is employed by her here, in consequence of her
being involved in doubt and filled with care, through
which she becomes debilitated in a greater degree ?
For through a diminution of intellect, she requires
the discursive energy of reason in order to be suffi¬
cient to herself; just as reasoning is requisite in
the arts, through the artists being involved in
doubts. But when there is no difficulty, then art
subdues [its subject matter] and operates. If,
however, souls live in the intelligible world without
reasoning, how can they be any longer rational?
In answer to this, it may be said, that they are still
rational, because they are able to employ a reason¬
ing process whenever circumstances render it ne¬
cessary. It is necessary, however, to assume a
ratiocination of this kind ; since if some one should
consider the discursive energy of reason as a dispo¬
sition always subsisting from intellect in souls, and
a stable energy which is as it were an evolution of
intellectual light, and if in the intelligible souls also
use the reasoning power, yet as it appears to me,
we must not think that voice is employed by them
there, so -long as they entirely subsist in the intel¬
ligible world. But when they have bodies in the
heavens, theydo not use the dialect which they em¬
ploy here through indigence or ambiguity ; but
performing every thing in an orderly manner, and
according to nature, they neither command any
thing to be done, nor consult about it. They also
mutually know the objects of their knowledge
through a consciousness of perception ; since even
here likewise we know many things through the
eyes, pertaining to those that are silent. There ,
however, every body is pure , and each inhabitant is
as it were an eye . Nothing likewise is there con¬
cealed, or fictitious, but before one can speak to
another, the latter knows what the former intended
to say. But there is no absurdity in admitting that
daemons and souls that dwell in the air use voice ;
for such as these are animals.
XIX. Shall we however say that the impartible
and partible, are to b& considered according to the
same thing [in the soul,] as if they were mingled to¬
gether; or that the impartible is to be assumed
according to one thing, but the partible as some·?
thing successive, and another part of the soul?
Just as we say the rational part is one thing, but
the irrational another. This, however, will be
known, when w'e have explained what we say each
of these is. The impartible, therefore, is simply as¬
sumed by Plato, but the partible not simply ; [for
he says that the soul is a medium between an
essence impartible] and an essence which is divi¬
sible about bodies, and that the soul is not on this
account generated. It is requisite, therefore, to
consider after what manner the nature of body is
indigent of soul for the purposes of living ; and to
see that it is necessary the soul should every where
be present with the body, and also with the whole
of it. Every sensitive power indeed, if it perceives
through the whole body, arrives at the whole by
being divided. For being every where in the body,
it may be said to be divided ; but appearing every
where a whole, it may be said that it is not entirely
distributed into parts ; but that it becomes partible
about bodies. If, however, some one should say
that the soul is not divided in the other senses, but
in the touch alone, to this we reply, that the soul is
also divided in the other senses, since it is the body
which receives it, but that it is less divided than in
the touch. The physical and augmentative powers
also of the soul, are divided in a similar manner.
And if desire dwells about the liver, but anger
about the heart, the same thing must also be assert*
ed of these. Perhaps however, these were not as¬
sumed in that mixture ; or perhaps they were as¬
sumed, but after another manner, and these were
produced from some one of the assumed parti¬
culars. But the reasoning power and intellect,
do not give themselves to body ; for their work is
not effected through corporeal instruments ; since
these are an impediment when they are employed
in contemplations. Hence the impartible is diffe¬
rent from the partible, and they are not mingled as
one thing, but as a whole consisting of parts, each
of which is pure, and separate in power. If, how»
ever, that which becomes partible about bodies^
has the impartible from a more sublime power, this
very same thing may be both impartible and parti-
ble, as being mingled from the partible, and the
power which proceeds into it from on high.
XX. It is requisite, however, to consider whe¬
ther these, and what are called the other parts of
the soul are in place, or these in short are not, but
the other parts are,, and if they are where they are^
or whether none of them is in place. For if we do
not assign a certain place to the several parts of the
soul, but admit that each of them is no where, and
thus make them to be no more within, than without
the body, we shall render the body inanimate, and
shall not be able to show how those works are
effected which are performed through the corporeal
organs. Or if we admit that some of the parts of
the soul are in place, but others not, we shall not
appear to grant those parts to be in us which we
exclude from place, so that neither shall we admit
that the whole of our soul is in us. In short, there*
fore, we must neither assert that any one of the
parts of the soul, nor that the whole of it is in body.
For place is that which comprehends, and is com·
prehensive of body ; and where each thing is that
is divided, there it is situated in such a way that
the whole is not in any thing indiscriminately.
Soul, however, is not body, and is not rather that
which is comprehended than that which compre¬
hends. Nor yet is it in body as in a vessel ; for if
it were, the body would become inanimate, whe¬
ther it comprehended the soul as a vessel, "or as
place ; unless it should be said that the soul is col¬
lected in itself, and by a certain distribution trans¬
mits something of itself into its vessel the body,
and thus as much as the vessel participates* so
much will be taken away from the soul. Place*
however, properly so called* is incorporeal, and not
body. So that in what will it be indigent of soul ?
