* It appears from the version of Ficinus, that the word στήριγμα is wanting in this place in the original.
becoming entirely partible. Of this kind are
colours, and all qualities, and each morphe , which
is capable of being wholly at one and the same time
in many things, that are separated from each other,
and wThich has no part suffering the same thing
with another part. Hence this must be admitted
to be in every respect partible.
Again, besides the nature which is perfectly in¬ divisible, there is another essence proximately sus-
pended from it, and· which has indeed from it the
impartible, but by a progression from thence, hast¬
ening to another nature, is established in the middle
of both ; viz. in the middle of that which is impar¬
tible and primary, and that which is divisible about
bodies, and is inherent in bodies. This nature
does not subsist after the same manner as colour
and every quality, which are indeed every where
the same in many masses of bodies, yet the quality
which is in one mass, is entirely separate from the
quality in another, so far as one mass is also sepa¬
rate from another. And though the magnitude
should be one, yet that which is the same in each
part, has no communion whatever so as to produce
co-passivity, because this sameness is at the same
time attended with [a predominant] difference.
For the sameness is passion, and is not itself also
essence. That, however, in this middle nature
which accedes to an impartible essence, is itself
essence, and is ingenerated in bodies, about which
also it happens to be divided ; yet it does not
suffer this,' till it gives itself to bodies. When,
therefore, it is inherent in bodies, though it should
be inherent in the greatest body, and which is
every where most extended, yet though it gives
itself to the whole, it does not depart from the
unity of its nature. Yet it is not one in the same
manner as body. For body is one by continuity,
bpt one part of it is different from another, and is
situated in a different place. Nor again is it one,
in the same manner as one quality. The nature,
however, which is at once partible and impartible,
and which we say is soul, is not one like that which
is continued, having another and another part ; but
it is partible indeed, because it is in all the parts
of that in which it subsists ; and impartible, be¬
cause the whole of it is in all the parts, and like¬
wise in each of the parts. He, therefore, who per¬
ceives this, and beholds the power of it, will know
what a divine and admirable thing soul is, and that
it possesses a supernatural essence; not indeed
having magnitude, but being present with all mag¬
nitude, and existing in this place, and again not
existing in it, and this not by a different, but the
same nature. So that it is divided into parts, and
again not divided ; or rather, it is neither divided,
nor generated divisible. For it remains with itself
a whole. But it is divided about bodies, because
bodies in consequence of their proper partibility,
are not able to receive it impartibly. So that the
distribution into parts, is the passion of bodies, and
not of soul.
II. That it is necessary, however, that the nature
of soul should be a thing of this kind, and that it is
not possible for soul to be any tiling besides this,
being neither alone impartible, nor alone partible,
but that it is necessarily after this manner both
these, is manifest from the following considerations.
For if it was like bodies having another and another
part, when one part suffered, another part would
not be sensible of the suffering, but that soul for
instance, which is in the finger, would have a sen¬
sation of the passion, as being different, and sub¬
sisting in itself. And, in short, there would be
many souls, governing each of us. One soul, like-
wise, would not govern this universe, but an infi¬
nite number of souls separate from each other*
For with respect to what is said about continuity,
unless it contributes to unity, it is introduced in
vain. For that which is asserted by some who
deceive themselves, is not to be admitted, viz. that
the senses gradually arrive at the ruling part, by a
continued succession.1 In the first place, there¬
fore, to say that the senses arrive at the ruling part
of the soul, is said without examination. For how
do they divide, and assert this to be one thing, but
that another, and the ruling part something else ?
By how much quantity, also, do they divide each
of these ; or by what difference, the quality being
one, and the bulk continued ? Whether, likewise,
is the ruling part alone sentient, or have the other
parts also a sensible perception ? And if this is the
case with the ruling part alone, it will then per¬
ceive, when the sensible passion falls on this part
established in a certain place ; but if it falls on
another part of the soul, which is not naturally
adapted to be sentient, this part will not deliver
* For &ι.αΒοσει here, it is necessary to read, conformably to the version of Ficinus, δια £οχ[/»
the same passion to the ruling part, nor, in short,
will there be sensation. If, also, the sensible pas¬
sion falls on the ruling part, it will either fall on a
part of it, and this being sentient, the remaining
parts will no longer be sensitive ; for it would be
in vain ; or there will be many and infinite sensible
perceptions, and all of them will be dissimilar.
