XXIII. Since the animated body is illuminated
by the soul, a different part of the body differently
participates of it ; and the power fitted to effect a
certain work, is denominated according to the apti¬
tude of the organ to the work. Thus the power in
the eves is denominated visive, in the ears acoustic,
in the tongue gustic, and in the nostrils olfactive ;
but we say that the power of the touch is present
with the whole body. For in order to effect this
perception, the whole body is present as an instru¬
ment with the soul. Since, however, the instru¬
ments of the touch are in the nerves first, which
\
also have the power of moving the animal, this
power imparts itself from the nerves. But the
nerves beginning from the brain, which is the prin¬
ciple of sense and impulse, and in short of the
whole animal, as they are derived from hence to
the other parts of the body, that which uses these
instruments is considered as subsisting there where
the principles of the instruments subsist. It is
better, however, to say, that the principle of the
energy of the power is there ; for from whence the
instrument is to be moved, there it is requisite that
the power of the artificer, which is adapted to the
instrument, should be as it were firmly fixed ; or
rather not the power, since power is every where.
But the principle of energy 5s there, where the
principle of the instrument exists. Since, there¬
fore, the power of sensible perception, and the
power of impulse, pertain to the sensitive soul, and
the nature of the phantasy, which as being nearer
to that which is beneath, have reason situated
above them ; — this being the case, where this prin¬
ciple is in the supreme part, there reason w?as
placed by the ancients in the summit of the whole
animal, viz. in the head ; not as being [immediately]
situated in the brain, but in this sensitive power,
through which [as a medium] reason is established
in the brain. For it is requisite to assign the sen¬
sitive power to the body, and to that which is espe¬
cially the recipient of the energy of the body. But
it is necessary that the form of the soul which is
able to receive apprehensions from reason, should
communicate with reason which has no communi¬
cation with the body. For the sensitive power is
in a certain respect judicial ; and the phantastic
power is as it were intellectual. Impulse and
appetite also follow the phantasy and reason.
Hence the reasoning power is there, not as in place,
but because that w?hich is [locally] there, enjoys
this pow?er [by participation]. But how that which
Is there subsists, has been shown in the sensitive
power. Since, however, the vegetative, and also
the augmentative and nutritive powers never fail,
but each of them nourishes through the blood, and
the blood which nourishes is in the veins, but the
principle of the veins and the blood is in the liver,
in which these powers are firmly fixed ; — this being
the case, the ancients assigned this place to a
portion of the epithymetic soul. For that which
generates, nourishes, and increases, must neces¬
sarily desire these [viz* the veins and blood]. But
as attenuated, light, acute, and pure blood, is an
instrument adapted to anger, the fountain of the
blood, the heart, was considered by the ancients as
a fit habitation for anger. For here a blood of this
kind is secreted, which is adapted to the efferves¬
cence of anger.
XXIV. Souls, however, still having a body
undergo corporeal punishments. But where does
the soul dwell on its departure from body ? It will
not indeed be here, where there is not any thing to
receive it. For it is not able to abide in that which
Is not naturally adapted to receive it, unless the
recipient has something of an unwise and insane
nature which attracts the soul to it. But the soul
is in such a recipient as this, if it has something
besides itself ; and it there follows where this reci¬
pient is naturally adapted to be and to be generated.
Since, however, each place is ample, it is necessary
that a difference should be produced both from the
disposition of the soul, and the justice which ha?
dominion in things. For no one can ever fly from
the punishment which it becomes him to suffer for
unjust deeds. For the divine law is inevitable,
containing at once in itself the power of accom¬
plishing what it has now judged to be fit. In the
mean time, he who suffers is ignorantly led to that
which it is proper he should suffer, being every
where in his wanderings conducted in a circuitous
course 1 by an unstable motion, but at length, like
one wearied by the resistance which he has made,
falling into a place adapted to him, he undergoes
an involuntary suffering through a voluntary mo¬
tion. In the law, however, it is promulgated how
much and how long it is necessary to suffer. And
again, at the same time a remission of punishment
1 Instead of αιωρονμενος in this place, it appears from the version of Ficinus, that we should read xeptayouevor. And indeed, the sense of the passage requires this emendation.
concurs with the power of flying from those places
[in which the punishment is inflicted] through a
power of harmony by which all things are detained.
