all things ; but the
one is all, because all things run as it were into it,
or rather do not as yet exist, but will be. How,
therefore, [does multitude proceed] from the one
which is simple, and in which no variety, nor any
duplicity present themselves to the view ? Is it be¬
cause there was nothing in it, on this account all
things are from it? Hence, in order that being
might exist, the one is not being, but being is the
progeny of it, and as it were its first-born. For
the one being perfect, in consequence of not seeking
after, or possessing, or being in want of any thing,
it becomes as it were overflowing, and the super¬
plenitude of it produces something else. That,
however, which is generated from it is converted
to it, and is filled, and was generated looking to it.
But this is intellect. And the permanency indeed
of it about the one , produced being ; but its vision
of the one , intellect. When, therefore, it is esta¬
blished about the one , in order that it may see it,
then it becomes at once intellect and being. Hence,
being in the same manner as the one produces
things similar to itself, through an effusion of abun¬
dant power. Its offspring also has the form of it,
in the same manner as prior to this it likewise
flowed forth from the one . And this energy from
essence is soul, w’hich w^as generated from intellect
permanently abiding. For intellect also was gene¬
rated, that which is prior to it abiding. Soul, how¬
ever, does not produce abiding, but being moved
generates an image of itself. Soul, therefore, look¬
ing thither whence it was generated, is filled. But
proceeding into another and contrary motion, it
generates an image of itself, viz. sense, and the
nature which is in plants. Nothing, however, is