Hence, one sensible perception will say, I prima¬
rily suffer, but another will say, I perceive the
passion of another sense. Each sensation, like¬
wise, except the first, will be ignorant where the
passion was generated. Or each part of the soul
will be deceived, fancying that the passion was
there generated, w here it is. If, however, not only
the ruling part, but any other part has a sensible
perception, why will this part be the leader, but
another part not ? Or why is it necessary that sen-
sation should arrive at the ruling part ? How, like¬
wise, will the sensations arising from many senses,
such as the ears and eyes, know one particular
thing ? But again, if the soul is entirely one, so as
to be perfectly impartible, and one in itself ; and if
it entirely flies from the nature of multitude and
partibility, no body which may participate of the
soul, will be wholly animated ; but the soul esta¬
blishing itself as it were about the centre of each,
will leave all the bulk of the animal without anima¬
tion. Hence it is necessary that soul should be
thus one and many, partible and at the same time
impartible : and we ought not to disbelieve that it
is impossible for one and the same thing to be in
many places at once. For if we do not admit
this, there will not be a nature which connects and
governs all things ; and which at once comprehends
all things, and conducts them by wisdom. And
this nature is indeed multitude, because beings are
many ; but it is also one, in order that the nature
which comprehends may be one. By its multitu¬
dinous one, therefore, it supplies all the parts of
body with life ; but by its impartible one it con¬
ducts all things wisely. In those things, however,
which are deprived of wisdom, that which is the
leading one imitates this one of the soul. Hence,
this is the meaning of what is divinely though ob¬
scurely asserted by Plato, viz. that from an essence
impartible and always subsisting according to same¬
ness, and from an essence divisible about bodies,
the Demiurgus mingled a third species of essence
from both.1 Soul, therefore, is after this manner
.one and many ; but the forms in bodies are many
and one ; bodies are many only ; and that which
is supreme is one alone.
1 See my Introduction to, and translation of, the Timaeus of Plato.
Discussion of Doubts
Relative to
THE SOUL.
1. Is it necessary to consider such doubts as
pertain to the soul as sufficiently solved ; or shall
we say that the doubts themselves are accompanied
with this gain, that to know the difficulty with
which they are attended, will be a right discussion
of the affair ? For what can any one reasonably
more abundantly consider and discuss than this ;
both on many other accounts, and also because it
contributes to the knowledge of those things of
which it is the principle, and of those from which
it is derived ? By so doing, likewise, we shall com¬
ply with the mandate of the God who calls upon
us to know ourselves. And since we wish to in¬
vestigate and discover other things, it is but just to
enquire what this is which investigates, especially
since we desire to apprehend that which is lovely
in the objects of contemplation. For in every
intellect there is that which is twofold ; 1 so that in
partial intellects it is reasonable to admit that one
has [the intelligible] in a greater, but another in a
less degree. It is likewise requisite to consider,
how souls become the receptacles of the Gods *
but this, indeed, we shall discuss when we investi¬
gate how soul subsists in body. Now, therefore,
again, let us return to those who assert that our
souls also are derived from the soul of the universe.