But to souls that have bodies, it also pertains to
undergo corporeal punishments. Souls, however,
that are pure, and attract nothing whatever to
themselves of body, are also necessarily unconfined
by the body. If \ therefore , they are not at all in
body , for neither ham they a body , they are there
where essence and beings and that which is divine ,
subsist, viz . in God . Hence, a soul of this kind
will he here, and together with these, and in deity.
If, however, you still inquire where it will be, you
must also inquire where they are. But in explor¬
ing this, do not explore it with the eyes, nor as if
you were investigating bodies.
XXV. With respeet to memory, it must be
considered whether souls on departing from these
places recollect [what happened to them on the
earth] ; or whether this is the case with some souls,
but not with others ; and likewise, whether they
have a recollection of all things, or of certain things
only. And in a similar manner, it deserves to be,
investigated whether they always remember, or for
a certain time near to their departure from hence.
If, however, we intend to investigate these things
rightly, what that is which remembers must be first
assumed. I do not mean that we must inquire
what memory is, but what that is in which it is
naturally adapted to subsist. For we have else¬
where shown what memory * is, and it has been
frequently mentioned ; but it must now be more
accurately assumed what that is which is naturally
adapted to remember. If, therefore, the power of
memory is something adventitious, or something
belonging to discipline or passion, remembrance
will not happen to beings which are impassive and
superior to time. Hence, memory must not be
placed in deity, or in being, or intellect. For to
these nothing accedes ; nor does time, but eternity
subsist about being. Nor is either temporal prio^
rity or that which is successive there ; but each of
these always subsists as it is, in sameness, receiving
no mutation. How, therefore, can that which is in
the same and the similar be in want of memory ?
For it is not at all disposed in futurity in a way
1 Memory is summarily, stability of knowledge ; just as
immortality is stability of life, and eternity is stability of
being.
different from what it was before ; nor has it one
intelligence after another, in order that it may
abide in another, or that it may remember another
intellection which it formerly possessed. But what
prevents it from knowing the mutations of other
things, without being changed itself, such as the
periods of the world ? Shall we say it is because it
intellectually perceives one thing as prior, but ano¬
ther as posterior which is consequent to the muta¬
tions of that which is convolved ? Besides, remem¬
brance is different from intellectual perception :
and it must not be said that the intellection of it¬
self is recollection. For it does not proceed in its
energy for the purpose of detaining it, lest it should
depart ; for thus it might fear lest the essence of
itself should depart from itself. Neither, there¬
fore, must it be said that soul remembers after the
same manner, as we say it recollects those things
which it innately possesses. But having descended
hither, it possesses these innate conceptions, yet
does not [always] energize according to them, and
especially when it has profoundly descended into
body. The ancients, however, appear to have
considered memory and reminiscence to be the
same thing as for the soul to energize according to
those things which it now possesses ; so that this
is another species of memory. Hence, time is not
present with memory thus denominated. Perhaps,
however, these things are considered by us lightly,
and not accurately. For perhaps it may be doubted,
whether memory and reminiscence belong to such
a soul as this [which we are now considering] or
whether they do not rather pertain to another more
obscure soul, or to this animal which is a compo¬
site of soul and body. And if they belong to
another soul, it may also be doubted when and
how it received what it recollects ; and a similar
doubt will arise if they are said to pertain to the
composite of soul and body. Hence, that must be
investigated which was the subject of our inquiry
from the first, what that is which possesses in us
the power of remembering. And if, indeed, it is
the soul which remembers, it must be considered
what part or power of the soul it is ; but if it is
the sentient power, as to some it has appeared to
be, what the mode is of its subsistence must be
investigated, and what ought to be called the ani-
maL And again, whether it is proper to admit
that the same thing apprehends both sensibles and
intelligibles, or that one thing perceives the former* but another the latter of these.