Body also, not by itself, but by the boundary of
itself, will approximate to soul. Many other ob-
jections, likewise, may be urged against him who
asserts that soul is in place. For place will always
be co-introduced with soul ; and [it may still be
asked] what will that be which introduces together
with itself place ? If place also is interval, much
less will soul be in the body as in place. For it is
necessary, that interval should be a vacuum.
Body, however, is not a vacuum, but perhaps that
will be a vacuum in which body is ; so that body
will be in a vacuum. Moreover, neither will soul
be in the body as in a subject. For that which is
in a subject, is a passion of that in which it is, as
colour and figure. But soul is separable from the
body. Nor yet, is soul ip the body, as a part in
the whole : for soul is not a part of the body. But
if some one should say that soul is a part as in the
whole animal, in the first place indeed, the same
doubt will remain how it is in the whole. For it
is not proper to conceive that it subsists either as
Plot. 2 A
.wine in a vessel of wine, or as a vessel in a vessel y
nor in the same manner as a thing is in itself. Nor
again, will it be in body as a whole in the parts.
For it is ridiculous to say that the soul is a whole;
but the body parts. Neither is it as form in
matter : for the form which is in matter, is inse¬
parable from matter. And matter now existing,
form afterwards accedes to it. But soul produces
the form in matter, being itself something different
from material form. If, however, it should be said
that soul is not a generated, but a separate form, it
will not yet be manifest how this form is in body ;
and soul will be separate from body. How then
is it said by all men, that the soul is in the body ?
Shall wre say it is because not the soul but the body
is visible ? Perceiving therefore the body, and con¬
ceiving it to be animated because it is moved and
has sensible perception, we say that the body has
the soul. Hence, therefore, we say that the soul
is in the body. If, however, the soul were visible
and sensible, so as to be perceived to be full of life*
to comprehend entirely the body in life, and to ex¬
tend itself equally to the extremities of it, we should
no longer say that the soul is in the body, but that
in the more principal nature that which is not such
subsists, in that which contains, the thing contained, and that which flows in that which does not flow*
XXI. What then shall we say, if some one
should ask us how the soul is present with the
body, without giving us any information himself on
the subject ? And also if he should ask us whether
the whole soul is similarly present, or a different
part is differently present with the body ? Since,
therefore, none of the above-mentioned modes of
the subsistence of one thing in another1 is adapted
to the subsistence of the soul in the body ; but the
soul is said to be in the body in such a way as the
pilot in a ship, this is well said so far as pertains to
the power by which the soul is able to separate
itself from the body ; yet it does not entirely exhi¬
bit to us the mode which we are now investigating.
For the pilot, so far as he is a sailor, will be from
accident a pilot in the ship. But if the soul is
present with the body in the same manner as the
pilot alone with the ship, how is this effected ? For
the pilot is not in all the ship, in the same manner as the soul is in all the body. Shall we, therefore,
I · . * J 1 V ’■ · * ’ *
* And these modes are enumerated by Aristotle in his Physics. ’
say, that the soul is in the body, in the same way
as art is in the instruments of art ? For instance, as
aft in the rudder, if the rudder was animated, so
that the piloting art is within it, moving it artifi¬
cially. Now, however, there is this difference be¬
tween the two, that art operates externally. If*
therefore, we admit that the soul is in the body,
Conformably to the paradigm of the pilot within the
rudder, as in a natural instrument ; for he thus
will move it, in whatever he wishes to effect ; shall
we make any accession to the object of our investi¬
gation ? Or shall we again be dubious how the soul
is in the instrument ? And though this mode is dif¬
ferent from the former modes, yet we still desire to
discover [something farther], and to accede still
nearer to the thing proposed*
XXII. Shall we therefore say, that when the
soul is present with the body, it is present in the
same manner as light is with the air ? For again,
this when present is [in reality] not present. And
being present through the whole, is mingled with
bo part of it. It is also itself permanent, but the
air flows by it. And when the air becomes situated
out of that in which there is light, it departs po§-
messing nothing luminous ; but as long as it is
under the light, it is illuminated. Hence, here
also, it may be rightly said, that air is in light,
rather'than light in air. On this account, likewise,
Plato [in the Timceus] does not place soul in the
body of the universe, but the body of the universe
in soul. And he says, that there is something of
soul in which body is contained, and also some»
thing in which there is nothing of body ; meaning
by the latter those powers of the soul, of which the
body is not indigent. The same thing, likewise,
must be said of other souls. Hence, we must
assert, that the other powers of the soul are not
present with the body ; but that those powers are
present with it of which it is indigent ; and that
they are present, without being established either
in the parts, or in the whole of the body. W e
must also say, that for the purpose of sensation in¬
deed, the sensitive power is present with the w hole
of the sentient [organ] ; but that with respect to
energies, a different energy is present with a dif¬
ferent part of the body. But my meaning is as
follows :