For perhaps they will say it is not sufficient [in
order to establish this hypothesis,] that our souls
extend as far as the soul of the universe, nor that
they are similarly intellectual with it ; since parts
are of a similar species with their wholes. They
will, likewise, adduce Plato % as the patron of this
opinion, when proving that the universe is animated,
he says : a As our body is a part of the body of
the universe, thus also our soul is a part of the
soul of the universe.** This, too, is confirmed by
the assertion, that we follow the circulation of the
* viz. The intelligible and the intellectual,
% See his Philebus and Timaeus.
universe. And it is clearly asserted and demon»
strated that our manners and fortunes are thence
derived ; and that as we are generated within the
world, we receive our soul from the universe in
which we are comprehended. Farther still, as
each part of us partakes of our soul, so likewise
w?e for the same reason, since we have the relation
of parts to the whole, participate as parts of the
soul of the universe. The assertion [of Plato ’]
likewise; that every soul pays a guardian attention
to every thing inanimate, has the same signification,
and does not leave any thing else externally of
soul, after the soul of the universe. For it is this
soul which pays attention to every thing inanimate.
II. In answer to these things, therefore, in the
first place it must be said, that those who admit
souls to be of a similar species, because it is granted
that they come into contact with the same things,
and ascribe to them a common genus, exclude
them from ranking as parts of one soul, and will
rather make one and the same soul, and each to be
every soul. But making one soul, they will also
8 In the Phaedru-s.
Plot.
suspend it from something else, which no longer
being something pertaining to this thing or that,
but neither belonging to the world, or to any other
thing, will effect the very same thing, as is effected
by [the life] of the world, and of any animated being
whatever. For it rightly happens that not every
soul is something belonging to another thing, since
soul is an essence ; but that there should be a cer¬
tain soul which is wholly exempt from a subordi¬
nate nature ; and that such souls as belong to
something else, are from accident at certain times
connected with that which is inferior to themselves.
Perhaps, however, it is necessary to show more
clearly how a part in such souls is to be considered.
Part, therefore, belonging to bodies, whether the
body is of the same or of a different species, must
be dismissed ; observing thus much alone, that
when part is asserted of bodies consisting of similar
parts, the part is according to bulk, and not accord¬
ing to form ; such for instance as whiteness. For
the whiteness which is in a part of milk, is not a
part of the whiteness of all the milk ; but it is the
whiteness indeed of a part, and not a part of the
whiteness. For whiteness is entirely without mag¬
nitude, and is void of quantity. This, therefore,
thus subsists. When, however, in things which
are not bodies we speak of a part, we either assume
it in such a way as in numbers, as when we say
that two is a part of ten ; (but let this be consi¬
dered as asserted in mere numbers alone) or as
when we speak of the part of a circle and a line ;
or as a theorem is a part of science. In monads
and figures, indeed, it is necessary in the same
manner as in bodies, that the whole should be
diminished, by a division into parts, and that the
several parts should be less than the wholes [of
which they are the parts.] For being quantities,
and having their existence in quantity, and also not
being the same quantity, they necessarily become
greater and less. A part, therefore, cannot after
this manner be asserted of soul. For it is not
quantity in such a -way as the decad is the whole,
but the monad a part of the decad. Many other
absurdities also will happen [from admitting that
the soul is quantity] ; nor are ten things one certain
thing. Either, likewise, each of the monads will
be soul, or soul will consist of all inanimate things.
Besides, the part of the whole soul is admitted to
be oi the same kind with the whole ; but it is not
necessary in continued quantity, that the part
should he such as the whole. Thus, for instance,
the parts of a circle are not of the same species
with the circle, nor the parts of a triangle with the
triangle ; at least, all the parts in these, in w hich a
part may be assumed, are not similar [to the whole.]