XXYI. If, therefore, the animal is both at one
and the same time in the senses according to
energy, it is also necessary that sensible perception
should be a thing of this kind. Hence* likewise*
it is said to be common, in the same manner as to
bore with an auger and to weave ; in order that
soul may subsist conformably to the artificer, in
* sensible perception, but the body according to the
instrument ; the body indeed suffering and being
ministrant, but the soul receiving the impression of
the body* or that which is effected through the
body. Or the soul must receive the judgment
arising from the passion of the body ; where, in¬
deed, sense may thus be said to be the common
work, but memory will not be compelled to pertain
to that which is common, the soul now receiving
the impression, and either preserving or ejecting it ;
unless some one should infer that remembrance
also is something common, because we acquire a
good memory, and likewise beeome forgetful from
the temperaments of the body. It may also be
said, that the body either impedes or does not im¬
pede reminiscence, but that remembrance will
nevertheless be the province of the soul. And
with respect to disciplines, how will the remem¬
brance of these pertain to that which is common
[or to the animal which is the composite of soul
and body], and not rather belong to the soul ? But
if the animal is both at once in such a way that
another thing is produced from both, in the first
place indeed, it will be absurd to say that the
animal is neither body nor soul. For both being
changed, the animal will not be something different
from both ; nor again, both being mingled, will
the soul be in the animal in capacity only ; though
even in this case, remembrance will nevertheless
belong to the soul. Just as in the mixture of
honey with wine, if there is still something of
sweetness in it, this will be derived from the honey.
What then, if it should be said that the soul indeed
herself remember^, yet in consequence of being in
the body, and therefore not being pure, but as it
were affected with quality, she is able to impress
in the body the types of sensibles, and to establish
as it were a seat in it, for the purpose of receiving
forms, and preventing them from gliding away?
To this we reply, in the first place indeed, these
types are not magnitudes ; nor in the second place,
are they like impressions from a seal, or resistances,
or figurations, because neither is there any impul¬
sion there, nor does the same thing take place as in
wax ; but the mode even in sensibles resembles
that of intellection. In intellection, however, what
resistance can there be ? Or what need is there of
body, or corporeal quality in intellectual energy ?
Moreover, it is necessary that soul should remem¬
ber its own motions, such as its tendencies to the
objects of its desire, and to things which it has not
obtained, and which have not arrived at the body.
For how could the body speak of things which
have not arrived to it ? Or how can the soul recol¬
lect in conjunction with body, that which the body
is not at all naturally adapted to know? But it
must be said, indeed, that some things end in the
soul ; and these are such as enter through the
body ; but that others pertain to the soul alone, if
it is necessary that the soul should be something,
and that there is a certain nature and work of it
If, however, this he the case, and it desires, and
remembers its desire, it will also remember the
attainment, or non-attainment of the object of its
desire, since its nature does not rank among things
of a flowing condition. For if this is not admitted,
we must neither grant that it has a co~ sensation,
nor a power of following the conceptions of intel¬
lect, nor a certain conspiration, and as it were con¬
sciousness of itself. For unless the soul naturally
possessed these things, it would not obtain them
through its union with the body ; but it would in¬
deed have certain energies, the works of which
wmuld require the assistance of corporeal organs ;
and of some things it would bring with itself the
powers ; but of others it wmuld also bring the ener¬
gies. With respect to memory, however, the body
is an impediment to it ; since even now also oblL
vion is produced from the addition of certain things ;
but through ablation and purification, memory fre¬
quently emerges. When the soul, therefore, is
alone, it is necessary that the moveable and flowing
nature of the body, should be the cause of oblivion
and not of memory. Hence, also, body may he
understood to be the river of Lethe. Let, there¬
fore, this passion [i. e. memory] belong to the soul.
XXV II. To what soul, however, does memory
pertain ? Does it belong to that more divine sou!
Plot . £ B
according to which we subsist, or to the other
which we derive from the universe ? May wre not
say, that memory pertains to each of these ; but
that one kind of memory is peculiar, and another
common ? and that when they are conjoined, all
the species of memory subsist at once ; but that
when they are separated, if both should exist and
remain, each soul will preserve for a long time the
remembrance of things pertaining to itself, but for
a short time the recollection of things foreign to its
nature ? The image, therefore, of Hercules, is in
Hades.1 For it appears to me requisite to think,
that this image has a recollection of every thing
that has been transacted in life. lor to this image
life especially pertained. Other souls, however,
being both these together, have nothing more to say
than what pertains to this life, and in consequence
of being the composite of soul and body, know the
concerns of the present state of existence, or besides
this, something belonging to justice. But we have
not yet shown what Hercules himself, who is with¬
out the image, will say. What, therefore, will the
other soul say that is liberated and alone ? For the