For all the parts of a triangle are not triangles ;
[and so in other figures] but there will be a differ¬
ence between the form of some of the parts and
and that of the w hole. Soul, however, is acknow¬
ledged to be of a similar form. In a line, likewise,
a part of it is still a line, but here also there is a
difference in magnitude. Butin soul, if the differ¬
ence between that soul which is partial, and that
which ranks as a whole, should be considered as a
difference in magnitude, soul wrould be a certain
quantity and a body ; since in this case, it would
receive the difference so far as it is soul, from
quantity. All souls, however, are admitted to be
similar and wholes. It appears, likewise, that
neither is soul divided after the same manner as
magnitudes ; nor do even our opponents admit that
the w hole of the soul can be divided into parts ;
since if this were the case, the w hole would be de¬
stroyed. And unless the first soul was every soul,
it would be a name alone ; just as if it should be
said, when wine is distributed into many amphorae,
that the portion of it in each amphora, is a part of
the whole wine. Shall we say, therefore, that part
is to be assumed in the soul, in the same manner
as a theorem is a part of science ? the whole
science, indeed, nevertheless remaining ; but the
separation into parts, being as it w^ere the utterance
and energy of each. In a thing of this kind, how¬
ever, each possesses the w hole science in capacity,
but the whole nevertheless continues to be the
whole. If, therefore, a part in the whole soul and
other souls is to be thus assumed, the whole soul,
of which things of this kind are parts, will not be
the soul of a certain thing, but will itself subsist
from itself. Neither, therefore, will it be the soul
of the world, but will be a certain soul, and will
rank among those that are of a partial nature :
hence all the parts being of a similar species, are
the parts of one soul. But how is one the soul of
the world, and another the soul of a part of the
world ?
III. Are parts, therefore, so to be assumed, as
if some one should say, that the soul which is in
the finger of a certain animal, is a part of the
whole soul which is in the whole animal ? This
assertion, however, either leaves no soul indepen¬
dent of body, or admits every soul not to be in
body, and contends that what is called the soul of
the universe is external to the body of the world.
But this must be considered ; and now must be
investigated by an image. For if the soul of the
universe imparts itself to all partial animals, and
thus each soul is a part [of the whole soul] ; for if
this soul were divided, it would not impart itself to
each ; in this case, in consequence of imparting
itself wholly, it will be every where the same, being
one and the same at once in many animals. After
this manner, however, one soul will no longer rank
as a whole, and another as a part, and especially
in those things in w^hich the same powder is present.
For where the employment of one thing is different
from the employment of another, as in the eyes and
ears, there it must not be said that one part of the
soul is present to the sight, and another to the ears,
(for such a division as this belongs to other things)
but the same part, though a different power ener¬
gizes in each. For all the powers of the soul are
in both the parts ; but the apprehensions are dif¬
ferent in consequence of the organs being different.
Nevertheless, all the powers rank among forms,
and are reduced to a form which is capable of
being fashioned according to all things. This is
evident from the necessity that all things should
arrive at one thing, [and concur in it] ; but the
nature of the instruments through which the con¬
currence is effected, is not able to receive all
things, and the passions become different in the
different instruments of sensation. The judgment,
however, is from the same thing, as from a judge
directing his attention to what is said and done.
But it has been shown, that it is every where one
thing which energizes in different actions. And if
the apprehensions are as sensations, it is not possi¬
ble for each of the senses to understand, but the
whole soul. But if intelligence is appropriate, each
intellectual perception subsists through itself. And
when the soul is rational, and is rational in such a
way as to be denominated wholly so, then that
which is called a part is the same with the whole,
and is not a part of it.
IV. What, therefore, shall wre say, if it is thus
one, when any one inquires, in the first place
doubting, whether soul can after this manner be at
once one in all things ? And in the next place,
when one soul is in body, but another not, [how
this takes place ?] For perhaps it follows that every
soul is always in body, and especially the soul of
the universe. For this soul does not, as ours is
said to do, leave the body ; though some say that
even this soul abandons its body, and yet is not
entirely out of the body. But if the soul of the
universe is entirely out of the body, how is it that
one soul leaves the body, but another does not,
though both are [essentially] the same ? In intel¬
lect, therefore, which is separated from itself by
difference, according to parts especially distin¬
guished from each other, but which always subsist
together at once, the essence of intellect being im¬
partible, no such doubt can arise. But in the soul
which is said to be divisible about bodies, how this
which is one certain thing can be all souls, is at¬
tended with many doubts ; unless that which is one
is established in itself, without falling into body,
and afterwards all souls proceed from it, both the
soul of the universe, and others to a certain extent ;
existing as it were together with it, and being one
in consequence of not belonging to any thing else
[i. e. of not being consubsistent with something of